In contemporary physical discourse, the term “information” is used in at least three different senses, which are often conflated, creating pseudo‑problems — the most striking example being the “black hole information paradox”. This article identifies these three phenomena and proposes separate, correct terms for each. The first phenomenon is information as the configuration of a physical system (the microscopic state of fields and particles). This is an ontic phenomenon, existing independently of any observer. The author proposes calling it “configuration” (information in the sense of the physical state of a system). The second phenomenon is information as the observer’s knowledge about the system. This is an epistemic phenomenon, existing only relative to an observer. The proposed term is “observer’s knowledge” (information in the sense of the description accessible to an observer). The third phenomenon is information as an independent physical entity (Wheeler’s “It from Bit” thesis). This is a metaphysical construct lacking a rigorous physical definition. The author proposes calling it “pseudosubstance” (information in the sense of an independent ontological entity) and notes that in serious physical discourse this term should not be used as a working concept. The proposed terminology eliminates ambiguity, makes pseudo‑problems disappear, and returns physics to its foundations — the description of physical objects, not of “information” as a separate entity. During a transitional period, it is recommended to use constructions with parenthetical explanations: “configuration (information in the sense of the physical state of a system)”. The author invites the scientific community to discuss these proposals. Keywords: information, terminology, configuration, observer’s knowledge, pseudosubstance, information paradox.
In contemporary physical discourse, the term “information” is used in at least three different senses, which are often conflated, creating pseudo‑problems — the most striking example being the “black hole information paradox”. This article identifies these three phenomena and proposes separate, correct terms for each. The first phenomenon is information as the configuration of a physical system (the microscopic state of fields and particles). This is an ontic phenomenon, existing independently of any observer. The author proposes calling it “configuration” (information in the sense of the physical state of a system). The second phenomenon is information as the observer’s knowledge about the system. This is an epistemic phenomenon, existing only relative to an observer. The proposed term is “observer’s knowledge” (information in the sense of the description accessible to an observer). The third phenomenon is information as an independent physical entity (Wheeler’s “It from Bit” thesis). This is a metaphysical construct lacking a rigorous physical definition. The author proposes calling it “pseudosubstance” (information in the sense of an independent ontological entity) and notes that in serious physical discourse this term should not be used as a working concept. The proposed terminology eliminates ambiguity, makes pseudo‑problems disappear, and returns physics to its foundations — the description of physical objects, not of “information” as a separate entity. During a transitional period, it is recommended to use constructions with parenthetical explanations: “configuration (information in the sense of the physical state of a system)”. The author invites the scientific community to discuss these proposals. Keywords: information, terminology, configuration, observer’s knowledge, pseudosubstance, information paradox.
This article presents a correspondence dictionary — a practical tool for transitioning from the tangled “informational language” to clear physical language in fundamental physics. The dictionary is based on the distinction of three senses of the word “information” introduced in Article 1 of the series: (1) configuration of a physical system (ontological), (2) observer’s knowledge (epistemic), (3) information as an independent entity (a metaphysical construct to be rejected). The dictionary covers key concepts reformulated in the previous articles of the series: the “collapsar information paradox”, Landauer’s principle, the holographic principle, Wheeler’s “Everything is information” thesis, entropy as “missing information”, and collapsar entropy. For each concept, tables are provided that replace informational formulations with physical ones. The extended dictionary includes additional terms: amount of information, quantum information, transmission, storage, processing and erasure of information, bit, and qubit. In the transitional period, it is recommended to use constructions with explanatory parentheses, for example: “configuration (information in the sense of the physical state of a system)”. The dictionary is addressed to authors of scientific articles, lecturers, students, and journal editors. Its goal is not to abolish the use of the word “information” in communication theory or quantum computing, but to offer a clear alternative where confusion of meanings creates pseudo‑problems. Keywords: dictionary, informational language, physical language, configuration, observer’s knowledge, reformulation.
This article analyses the so‑called “black hole information paradox” — one of the most discussed problems in modern theoretical physics. It is shown that the paradox arises only within the framework of “informational language”, where the word “information” is used in three different senses that become conflated. A distinction is introduced between the ontic (the physical configuration of the system, existing independently of any observer) and the epistemic (the observer’s knowledge about the system). A simple description of Hawking radiation is given: quantum fluctuations near the horizon of a collapsar produce pairs of particles; one falls inward, the other escapes, creating the appearance of evaporation. Based on this distinction, a reformulation of the problem is proposed in terms of physical objects without the ontologised concept of “information”. In this reformulation, a collapsar (so‑called “black hole”) is a compact massive object into whose gravitational capture zone physical systems are drawn. Crossing the event horizon means an epistemic loss (the observer ceases to know the configuration), not an ontological destruction. The unitarity of quantum mechanics is not violated because the total quantum state of the system evolves reversibly. The main counter‑arguments (the firewall paradox, the unproven status of correlations in Hawking radiation) are examined and answered. It is shown that the “information paradox” disappears, leaving a technical problem of describing quantum correlations. This article is the first in the series “Reformulating Key Concepts of Physics Without Informational Language”. Keywords: collapsar, information paradox, ontic, epistemic, configuration, observer’s knowledge.
This programmatic article (zeroth in the series “Reformulating Key Concepts of Physics Without Informational Language”) outlines a systematic replacement of “informational language” by physical language. It shows that many paradoxes of modern physics — the collapsar information paradox, Landauer’s principle as “proof of the physicality of information”, the holographic principle as “the informational nature of reality”, and Wheeler’s thesis “It from Bit” (“Everything from the bit”) — arise from conflating three senses of the word “information”: configuration (physical state), observer’s knowledge (epistemic category), and pseudosubstance (metaphysical construct, to be rejected). The key distinction between the ontic (pertaining to reality itself) and the epistemic (pertaining to our knowledge) is introduced. Confusing these levels is the root of pseudo‑paradoxes. On this basis, the article proposes to reformulate eight key concepts (each covered in a separate article of the series): the collapsar pseudo‑paradox, Landauer’s principle, the holographic principle, Wheeler’s thesis, entropy as “missing information”, as well as to compile a correspondence dictionary, analyse the firewall paradox, and address the technical problem of quantum state recovery. The aim of the reformulation is to eliminate pseudo‑problems, return physics to describing matter, fields, and space‑time, and provide a practical tool (dictionary) for switching to clear physical language. The article invites the scientific community to discussion. Keywords: informational language, reformulation, ontic, epistemic, collapsar, programmatic article.
In this article I present the extracts and summary of heuristic and speculative observations on various aspects I feel are problematic in the practice of modern physics, the definitions and methods of which are the premise for the whole of Science. The illustrations will be fully developed in a later, more extensive and in-depth work in which some theoretical solutions will also be put forward; therefore in the interests of brevity all assertions will not be demonstrated fully in this article. I will initially discuss the problem with thinking of Reality as basically being made up of ontologically autonomous “parts”; I will recall how the existence of the vacuum is demonstrated through the thermodynamic experiments about heat capacities run by W. Nernst and the experiments of W. Lamb and H. Casimir (static and dynamic); the vacuum will be defined as an object that precedes matter and space, and actually illustrated as an evolving (becoming) singularity, which all existence draws from; the non-isolability of the autonomous entity will be substantiated further by the uncertainty demonstrated as intrinsically following on from phase space quantisation, and not only as an algebraic requirement of quantum formalism. Once the inconsistency of the isolable entity has been demonstrated, the ontological supremacy of relationships in a perspective close to ontic structural realism will be considered; finally, issues relating to the usual idea of “information” in the scientific domain (in thermodynamics, informatics, and telecommunications) will be discussed fairly briefly, and its inadequacy in pooling knowledge. I will then touch on what is meant by living information as the basis for Reality and how it can be discussed consistently in terms of a self-implementing subject. It should be stressed that these topics are dealt with more extensively (along with other important subjects excluded here for reasons of space) in a complete work.
Operatoric Research CorpusStudies in World-Formation Section I Ontology and Physics Volume 2 The Ontological Limits of Physical ExplanationMeasurement, Collapse and Boundary Phenomena in Quantum Physics This volume brings together a series of contributions on the ontology of fundamental problems in physics, in particular the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, the collapse of the wave function, the relationship between quantum mechanics and relativity theory, as well as boundary phenomena such as black holes, renormalization, and vacuum energy. The point of departure of these investigations is the thesis that numerous paradoxes of modern physics do not primarily result from insufficient physical theories, but from a categorical misaddressing. Transitions that concern the very conditions of world stability—especially the transition from possibility to facticity—are often interpreted as dynamical processes within an already stabilized world. This gives rise to explanatory programs that attempt to bridge this boundary by means of additional mechanisms, ontologies, or informational structures. The texts collected in this volume pursue an alternative strategy. They understand the so-called collapse of the wave function not as a physical process, but as an irreversible constriction of a space of possibility through which objectivity and the direction of time first emerge at all. The concept of indimergence designates the boundary act in which possibility passes into facticity without itself being describable as an event within the world. On the basis of this determination, central approaches in the foundations of quantum mechanics—particularly dynamical collapse models, Many-Worlds interpretations, and information-theoretic ontologies—are comparatively analyzed. It becomes evident that, despite their differences, they share a common presupposition: the assumption that the transition from possibility to facticity must itself be explicable within physical description. The contributions in this volume instead propose to read the measurement problem and related paradoxes as indications of structural limits of physical description. From this perspective, other fundamental problems—such as the tension between quantum mechanics and relativity theory, the information paradoxes of black holes, or divergences in field theory—no longer appear primarily as unsolved technical puzzles, but as boundary phenomena of world formation itself. The volume therefore does not present itself as an alternative physical theory, but as an ontological clarification of the conditions under which physical theories are able to describe a world at all.
The concept of information plays a fundamental role in our everyday experience, but is conspicuously absent in framework of classical physics. Over the last century, quantum theory and a series of other developments in physics and related subjects have brought the concept of information and the interface between an agent and the physical world into increasing prominence. As a result, over the last few decades, there has arisen a growing belief amongst many physicists that the concept of information may have a critical role to play in our understanding of the workings of the physical world, both in more deeply understanding existing physical theories and in formulating of new theories. In this paper, I describe the origin of the informational view of physics, illustrate some of the work inspired by this view, and give some indication of its implications for the development of a new conception of physical reality.