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IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference Workshops (WCNCW)

Metasource-Based Secret Key Generation via Low-Density Parity-Check Patterns

Quan Zhang, Yuli Yang, Jide Yuan, Mohsen Guizani

Published Apr 13, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Recently, the concept of metasource-based secret key (MBSK) has been proposed for enhancing physical-layer security. In this paper, we propose a new approach of MBSK generation, via low-density parity-check (LDPC) patterns, where the parity-check matrix is varied and determined by the random channel gain of the legitimate link in each transmission. As there is no information on the legitimate channel gain delivered over the link between the legitimate transmitter and its desired receiver, eavesdroppers are unable to know which parity check matrix is being adopted in the legitimate LDPC encoding and, therefore, they fail to appropriately decode the confidential information protected by the MBSK via LDPC patterns. The security performance of our MBSK approach is evaluated in terms of the error rate difference between legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers. Illustrative simulation results substantiate that, even in the presence of powerful eavesdroppers possessing unlimited computing resources, our MBSK approach via LDPC patterns guarantees the physical-layer security without the aid of upper-layer encryption.

DOI
10.1109/wcncw67598.2026.11555419

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Recently, the concept of metasource-based secret key (MBSK) has been proposed for enhancing physical-layer security. In this paper, we propose a new approach of MBSK generation, via low-density parity-check (LDPC) patterns, where the parity-check matrix is varied and determined by the random channel gain of the legitimate link in each transmission. As there is no information on the legitimate channel gain delivered over the link between the legitimate transmitter and its desired receiver, eavesdroppers are unable to know which parity check matrix is being adopted in the legitimate LDPC encoding and, therefore, they fail to appropriately decode the confidential information protected by the MBSK via LDPC patterns. The security performance of our MBSK approach is evaluated in terms of the error rate difference between legitimate receivers and eavesdroppers. Illustrative simulation results substantiate that, even in the presence of powerful eavesdroppers possessing unlimited computing resources, our MBSK approach via LDPC patterns guarantees the physical-layer security without the aid of upper-layer encryption.
This paper develops a novel metasource-based secret key (MBSK) generation scheme achieving physical-layer security in wireless communications. The core mechanism dynamically varies the low-density parity-check (LDPC) matrix for each transmission, using the random channel gain of the legitimate link as a driving parameter. Since eavesdroppers lack access to the legitimate channel state information (CSI), they cannot identify the specific LDPC matrix employed in the legitimate link, thus failing to successfully decode. In practice, however, the legitimate transmitter and receiver perform channel estimation independently. The estimation errors might result in a mismatch between the LDPC matrices used at each end. To address this challenge, we integrate a federated learning framework to enhance the accuracy and consistency of channel estimation. This approach minimizes the mismatch probability while ensuring that eavesdroppers remain ignorant of both the CSI and the corresponding LDPC matrix. Simulation results substantiate that, even against computationally unbounded eavesdroppers, the developed MBSK scheme robustly guarantees the physical-layer security without relying on higher-layer encryption mechanisms.
Physical-layer security (PLS) is a promising concept to complement upper-layer cryptographic technologies in wireless networks. Various chan-nel-based approaches were conceived to exploit random channel characteristics in providing PLS, for example, through secret-key extraction, directional modulation, and artificial-noise injection. For overcoming the drawbacks associated with these approaches, legitimate channel-gain-mapped sources have recently been proposed to create a new family of physical-layer secret key generation techniques, herein referred to as metasource-based secret key (MBSK). In contrast to the channel-based approaches, the MBSK family not only promotes the actual realization of the PLS concept but also enables green communication infrastructure. The aim of this treatise is to elucidate the prominent MBSK techniques by delving into their fundamental principles, underlying mechanisms, and design rationales from a broad communications security perspective. Specifically, the latest advances and open issues in the MBSK realm are discussed to facilitate researchers who might be familiar with channel-based PLS approaches and would like to kick-start their understanding of the PLS frontiers established by MBSK.
This work introduces security for unsourced random access (URA) via a physical-layer security approach. To achieve confidentiality, the proposed system opportunistically exploits intrinsic features of feedback-aided URA without altering its original structure or operational characteristics. As a result, the system preserves URA's efficiency, including low delay and minimal signaling overhead, while ensuring secure communication. To secure transmission, each user generates a secret key from a feedback signal broadcast by the BS in a previous transmission round, which depends on the BS-user channel and can thus be treated as private. Each user then encrypts its data using the secret key before transmission. Along with the encrypted data, only the parity bits of the LDPC-encoded key are transmitted, enabling secret key recovery at the legitimate receiver via Slepian-Wolf decoding with side information. We propose a receiver algorithm to recover both the encrypted data and the encoded secret key at the legitimate receiver. We further present a theoretical analysis to derive analytical error probabilities for both the legitimate receiver and the passive eavesdropper, as well as to quantify the additional load imposed by the security measures on the URA system. It is shown, based on both theoretical analysis and simulation results, that meaningful secrecy is achieved with only negligible extra overhead compared to the standard URA system.
Next generation 5G wireless networks pose several important security challenges. One fundamental challenge is key management between the two communicating parties. The goal is to establish a common secret key through an unsecured wireless medium. In this paper, we introduce a new physical layer paradigm for secure key exchange between the legitimate communication parties in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. The proposed method ensures secrecy via pre-equalization and guarantees reliable communications by the use of Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) codes. One of the main findings of this paper is to demonstrate through simulations that the diversity order of the eavesdropper will be zero unless the main and eavesdropping channels are almost correlated, while the probability of key mismatch between the legitimate transmitter and receiver will be low. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed approach achieves very low secret key mismatch between the legitimate users, while ensuring very high error probability at the eavesdropper.
Physical layer approaches for generating secret encryption keys for wireless systems using channel information have attracted increased interest from researchers in recent years. This paper presents a new approach for calculating log-likelihood ratios (LLRs) for secret key generation that is based on one-bit quantization of channel measurements and the difference between channel estimates at legitimate reciprocal nodes. The studied secret key agreement approach, which implements advantage distillation along with information reconciliation using Slepian-Wolf low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes, is discussed and illustrated with numerical results obtained from simulations. These results show the probability of bit disagreement for keys generated using the proposed LLR calculations compared with alternative LLR calculation methods for key generation based on channel state information. The proposed LLR calculations are shown to be an improvement to the studied approach of physical layer secret key agreement.
Physical layer approaches for generating secret encryption keys for wireless systems using channel information has attracted increased interest from researchers in recent years. This paper presents a new approach for secret key generation that is based on one-bit quantization of channel measurements along with log-likelihood ratios (LLRs) that are calculated based on the difference between channel estimates at legitimate reciprocal nodes. The proposed approach, which implements advantage distillation along with information reconciliation using Slepian-Wolf low-density parity check (LDPC) codes, is discussed and illustrated with numerical results obtained from simulations. These show the probability of bit disagreement for keys generated through the proposed approach and compare it with that of alternative methods for key generation based on channel state information.