Wavefunction Realism and Fundamentality

Nina Emery, Gabrielle Kerbel

Published May 28, 2026• 0 citations

Abstract

Wavefunction realism is an account of quantum ontology according to which the wavefunction represents a field in a high-dimensional space. We present a novel version of wavefunction realism that differs from the standard version when it comes to which features of the ontology are fundamental. We argue that our version should be taken just as seriously as the standard version. Along the way we show that the choice between the two turns on substantive commitments regarding the nature of grounding, supervenience, locality, and explanation.

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