In this paper, we investigate the performance of physical-layer security of a pinching-antenna system on a lossless dielectric waveguide. In particular, the system uses a single pinching-antenna to convey confidential information from a base station to a legitimate destination equipped with a single antenna, while an eavesdropper, also equipped with a single antenna, attempts to decode the transmitted information. As such, the performance of the pinching-antenna system is evaluated in terms of average secrecy capacity, strictly positive secrecy capacity, and secrecy outage probability. To this end, accurate mathematical expressions for the aforementioned performance metrics are provided. To validate the analysis, the analytical results are numerically evaluated and further validated through MonteCarlo simulations. The results demonstrate that secrecy capacity between the base station and the legitimate destination improves when the height of the pinching-antenna placed closer to the destination. Additionally, the performance can be improved when the eavesdropper's location over a rectangular area increases.
In this paper, we investigate the performance of physical-layer security of a pinching-antenna system on a lossless dielectric waveguide. In particular, the system uses a single pinching-antenna to convey confidential information from a base station to a legitimate destination equipped with a single antenna, while an eavesdropper, also equipped with a single antenna, attempts to decode the transmitted information. As such, the performance of the pinching-antenna system is evaluated in terms of average secrecy capacity, strictly positive secrecy capacity, and secrecy outage probability. To this end, accurate mathematical expressions for the aforementioned performance metrics are provided. To validate the analysis, the analytical results are numerically evaluated and further validated through MonteCarlo simulations. The results demonstrate that secrecy capacity between the base station and the legitimate destination improves when the height of the pinching-antenna placed closer to the destination. Additionally, the performance can be improved when the eavesdropper's location over a rectangular area increases.
This paper investigates the performance of physical layer security (PLS) in fluid antenna-aided communication systems under arbitrary correlated fading channels. In particular, it is considered that a single fixed-antenna transmitter aims to send confidential information to a legitimate receiver equipped with a planar fluid antenna system (FAS), while an eavesdropper, also taking advantage of a planar FAS, attempts to decode the desired message. For this scenario, we first present analytical expressions of the equivalent channel distributions at the legitimate user and eavesdropper by using copula, so that the obtained analytical results are valid for any arbitrarily correlated fading distributions. Then, with the help of Gauss-Laguerre quadrature, we derive compact analytical expressions for the average secrecy capacity (ASC), the secrecy outage probability (SOP), and the secrecy energy efficiency (SEE) for the FAS wiretap channel. Moreover, for exemplary purposes, we also obtain the compact expression of ASC, SOP, and SEE by utilizing the Gaussian copula under correlated Rayleigh fading channels as a special case. Eventually, numerical results indicate that applying the fluid antenna with only one activated port to PLS can guarantee more secure and reliable transmission, when compared to traditional antenna systems (TAS) exploiting maximal ratio combining (MRC) and antenna selection (AS) under selection combining (SC).
In this paper, a robust pinching antenna-based scheme for ensuring secure wireless communication systems is proposed. In the presence of several malicious eavesdroppers targeting the legitimate signal of various genuine users, the designed approach exploits the spatial flexibility of a pinchingantennas system (PAS) composed of several waveguides and pinching antennas to provide secure communication to legitimate nodes. In particular, multiple pinching antennas can be positioned in each waveguide spanning a long distance, providing additional degrees of freedom and flexibility to adjust the channel response with respect to the various users and eavesdroppers. By virtue of semidefinite programming, an optimization problem aiming at optimizing the transmit beamforming to minimize the total transmit power, subject to secrecy constraints, is formulated and solved. The obtained results demonstrate the total transmit power reduction by increasing the number of antennas and waveguides subject to the same secrecy constraints. Furthermore, the proposed scheme outperforms the benchmark one, consisting of an array of co-located transmit antennas at the base station, when either a direct link from the latter to the users is blocked or when the eavesdroppers are located in the line of sight of the legitimate users.
A novel pinching-antenna systems (PASS)-enabled secure wireless communication framework is proposed. By dynamically adjusting the positions of dielectric particles, namely pinching antennas (PAs), along the waveguides, PASS introduces a novel concept of pinching beamforming to enhance the performance of physical layer security. A fundamental PASS-enabled secure communication system is considered with one legitimate user and one eavesdropper. Both single-waveguide and multiple-waveguide scenarios are studied. 1) For the single-waveguide scenario, the secrecy rate (SR) maximization is formulated to optimize the pinching beamforming. A PA-wise successive tuning (PAST) algorithm is proposed, which ensures constructive signal superposition at the legitimate user while inducing a destructive legitimate signal at the eavesdropper. 2) For the multiple-waveguide scenario, artificial noise (AN) is employed to further improve secrecy performance. A pair of practical transmission architectures are developed:waveguide division (WD)andwaveguide multiplexing (WM). The key difference lies in whether each waveguide carries a single type of signal or a mixture of signals with baseband beamforming. For the SR maximization problem under the WD case, a two-stage algorithm is developed, where the pinching beamforming is designed with the PAST algorithm and the baseband power allocation among AN and legitimate signals is solved using successive convex approximation (SCA). For the WM case, an alternating optimization algorithm is developed, where the baseband beamforming is optimized with SCA and the pinching beamforming is designed employing particle swarm optimization. Numerical results demonstrate that i) PASS can significantly improve the secrecy performance over conventional antenna systems in both scenarios; ii) the proposed PAST algorithm for the single-waveguide scenario is efficient, especially when the number of PAs is even or large; iii) WM provides higher and more stable performance at the cost of increased complexity, while WD serves as a simple yet scalable alternative, which is effective when a large number of PAs are deployed.
This letter investigates the potential of pinching-antenna systems for enhancing physical layer security. By pre-installing multiple pinching antennas at discrete positions along a waveguide, the capability of the considered system to perform amplitude and phase adjustment is validated through the formulation of a secrecy rate maximization problem. Specifically, amplitude control is applied to enhance the signal quality at the legitimate user, while phase alignment is designed to degrade the received signal quality at the eavesdropper. This cooperation among pinching antennas is modeled as a coalitional game, and a corresponding antenna activation algorithm is proposed. The individual impact of each antenna is quantified based on the Shapley value and marginal contribution, providing a fair and efficient method for performance evaluation. Simulation results show that the considered pinching-antenna system achieves significant improvements in secrecy rate, and that the Shapley value based algorithm outperforms conventional coalition value based solutions.
In this paper we investigate the physical layer security in a cooperative scenario where the source and the eavesdropper are equipped with multiple antennas, while the relay and the destination are single-antenna devices. We consider that no channel state information (CSI) is available at the transmitter, besides the index of the selected transmit antenna. Closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage probability of the selective decode-and-forward (SDF) and incremental decode-and-forward (IDF) schemes are derived. In addition, we also conduct an asymptotic analysis to get further insights on the performance of each scheme, which predicts a performance floor inherent to the scenario without CSI at the transmitter. Moreover, we also analyze the schemes in terms of the secrecy throughput, which shows that the performance floor that appear in the outage analysis only affects the secrecy throughput if the floor is too high, as is the case of the non-cooperative transmission. Our analysis show that IDF can considerably outperform the SDF and the non-cooperative transmission both in terms of secrecy outage probability and secrecy throughput.
The information-theoretic techniques can ensure security in communication regardless of the computational power of the attackers. The requirements for applying such techniques require: 1) an advantage over the eavesdroppers' quality of reception and 2) the location information on the eavesdropper. Traditionally, the performance of a secure communication link is measured using the metrics of secrecy capacity or outage probability, which are both related to the relative quality of the legitimate link compared with that of the eavesdropper link. In this paper, we present a new metric, called secrecy pressure, which measures the security level of the surface/environment where the legitimate link is embedded but is independent of the position of the eavesdropping node. The metric can be also visualized as a secrecy map. The analytical results show how the optimization of the secrecy pressure measure can lead to decide the optimum transmit antenna orientation and/or the position and power of an additional interfering node (friendly jammer).