Poisonous Lattice v7.0 introduces a QCAS-aligned dynamic structural assurance framework for post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) systems.While modern PQC standards focus on quantum-resistant algorithms and assurance frameworks validate deployment practices, long-term quantum security also requires continuous monitoring of operational degradation, implementation drift, and structural resilience.This work proposes the Ω-PQC Structural Health Monitor, a time-dependent assurance model designed to evaluate the evolving state of PQC infrastructures through:• entropy degradation monitoring• side-channel drift indicators• downgrade/fallback anomaly detection• key lifecycle risk assessment• Live-CBOM structural consistency trackingThe framework introduces:• Ω_PQC(t) structural health metric• D_PQC(t) degradation model• Quantum Risk Index (QRI)• Lyapunov-based recovery analysis• error-bounded decision regions• SAFE / WARNING / CRITICAL operational statesSimulation scenarios evaluate:• normal PQC operation• entropy poisoning• side-channel drift• downgrade attacks• recovery behaviorPoisonous Lattice v7.0 does not replace NIST PQC standards, cryptographic proofs, or QCAS-style assurance methodologies. Instead, it explores a complementary continuous structural monitoring layer for future quantum-safe infrastructures.The goal is to move from a static question:“Is the system quantum-safe today?”toward a dynamic question:“Does the quantum-safe system remain structurally healthy over time?”
Poisonous Lattice v7.0 introduces a QCAS-aligned dynamic structural assurance framework for post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) systems.While modern PQC standards focus on quantum-resistant algorithms and assurance frameworks validate deployment practices, long-term quantum security also requires continuous monitoring of operational degradation, implementation drift, and structural resilience.This work proposes the Ω-PQC Structural Health Monitor, a time-dependent assurance model designed to evaluate the evolving state of PQC infrastructures through:• entropy degradation monitoring• side-channel drift indicators• downgrade/fallback anomaly detection• key lifecycle risk assessment• Live-CBOM structural consistency trackingThe framework introduces:• Ω_PQC(t) structural health metric• D_PQC(t) degradation model• Quantum Risk Index (QRI)• Lyapunov-based recovery analysis• error-bounded decision regions• SAFE / WARNING / CRITICAL operational statesSimulation scenarios evaluate:• normal PQC operation• entropy poisoning• side-channel drift• downgrade attacks• recovery behaviorPoisonous Lattice v7.0 does not replace NIST PQC standards, cryptographic proofs, or QCAS-style assurance methodologies. Instead, it explores a complementary continuous structural monitoring layer for future quantum-safe infrastructures.The goal is to move from a static question:“Is the system quantum-safe today?”toward a dynamic question:“Does the quantum-safe system remain structurally healthy over time?”
This revised technical note presents the unified edition of the Poisonous Lattice research program, spanning versions v1.0–v8.0 and integrating three complementary hardware-security layers. Layer 1 introduces an entropy-reactive collapse mechanism designed to reduce the distinguishability of secret-correlated physical states following detected intrusion. It includes an unconditional Lyapunov convergence result, a conditional ensemble-distinguishability contraction proposition, and an explicitly unproved research hypothesis concerning statistical and computational indistinguishability under lattice-based assumptions. Layer 2 develops the Omega-PQC structural health-monitoring and ML-KEM operational-risk framework. It combines entropy-source degradation, side-channel exposure, protocol fallback, cryptographic bill-of-materials inconsistency, and key-lifecycle risk into normalized structural-trust indicators. The proposed QCAS v1.1 mappings are presented as model-estimated candidate alignment scores pending independent assessment and do not constitute a claim of certification or conformity. Layer 3 introduces the Dirac-Triggered Poisonous Lattice (DTPL), a normalized multi-physical anomaly-detection architecture based on Clifford-algebra operators. Power, electromagnetic, optical, thermal, quantum-state, and control-integrity channels are mapped into a composite operator score combining manifold distance, spectral deviation, eigenspace rotation, and dynamic drift. When validated thresholds are exceeded, the architecture initiates controlled information separation, isolated poisoning, secure erasure, and key reconfiguration. The revised edition incorporates pre-publication review corrections. The former Holevo-information claim has been reformulated as a conditional ensemble-distinguishability result; the computational-indistinguishability statement has been reclassified as a research hypothesis; the previous ML-KEM-768 “538-bit security” statement has been removed; Lyapunov time constants and strict-monotonicity assumptions have been corrected; dimensional channel normalization has been added to the DTPL operator; and the technology-readiness levels have been revised. Consolidated model-based simulations cover eleven scenarios using 100-run Monte Carlo analyses, bootstrap confidence intervals, and pre-attack false-trigger estimates. These results demonstrate internal model consistency under the stated assumptions but do not constitute physical implementation validation. The current estimated maturity is TRL 3 for Layers 1 and 2 and TRL 2–3 for Layer 3. A unified experimental roadmap is provided for FPGA synthesis, side-channel testing, entropy validation, multi-physical sensing, information-leakage measurement, and secure key-renewal experiments required for progression toward TRL 4 and TRL 5. The principal contribution of this work is a unified defensive architecture connecting physical-attack detection, post-quantum implementation assurance, structural trust monitoring, controlled information poisoning, domain separation, and secure reconfiguration within a single research framework.
Description ΩQKD introduces a structure-sensitive operational security monitoring framework for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems. Instead of relying solely on the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER), the proposed methodology integrates multiple normalized operational indicators—including QBER, secret key rate deficit, photon loss, timing drift, detector noise, and channel instability—into a unified mathematical security index. The framework establishes a rigorous mathematical foundation through boundedness, monotonicity, Lipschitz stability, generalized power-mean functionals, and a risk-entropy metric for distinguishing distributed degradation from structured attacks. Objective parameter weighting is performed using Shannon entropy (CRITIC-type) weighting, while alarm thresholds are determined using statistically controlled false-alarm criteria. Numerical validation based on 12,000 Monte Carlo scenarios demonstrates that ΩQKD significantly improves operational anomaly detection compared with conventional QBER-only monitoring, particularly under stealthy attack scenarios where individual indicators may remain within nominal limits. This work does not propose a new QKD protocol or a new information-theoretic security proof. Instead, it introduces a mathematically grounded operational monitoring and security evaluation methodology intended to complement existing QKD security analyses and support real-time health assessment of practical quantum communication systems.
Quantum computing offers major computational advances but threatens modern public-key cryptography. Classical algorithms such as RSA, Diffie–Hellman (DH), and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly Shor’s algorithm. As large-scale quantum capabilities emerge, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has become essential to ensure future data confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. This paper discusses the need to replace classical cryptography, explores quantum-safe solutions, and examines challenges in large-scale migration. PQC is critical across government, critical infrastructure, finance, healthcare, telecommunications, IoT, autonomous vehicles, and 6G networks. A key concern is “harvest-now, decrypt-later” attacks, where encrypted data is stored today for future quantum decryption. The study analyzes classical cryptographic vulnerabilities and reviews major PQC families: lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate-based, and isogeny-based schemes, highlighting the ongoing NIST standardization efforts. It proposes a migration framework including quantum-readiness assessment, algorithm selection, hybrid implementation, and performance evaluation. Results show that although PQC introduces higher computational complexity, optimized implementations can support real-time applications with reasonable overhead. Among PQC approaches, lattice-based schemes appear most mature and balanced in terms of security and key size. The paper concludes that quantum-safe cryptography is a necessary evolution requiring continuous monitoring, adaptable systems, and alignment with emerging standards.
Description The Poisonous Lattice v3.0 presents a complementary adaptive security architecture designed for post-breach protection in post-quantum environments. Unlike classical cryptographic systems that primarily aim to prevent unauthorized access, the Poisonous Lattice (PL) framework explores an intrusion-reactive approach in which adversarial access attempts trigger entropy-driven informational degradation mechanisms. The framework combines: density operator theory, von Neumann entropy dynamics, Lindblad-type open quantum system evolution, stochastic Lyapunov convergence analysis, and LWE-coupled adaptive noise injection to model the progressive collapse of extractable informational structure toward the maximum-entropy state. Version 3.0 introduces: a formally specified threat model, peer-review calibrated theorem language, expanded limitations and security assumptions, behavioral FPGA emulation analyses, AXI4-Lite hardware interface specifications, false-positive and latency modeling, and a multi-phase deployment roadmap extending from proof-of-concept simulation toward FPGA, ASIC, and standardization pathways. This work is not proposed as a replacement for standardized post-quantum cryptography. Instead, it is positioned as a complementary Layer-3 adaptive anti-extraction architecture intended to operate after adversarial boundary breach conditions have already occurred. The repository includes: the main peer-review edition paper, supplementary threat-model documentation, FPGA behavioral interface specifications, roadmap and standardization strategy documents, simulation source code, telemetry outputs, and behavioral RTL-oriented research artifacts. Research areas include: post-quantum security, adaptive cyber defense, anti-tamper architectures, open quantum systems, runtime information neutralization, hardware security, and entropy-reactive security systems.
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the emerging threat that large-scale quantum computing poses to classical public-key cryptographic systems, particularly RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which form the backbone of contemporary digital security infrastructures. In response to this threat, the study aims to analyze post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a viable long-term solution capable of resisting both classical and quantum adversaries. The paper further seeks to assess the urgency of PQC adoption in light of the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat model and to evaluate the practical readiness of quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms currently under consideration by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Materials and Methods: This study employs a qualitative and analytical research methodology grounded in an extensive review of authoritative sources, including NIST’s post-quantum cryptography standardization documents, recent academic literature, industry white papers, and policy reports from organizations such as RAND Corporation and Cloudflare. The analysis systematically surveys major families of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms namely lattice-based, code-based, and hash-based schemes and evaluates them based on security assumptions, computational efficiency, implementation complexity, and standardization maturity. Findings: The analysis indicates that Lattice-based cryptographic schemes demonstrate the highest maturity and practical readiness, evidenced by their selection in NIST’s PQC process. Code- and hash-based methods provide strong security but face key size and performance challenges. The lack of scalable quantum computers does not reduce urgency, as data harvesting persists. Artificial intelligence emerges as a key enabler for accelerating PQC adoption. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: The paper recommends a proactive, phased post-quantum migration using hybrid cryptographic architectures. Organizations should conduct inventories, benchmarking, and pilot deployments aligned with NIST standards. AI-driven tools are advised to improve key management and reduce complexity. Continued interdisciplinary research and policy support are encouraged to ensure a secure, scalable transition to quantum-resistant security systems.
Nuclear power plants face a structural lifecycle asymmetry: their 60-80 year operational lifecycles exceed the anticipated arrival of Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers (CRQCs), so cryptographic material harvested today becomes decryptable within the service life of the systems it protects. This paper introduces a forensics-first framework for quantum resilience that treats forensic integrity as operationally essential rather than merely evidentiary, analyzing the quantum threat landscape across the Purdue architecture (L0-L5) to show how Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later (HNDL) campaigns enabled by Shor's algorithm can retroactively compromise cryptographic foundations and undermine forensic evidence. Through two case studies, Quantum Scar and Quantum Dawn, we model attack feasibility via a conditional-chain formulation over structured expert-judgment priors anchored to documented HNDL activity and published CRQC roadmaps, yielding success probabilities of 8-78% under current defenses, where the upper bound corresponds to high-value facilities exhibiting cryptographic monoculture. We propose a defense-in-depth migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) integrating hybrid key exchange, code and log integrity with anti-rollback, authenticated time synchronization, and side-channel-resistant implementations aligned with ISA/IEC 62443 and NIST standards, and specify seven design-level conformance criteria for validating it; modeled residual feasibility falls to 1-8% at Security Level 4 and below 1% under full PQC migration. We further contribute six MITRE ATT&CK for ICS technique extensions (T1001-T1006) as a standardized vocabulary for quantum-enabled infrastructure attacks. Quantum threats thus extend beyond cybersecurity to system safety, operational reliability, and post-incident evidence admissibility across multi-decade nuclear asset lifecycles.