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IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference

Comparison of Methods to Experimentally Validate Information-Theoretic Physical Layer Security

Johannes Voichtleitner, Moritz Wiese, Holger Boche

Published Apr 13, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1109/wcnc65185.2026.11555265

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The maximum likelihood attack strategy is known to be the optimal attack strategy for an eavesdropper in a wiretap channel scenario with additive white Gaussian noise channels under the distinguishing security criterion. The main drawback of this optimal attack is its high computational complexity. While this complexity doesn’t hinder the eavesdropper since he has unlimited computing power, it does present a significant challenge for legitimate parties. For them, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the outcome of the optimal attacker strategy to validate the secrecy of their communication system. In this paper, we introduce a low complexity method for generating upper and lower bounds on the attack performance of the eavesdropper to validate the security against the maximum likelihood attack strategy. We theoretically establish that the derived bounds represent valid constraints on the attack success probability under suitable constraints. The validation method is based on list generation and can be used for any linear block code. Furthermore, we propose a list generation algorithm for this validation method and show different ways to further reduce the complexity. We compare the proposed validation method with state-of-the-art attack strategies in numerical simulations for various error-correcting codes.
Jamming emits white Gaussian noise that causes interference to both the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper. It has been an effective method for improving physical-layer security in wireless communication. In this paper, cautious jamming strategy based on optimal jammer selection method is proposed. More specifically, by using perfect channel state information, cautious jamming strategy selects an optimal jammer to improve the secrecy performance. For the purpose of comparison, we consider the direct jamming strategy and the adaptive jamming strategy as benchmark schemes. Closed-form expressions of the exact intercept probability for three jamming strategies are derived over Rayleigh fading channels and the theoretical analysis is validated by Monte-Carlo simulation. Both the analytical and the simulation results show that: 1) increasing the power of jammer is an effective approach to mitigate the intercept probability; 2) the intercept probability can be decreased and the wiretapped range of eavesdropper can be reduced by increasing the number of jammer; 3) by using perfect CSI and selecting optimal jammer, cautious jamming strategy outperforms direct jamming strategy and adaptive jamming strategy.
As quantum computing advances toward largescale deployment, ensuring system-wide security across multiple abstraction layers becomes critical. This work presents Q-PLPI Hierarchical Quantum Security (Q-PLPI-HQS) as a theoretical hypothesis integrating information flow control, physical-layer integrity monitoring, and composable security. We formalize quantum noninterference with label structures and propose Quantum Physical-Layer Resilience/Integrity (Q-PLRI) as a concrete physical-layer monitoring mechanism using entangled Bell states as quantum seals. To validate this hypothesis, we develop a comprehensive threephase approach: (1) Theoretical formulation establishing the Q-PLPI-HQS framework with labeled Hilbert spaces and compliant operations, (2) Scilab numerical simulation demonstrating Integrity Loss (IL) metric behavior under baseline and attack scenarios with statistical analysis showing separation between normal operation (µB ≈ 0.10) and adversarial tampering (µA ≈ 0.29), and (3) IBM Quantum experimental validation plan detailing protocols for executing Bell-state measurements on 127-qubit superconducting processors with 4,096 shots across 100 independent campaigns. Simulation results confirm the theoretical prediction that three-sigma threshold detection (θanomaly = µB + 3σB) can distinguish attacks from natural noise with very low false positive rates. The proposed IBM Quantum experimental protocol aims to verify these predictions on actual quantum hardware, establishing physical-layer tamper monitoring as a unifying security primitive spanning classical and quantum platforms.