In the context of secret-sharing-based secure multiparty computation, multiplication is a fundamental operation. To date, multiplication protocols with reduced communication have been actively studied, and recent works have achieved one-round multiplication with each party sending only a single element. In this work, we propose a constrained multiplication protocol. While our protocol is applicable only in constrained situations, it reduces the total communication in practical applications to one third to one third of that of such protocols. Furthermore, we show that such constrained situations actually arise in important primitives for connecting logical and arithmetic circuits, such as modulus conversion and bit decomposition.
In the context of secret-sharing-based secure multiparty computation, multiplication is a fundamental operation. To date, multiplication protocols with reduced communication have been actively studied, and recent works have achieved one-round multiplication with each party sending only a single element. In this work, we propose a constrained multiplication protocol. While our protocol is applicable only in constrained situations, it reduces the total communication in practical applications to one third to one third of that of such protocols. Furthermore, we show that such constrained situations actually arise in important primitives for connecting logical and arithmetic circuits, such as modulus conversion and bit decomposition.
Abstract. When secure arithmetic is required, computation based on secure multiplication (MULT) is much more efficient than computation based on secure boolean circuits. However, a typical application can also require other building blocks, such as comparison, exponentiation and the modulo (MOD) operation. Secure solutions for these functions proposed in the literature rely on bit-decomposition or other bit-oriented methods, which require O(ℓ) MULTs for ℓ-bit inputs. In the absence of a known bit-length independent solution, the complexity of the whole computation is often dominated by these non-arithmetic functions. To resolve the above problem, we start with a general modular conversion, which converts secret shares over distinct moduli. For this, we proposed a probabilistically correct protocol for this with a complexity that is independent of ℓ. Then, we show that when these non-arithmetic functions are based on secure modular conversions, they can be computed in constant rounds and O(k) MULTs, where k is a parameter for an error rate of 2 −Ω(k). To promote our protocols to be actively secure, we apply O(k) basic zero-knowledge proofs, which cost at most O(k) exponentiation computation, O(1) rounds and O(k(ℓ + κ)) communication bits, where κ is the security parameter used in the commitment scheme.
Bit-decomposition is an important primitive in multi-party computation (MPC). Given a sharing of secret x, it allows the parties to compute the sharings of the bits of x in constant rounds. With the help of bit-decomposition, we will be able to construct constant-rounds protocols for various MPC problems, such as equality test, comparison, public modulo reduction and private exponentiation, which are four main applications of bit-decomposition. However, when considering perfect security, bit-decomposition does not have a linear communication complexity. Thus any protocols involving bit-decomposition inherit this inefficiency, i.e. the communication complexity is non-linear. Constructing protocols for MPC problems without relying on bit-decomposition is a meaningful work because this may provide us with perfect secure protocols with linear communication complexity. It is already proved that equality test, comparison and public modulo reduction can be solved without involving bit-decomposition and the communication complexity can be reduced to linear. However, it remains an open problem whether private exponentiation could be done without relying on bit-decomposition. In this paper, maybe somewhat surprisingly, we show that it can. That is to say, we construct
The advantage of mixed-protocol multi-party secure computation frameworks lies in their ability to utilize different sharing types optimally for diverse tasks. A key module in these frameworks are Boolean-to-arithmetic secret sharing conversion protocols, which transfer a secret value from Boolean secret sharing to arithmetic secret sharing. This conversion process can either take in the Boolean secret sharing of a bit or a secret binary string. In this work, we suggest the application of an innovative correlated random tuple for this task in the semi-honest three-party (3PC) setting. This tuple provides the basis for building Boolean-to-arithmetic share conversion protocols. Specifically, we propose two such protocols in the semi-honest 3PC setting, the first protocol takes as input the Boolean secret sharing of a bit, and the second protocol takes as input the Boolean secret sharing of a secret binary string. When it comes to concrete efficiency, the first protocol shows superior performance compared to the existing state-of-the-art in ABY3 (CCS ’18). It achieves this by reducing the total required communication from 2ℓ bits per party to 4ℓ/3+1 bits (including 4ℓ/3 bits in the setup phase, and 1 bit in the online phase) per party, while maintaining a single round of optimized communication. On the other hand, the second protocol involves two rounds of online communication and its communication cost is comparable to that of ABY2.0 (USENIX’21) that relies on correlated oblivious transfer.
In recent years, multi-party computation (MPC) frameworks based on replicated secret sharing schemes (RSSS) have attracted the attention as a method to achieve high efficiency among known MPCs. However, the RSSS-based MPCs are still inefficient for several heavy computations like algebraic operations, as they require a large amount and number of communication proportional to the number of multiplications in the operations (which is not the case with other secret sharing-based MPCs). In this paper, we propose RSSS-based three-party computation protocols for modular exponentiation, which is one of the most popular algebraic operations, on the case where the base is public and the exponent is private. Our proposed schemes are simple and efficient in both of the asymptotic and practical sense. On the asymptotic efficiency, the proposed schemes require O(n)-bit communication and O(1) rounds,where n is the secret-value size, in the best setting, whereas the previous scheme requires O(n2)-bit communication and O(n) rounds. On the practical efficiency, we show the performance of our protocol by experiments on the scenario for distributed signatures, which is useful for secure key management on the distributed environment (e.g., distributed ledgers). As one of the cases, our implementation performs a modular exponentiation on a 3,072-bit discrete-log group and 256-bit exponent with roughly 300ms, which is an acceptable parameter for 128-bit security, even in the WAN setting.
We present improved protocols for the conversion of secret-shared bit-vectors into secret-shared integers and vice versa, for the use as subroutines in secure multiparty computation (SMC) protocols and for protocols verifying the adherence of parties to prescribed SMC protocols. The protocols are primarily designed for three-party computation with honest majority. We evaluate our protocols as part of the Sharemind three-party protocol set and see a general reduction of verification overheads, thereby increasing the practicality of covertly or actively secure Sharemind protocols.
Performing L pairs of multiplication with known (k, n)-linear secret sharing-based n party multiplication protocols using an (offline) preprocessing by the Beaver multiplication triple requires 2Lk elements of on-line communications where k is the threshold. This paper proposes a simultaneous multiplication protocol for L pairs based on (k, L, n)-packed linear secret sharing. By embedding L secret information into each share using (k, L, n)-packed linear secret sharing, though partial information of secret information is leaked from k - l + 1 shares for 1 ≤ l ≤ L, the proposed protocol can perform L multiplications with 2k elements of online communications. As applications of the proposed simultaneous multiplication protocol, we also introduce a simultaneous comparison protocol and an improvement of the communication cost of Araki et al.'s n party group-wise maximum/minimum value aggregation protocol. For example, when computing the maximum/minimum value of eight 64-bit data, our proposed aggregation protocol can reduce 59.6% of the communication cost.