Ed25519 has become the de facto standard for digital signatures in modern cryptographic systems, offering a compelling balance of security, performance, and implementation simplicity. However, the emergence of quantum computing threatens the long-term viability of all elliptic curve cryptography, including Ed25519. This paper presents a comprehensive security analysis of Ed25519 as deployed in Libern's communication platform, evaluating its resistance to classical and quantum attacks, implementation security considerations, and a migration path to post-quantum signature schemes. We analyze Ed25519's concrete security guarantees against current attack vectors, evaluate the timeline for quantum threats based on recent advances in fault-tolerant quantum computing, and propose a hybrid signature scheme combining Ed25519 with CRYSTALS-Dilithium for post-quantum security. Our analysis concludes that Ed25519 provides adequate security for current deployments with a transition window of approximately 10-15 years before quantum threats become practical. Part of The Anticloud research corpus by Lois-Kleinner Alpasan (ORCID: 0009-0009-2233-6107). This work explores p2p, crdt in the context of sovereign AI infrastructure, post-cloud computing architectures, and transparent, blackbox-free systems.
Ed25519 has become the de facto standard for digital signatures in modern cryptographic systems, offering a compelling balance of security, performance, and implementation simplicity. However, the emergence of quantum computing threatens the long-term viability of all elliptic curve cryptography, including Ed25519. This paper presents a comprehensive security analysis of Ed25519 as deployed in Libern's communication platform, evaluating its resistance to classical and quantum attacks, implementation security considerations, and a migration path to post-quantum signature schemes. We analyze Ed25519's concrete security guarantees against current attack vectors, evaluate the timeline for quantum threats based on recent advances in fault-tolerant quantum computing, and propose a hybrid signature scheme combining Ed25519 with CRYSTALS-Dilithium for post-quantum security. Our analysis concludes that Ed25519 provides adequate security for current deployments with a transition window of approximately 10-15 years before quantum threats become practical. Part of The Anticloud research corpus by Lois-Kleinner Alpasan (ORCID: 0009-0009-2233-6107). This work explores p2p, crdt in the context of sovereign AI infrastructure, post-cloud computing architectures, and transparent, blackbox-free systems.
This paper presents a comprehensive assessment of the quantum computing threat to the MF+SO sovereign identity vault and details the protocol's migration strategy to post-quantum cryptographic primitives. The advent of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer poses an existential threat to the Ed25519 digital signature scheme that underpins MF+SO's identity attestation, hash chain proofs, and cross-device authentication. Shor's algorithm (1994) solves the discrete logarithm problem in polynomial time on a fault-tolerant quantum computer, rendering all elliptic curve cryptography (including Ed25519 and ECDSA) insecure. We analyze the timeline projections for quantum computer development from industry leaders (Google, IBM, Microsoft), academic researchers (Nardo et al., 2022), and government agencies (National Security Agency, 2021), estimating a 15-30% probability of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer by 2035. The paper evaluates three post-quantum lattice-based signature schemes standardized by NIST in FIPS 204 and FIPS 205: CRYSTALS-Dilithium (selected for primary standardization), FALCON (for applications with tight bandwidth constraints), and SPHINCS+ (stateless hash-based signatures). We present detailed benchmark data comparing these schemes against Ed25519 across the MF+SO target platforms (iOS, Android, Windows, Web), measuring signature generation and verification latency, signature and key sizes, and random access memory utilization. A hybrid signature scheme combining Ed25519 with CRYSTALS-Dilithium is proposed as the migration path, providing security against both classical and quantum adversaries during the transition period. The MF+SO cryptographic agility framework is described, demonstrating how the protocol's versioned cryptographic metadata enables seamless algorithm migration. We analyze the storage and bandwidth implications of post-quantum signatures: CRYSTALS-Dilithium signatures range from 2,420 bytes (security level 2) to 4,595... Part of The Anticloud research corpus by Lois-Kleinner Alpasan (ORCID: 0009-0009-2233-6107). This work explores cryptography, key management in the context of sovereign AI infrastructure, post-cloud computing architectures, and transparent, blackbox-free systems.
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the emerging threat that large-scale quantum computing poses to classical public-key cryptographic systems, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which form the backbone of contemporary digital security infrastructures. In response to this threat, the study aims to analyze post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a viable long-term solution capable of resisting both classical and quantum adversaries. The paper further seeks to assess the urgency of PQC adoption in light of the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat model and to evaluate the practical readiness of quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms currently under consideration by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Materials and Methods: This study employs a qualitative and analytical research methodology grounded in an extensive review of authoritative sources, including NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization documents, recent academic literature, industry white papers, and policy reports from organizations such as RAND Corporation and Cloudflare. The analysis systematically surveys major families of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms namely lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes and evaluates them based on security assumptions, computational efficiency, implementation complexity, and standardization maturity. Findings: The analysis indicates that Lattice-based cryptographic schemes demonstrate the highest maturity and practical readiness, evidenced by their selection in NIST’s PQC process. Code- and hash-based methods provide strong security but face key size and performance challenges. The lack of scalable quantum computers does not reduce urgency, as data harvesting persists. Artificial intelligence emerges as a key enabler for accelerating PQC adoption. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The paper recommends a proactive, phased post-quantum migration using hybrid cryptographic architectures. Organizations should conduct inventories, benchmarking, and pilot deployments aligned with NIST standards. AI-driven tools are advised to improve key management and reduce complexity. Continued interdisciplinary research and policy support are encouraged to ensure a secure, scalable transition to quantum-resistant security systems.
As the advent of quantum computing threatens traditional cryptographic protocols, hybrid classical-quantum secure communication infrastructures have emerged as a critical frontier in cybersecurity. This paper explores the integration of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms—specifically CRYSTALS-Kyber for key encapsulation and CRYSTALS-Dilithium for digital signatures—into hybrid communication architectures designed to resist quantum-level attacks. Leveraging lattice-based cryptographic primitives, both algorithms have been selected for standardization by NIST due to their robust security and performance characteristics. This study evaluates their implementation in real-world communication stacks, assesses latency and throughput under hybrid channel configurations, and proposes a layered security architecture combining classical and quantum-resilient mechanisms. Furthermore, it examines key management, digital trust, and infrastructure scalability in a post-quantum context. Simulation results and hardware-based validations are used to determine practical deployment feasibility in critical sectors such as finance, defense, and healthcare. The findings offer a comprehensive framework for securing data in transitional computing eras, ensuring forward secrecy, and maintaining operational integrity against future adversarial quantum threats.
This paper examines the growing threat that quantum computing presents to blockchain security. Core blockchain cryptographic frameworks, specifically the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and the Secure Hash Algorithm 256, are vulnerable to quantum algorithms. Both the Shor algorithm and the Grover algorithm are capable of breaking the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, enabling attackers to calculate private keys from public keys, while the Grover algorithm can also compromise hash-based systems that depend on brute-force methods, such as Proof-of-Work. On-chain analysis indicates that billions of dollars’ worth of crypto-assets are held in addresses susceptible to these quantum attacks. A proposed countermeasure is migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography, which incorporates quantum-resistant algorithms, such as CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon. However, this migration introduces a trilemma among network security, decentralization, and performance. Post-Quantum Cryptography algorithms significantly increase transaction sizes and computational costs, which pose economic and technical challenges for large blockchain networks. The paper further discusses how the timeline for quantum advancements will be shaped by geopolitical competition, and how the catch-the-crop, decrypt-later strategy puts current data at risk from future quantum decryption. It emphasizes that active migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography is urgent, calling on stakeholders to prioritize system audits, transition to cryptographically flexible infrastructures, promote research into quantum-resistant solutions, and establish governance frameworks that enable prompt and decentralized upgrades.
Public key cryptography plays a pivotal role in maintaining digital security and privacy, with its foundations built on the hardness of certain mathematical problems. However, the emergence of quantum computing threatens the security of current cryptographic systems, making the adoption of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) an urgent necessity. Digital signature schemes are essential components in secure communications, providing authentication, non-repudiation, and data integrity. This paper examines the state of post-quantum digital signature schemes across various cryptographic approaches, including lattice-based, code-based, multivariate polynomial-based, hash-based, symmetric-key-based, and isogeny-based systems, alongside advancements in Multi-Party Computation in the Head (MPC-in-the-head) schemes. The paper then explores application-specific signatures such as blind, undeniable, threshold, chameleon, aggregate, and ring signatures, explaining their main use cases and the existing post-quantum cryptographic classifications that support these constructions individually. Software implementations of selected prominent PQC digital signature schemes were carried out, and their performance was systematically analysed using metrics such as bandwidth consumption, latency, and computational efficiency. These results provide key observations regarding the suitability of different schemes for both resource-constrained and high-performance environments. Subsequently, a detailed literature review of implementations on embedded and hardware platforms is presented, focusing on ARM-based devices and FPGA accelerators to evaluate deployment feasibility beyond general-purpose processors. Based on the software and implementation-level findings, a comparative analysis across software, embedded, and hardware platforms is conducted to highlight architectural influences on performance, scalability, and practicality. Furthermore the cryptanalytic attacks on post-quantum digital signature schemes across various PQC classifications are examined in this paper, taking into account both classical and quantum adversarial models. To evaluate realistic security constraints, implementation-oriented vulnerabilities such as side-channel and fault-based attacks are also examined. In addition, the applicability of post-quantum digital signature schemes within TLS, IoT, and related practical deployment scenarios is analysed. The study also discusses possible directions for further investigation, focusing on the requirement for effective and expandable PQC systems that can satisfy changing cybersecurity requirements. In order to protect sensitive data in the digital era, this study emphasizes the need for implementing quantum-secure systems by fusing theoretical understandings with real-world applications.
Quantum computing is rapidly advancing and threatens the cryptographic systems that secure digital communications. Classical cryptosystems, such as RSA and ECC, rely on mathematical problems that are difficult for classical computers but can be solved easily by quantum algorithms, such as Shor’s. This challenge underscores the pressing need for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to safeguard data against both classical and quantum threats. This study provides a comprehensive review of PQC Approaches in securing data against quantum threats by analyzing reviewed journals, conference proceedings, book chapters, and websites. Several researchers reviewed relevant literature published between 2019 and 2026 using the ACM Digital Library, Wiley Online Library, Taylor & Francis, Springer, ScienceDirect, MDPI, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, and Google Scholar. The review evaluates lattice-based, code-based, Hash-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based schemes across security strength, performance, interoperability, and deployment feasibility in heterogeneous environments, including cloud platforms and Internet of Things devices. The findings indicate that lattice-based schemes, particularly CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium, currently offer the most balanced trade-off between efficiency and quantum resistance, while Hash-based schemes such as SPHINCS+ prioritize conservative security at notable performance cost. Code-based approaches, including McEliece, demonstrate strong long-term security but remain constrained by large key sizes. The review highlights implementation, energy, migration, and governance barriers that must be addressed before adoption. The review concludes by emphasizing that transitioning to PQC requires a collaborative effort from academia, industry, and government. Future research should focus on integrating lightweight PQC in IoT, 5G/6G, and cloud environments, as well as developing hybrid models that combine classical and quantum-safe systems. Addressing these issues is crucial for establishing secure data protection in the quantum era.