Abstract The article proposes a methodology for the construction and operation of a novel optical system for the numerical and experimental study of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. The system makes it possible to simulate and experimentally implement various attacks on well-known QKD protocols in the plug-and-play mode. The distinctive feature of the system is that it uses only standard laboratory instruments, such as general-purpose diode lasers and photodiode detectors. This makes it allows for demonstrating the operation of the QKD system without the need to deploy an expensive and technically complex full-fledged QKD system in the truly quantum mode. Such a paradigm appears useful for various studies of QKD systems in the context of their intensive development. First, this is associated with the growing need for the numerical simulation of QKD systems for research purposes. Second, the experimental implementation of the proposed approach is necessary for the practical demonstration of the functioning of QKD systems, in particular, in the training of specialists in the field of quantum encryption. At the same time, the analogues currently existing make it possible for researchers to reproduce experimentally only the simplest attacks of an eavesdropper (Eve) on QKD protocols, such as intercept-and-resend attacks. With their aid it is also possible to simulate numerically a wide range of attacks, but using rather sophisticated design systems. In contrast to this, the proposed system allows attacks to be reproduced both numerically and experimentally, ranging from the simplest to technically complex attacks, such as the photon–number-splitting (PNS) ones, for use in the plug-and-play mode.
Abstract The article proposes a methodology for the construction and operation of a novel optical system for the numerical and experimental study of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. The system makes it possible to simulate and experimentally implement various attacks on well-known QKD protocols in the plug-and-play mode. The distinctive feature of the system is that it uses only standard laboratory instruments, such as general-purpose diode lasers and photodiode detectors. This makes it allows for demonstrating the operation of the QKD system without the need to deploy an expensive and technically complex full-fledged QKD system in the truly quantum mode. Such a paradigm appears useful for various studies of QKD systems in the context of their intensive development. First, this is associated with the growing need for the numerical simulation of QKD systems for research purposes. Second, the experimental implementation of the proposed approach is necessary for the practical demonstration of the functioning of QKD systems, in particular, in the training of specialists in the field of quantum encryption. At the same time, the analogues currently existing make it possible for researchers to reproduce experimentally only the simplest attacks of an eavesdropper (Eve) on QKD protocols, such as intercept-and-resend attacks. With their aid it is also possible to simulate numerically a wide range of attacks, but using rather sophisticated design systems. In contrast to this, the proposed system allows attacks to be reproduced both numerically and experimentally, ranging from the simplest to technically complex attacks, such as the photon–number-splitting (PNS) ones, for use in the plug-and-play mode.
In this paper, we propose and test a scheme of a novel optical system for the numerical and experimental study of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, as well as various attacks on the implementation of known protocols in a plug-and-play mode. Moreover, the system exploits the standard laboratory tools such as general purpose diode lasers and photodiode detectors. This allows to perform QKD demonstration without need for deploying an expensive and technically complex actual QKD system. Such a paradigm seems to be useful in the context of intensive developing of QKD systems for research purposes Firstly, it is linked to the emerging need in numerical simulation of QKD systems for research purposes. In turn, the experimental realization of such an approach is essential for practical demonstration of QKD systems as well as training the specialists in the field of quantum ciphering. Moreover, the currently available systems only allow researchers to experimentally reproduce the simplest eavesdropper (Eve) attacks on QKD protocols, such as the intercept-and-resend attacks. They can also only numerically simulate a wide range of attacks, but using enough sophisticated systems. In contrast, the suggested system allows for both numerical and experimental replication of attacks ranging from simple ones to technically challenging PNS-like ones in a simple plug-and-play manner.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a potential defense against future quantum attacks that can break traditional encryption algorithms, such as RSA and ECC. The current work is based on the development of the BB84 protocol with the features of utilizing quantum mechanics and eavesdropping detection through signal disturbance. A simulation of the BB84 protocol was built using polarization encoding over a 10 km single-mode optical fiber using OptiSystem software. The system consists of standard telecom equipment, such as a continuous wave laser at a frequency of 193.1 THz, polarization controllers, and single-photon detectors. Both secure and insecure cases were simulated, where an attacker (Eve) had used an intercept-resend attack. The outcome showed significant Bit Error Rate (BER) and Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) increases during attacks, thus proving the protocol's vulnerability to interference. In addition, a special intrusion detection system based on BER was used to identify such anomalies in real-time. The simulation illustrates the feasibility of using QKD in today's optical networks to secure communications.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an innovative technology, which exploits the laws of quantum mechanics to generate and distribute unconditionally secure shared cryptographic keying material between two geographically separated parties. The unique nature of QKD that ensures eavesdropping on the key distribution channel necessarily introduces detectable errors and shows promise for high-security environments, such as banking, government, and military. However, QKD systems are vulnerable to advanced theoretical and experimental attacks. In this paper, the photon number splitting (PNS) attack is studied in a specialized QKD modeling and simulation framework. First, a detailed treatment of the PNS attack is provided with emphasis on practical considerations, such as performance limitations and realistic sources of error. Second, ideal and non-ideal variations of the PNS attack are studied to measure the eavesdropper's information gain on the QKD-generated secret key bits and examine the detectability of PNS attacks with respect to both quantum bit error rate and the decoy state protocol. Finally, this paper provides a repeatable methodology for efficiently studying advanced attacks, both realized and notional, against QKD systems and more generally quantum communication protocols.
Abstract The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a well-researched secure communication method for exchanging cryptographic keys only known by the shared participants. The vulnerable problem of a secret key distribution is the negotiation and the transfer over an insecure or untrusted channel. Novel further developments of the QKD communication method are part of in-field technologies and applications in communication devices, such as satellites. However, expensive physical test setups are necessary to improve new application possibilities of cryptographic protocol involving components of quantum mechanics and quantum laws of physics. Therefore, optical simulation software can play a part in essential QKD simulating and further developing quantum-based cryptosystems. In the paper, the authors consider a feasible QKD setup based on the BB84 protocol to create a symmetric key material based on achieving a linear key rate via optical simulation software. The paper still provides two experimental architecture designs to use the QKD for a cryptosystem.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is an emerging cybersecurity technology that exploits the laws of quantum mechanics to generate unconditionally secure symmetric cryptographic keying material. The unique nature of QKD shows promise for high-security environments such as those found in banking, government, and the military. However, QKD systems often have implementation non-idealities that can negatively impact their performance and security. This article describes the development of a system-level model designed to study implementation non-idealities in commercially available decoy state enabled QKD systems. Specifically, this paper provides a detailed discussion of the decoy state protocol, its implementation, and its usage to detect sophisticated attacks, such as the photon number splitting attack. In addition, this work suggests an efficient and repeatable systems engineering methodology for understanding and studying communications protocols, architectures, operational configurations, and implementation tradeoffs in complex cyber systems.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a technology that allows two users to communicate with theoretically perfect security using standard optical fibres. This is possible by transmitting the key on single photons, meaning a measurement by an eavesdropper disturbs the system in a way observable to the legitimate parties. The technology has advanced since the first protocol proposed in 1984, to the stage where there are now many protocols that can be experimentally implemented. These protocols have allowed secure keys to be generated over distances greater than 400 km and with secure key rates over 10 Mbit/s. In a metropolitan QKD network, it would be desirable for as many users to be connected as possible. Unfortunately, each protocol comes with different requirements on the transmitter and receiver. Even within a single protocol, different clock rates can require individualised transmitter and receiver hardware. This prohibits users from communicating with all receivers, unless they have complex transmitters with hardware for many protocols. This thesis develops a transmitter for practical QKD that is able to adapt to a number of different protocols with no changes to the hardware. The transmitter works using optical injection locking, where a pulse preparation laser adopts the phase of a phase preparation laser. Controlling the phase and intensity of the pulses in this way removes the side channel ordinarily present with direct modulation, in that the phase, intensity and frequency simultaneously change in response to an applied current. The cavity-enhanced electro-optic effect allows for the first demonstration of sub-volt half-wave phase modulation at high clock rates. The transmitter successfully demonstrates phase encoding, intensity encoding and on-demand phase randomisation. This allows for the experimental realisation and direct comparison of different QKD protocols, including one that has never before been implemented due to experimental complexity. A stable intensity modulator is also developed, based on a Sagnac interferometer. This removes a side channel in QKD systems and integrates well with the directly-modulated quantum transmitter. This development also means that the transmitter can implement all current two-party QKD protocols based on weak coherent pulses. The transmitter has the potential to become the standard transmitter for future quantum communication networks due to its stability, versatility and power efficiency. The design could also be demonstrated on a photonic chip, making it compact enough to fit in small transmitter units.