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Textbooks in telecommunication engineering

Covert Communication

Lin Zhou, Lin Bai

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-032-06627-5_10

Related papers

Physical Layer Covert Communication in B5G Wireless Networks—its Research, Applications, and Challenges

Yu'e Jiang, Liangmin Wang, Hsiao‐Hwa Chen +1 more

Physical layer covert communication is a crucial secure communication technology that enables a transmitter to convey information covertly to a recipient without being detected by adversaries. Unlike typical cryptography and physical layer security systems that concentrate on protecting the sent signal content, covert communications seek to conceal the existence of legitimate transmission. Thus, with beyond fifth-generation (B5G) wireless communications, covert communications can operate in tandem or as a supplement to conventional security techniques. We provide an extensive overview of the basic theories and several strategies in physical layer covert communications in this article. In particular, we go into great detail about the basic theories of physical layer covert communications, such as channel models, codes, secret keys, and covertness metrics, as well as various covert schemes in progressively more complicated scenarios, such as covert communications in single-antenna and multiantenna three-node systems and covert communications in jammer-and relay-aided systems. In addition, we identify the challenges and future directions for research on covert communications in B5G wireless networks.

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COVERT COMMUNICATIONS IN CONTINUOUS-TIME SYSTEMS

Ke Li

This dissertation studies covert wireless communications where a transmitter (Alice) intends to transmit messages to a legitimate receiver (Bob) such that the presence of the message is hidden from an attentive warden (Willie). Here we consider pertinent aspects of covert communications that focus on moving such systems closer to implementation. For example, previous studies use the standard discrete-time communication model when analyzing covert communications, since this is commonly assumed without loss of generality in standard communication theory. However, it is not clear that such a model captures the salient aspects of the continuous-time covert communications problem. A power detector that is optimal for the warden in a discrete-time covert communications scenario may not be optimal on a continuous- time model. Thus, it is of interest to consider this more realistic model for physical channels. After analyzing a power optimization problem using the standard discrete-time model, we move to the key part of system implementation: the instantiation in true continuous-time systems of the discrete-time models studied to this point in the literature. A key goal is to examine Willie’s detection capability on a continuous-time model and study how the limits of covert communications change from the discrete-time case. In particular, we show that detectors for Willie can benefit from the continuous-time setting and outperform detectors based on the discrete-time model; not surprisingly, this has a significant impact on the true covert throughput of the system. Nevertheless, we establish constructions such that efficient covert communications can still be achieved in a continuous-time model, and prove the fundamental limit on the covert communication rate. After considering the continuous-time problem in detail, we then turn to addressing another limitation of previous work - the requirement for an intentional jammer to facilitate efficient covert communication. Instead, we consider how to exploit a pre-existing interference source – a radar - to achieve covert communication. We establish a covert communication scheme in such an environment, and analyze the corresponding covert rate. Finally, we consider the use of a detection technique similar to that in the covert communications problem, in the area of quantized signal detection.

•Jul 1, 2021•2 citations

Secure Communications

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Experimental Covert Communication Using Software-Defined Radio

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The fundamental information-theoretic limits of covert, or low probability of detection/intercept (LPD/LPI), communication have been extensively studied for over a decade, resulting in the square root law (SRL): only $L\sqrt n $ covert bits can be reliably transmitted over time-bandwidth product n, for constant L> 0. Transmitting more either results in detection or decoding errors. The SRL imposes significant constraints on hardware realization of mathematically guaranteed covert communication. Indeed, they preclude using standard link maintenance operations that are taken for granted in non-covert communication. Thus, experimental validation of covert communication is underexplored: to date, only two experimental studies of SRL-based covert communication are available, both focusing on optical channels. Here, we report a demonstration of provably secure covert radio-frequency (RF) communication using software-defined radios (SDRs). This validates theoretical predictions, opens practical avenues for implementing covert communication systems, and raises further research questions.

arXiv:2506.02297•IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM)•Oct 6, 2025•1 citation
Physical layer covert communication is a crucial secure communication technology that enables a transmitter to convey information covertly to a recipient without being detected by adversaries. Unlike typical cryptography and physical layer security systems that concentrate on protecting the sent signal content, covert communications seek to conceal the existence of legitimate transmission. Thus, with beyond fifth-generation (B5G) wireless communications, covert communications can operate in tandem or as a supplement to conventional security techniques. We provide an extensive overview of the basic theories and several strategies in physical layer covert communications in this article. In particular, we go into great detail about the basic theories of physical layer covert communications, such as channel models, codes, secret keys, and covertness metrics, as well as various covert schemes in progressively more complicated scenarios, such as covert communications in single-antenna and multiantenna three-node systems and covert communications in jammer-and relay-aided systems. In addition, we identify the challenges and future directions for research on covert communications in B5G wireless networks.
This dissertation studies covert wireless communications where a transmitter (Alice) intends to transmit messages to a legitimate receiver (Bob) such that the presence of the message is hidden from an attentive warden (Willie). Here we consider pertinent aspects of covert communications that focus on moving such systems closer to implementation. For example, previous studies use the standard discrete-time communication model when analyzing covert communications, since this is commonly assumed without loss of generality in standard communication theory. However, it is not clear that such a model captures the salient aspects of the continuous-time covert communications problem. A power detector that is optimal for the warden in a discrete-time covert communications scenario may not be optimal on a continuous- time model. Thus, it is of interest to consider this more realistic model for physical channels. After analyzing a power optimization problem using the standard discrete-time model, we move to the key part of system implementation: the instantiation in true continuous-time systems of the discrete-time models studied to this point in the literature. A key goal is to examine Willie’s detection capability on a continuous-time model and study how the limits of covert communications change from the discrete-time case. In particular, we show that detectors for Willie can benefit from the continuous-time setting and outperform detectors based on the discrete-time model; not surprisingly, this has a significant impact on the true covert throughput of the system. Nevertheless, we establish constructions such that efficient covert communications can still be achieved in a continuous-time model, and prove the fundamental limit on the covert communication rate. After considering the continuous-time problem in detail, we then turn to addressing another limitation of previous work - the requirement for an intentional jammer to facilitate efficient covert communication. Instead, we consider how to exploit a pre-existing interference source – a radar - to achieve covert communication. We establish a covert communication scheme in such an environment, and analyze the corresponding covert rate. Finally, we consider the use of a detection technique similar to that in the covert communications problem, in the area of quantized signal detection.
The fundamental information-theoretic limits of covert, or low probability of detection/intercept (LPD/LPI), communication have been extensively studied for over a decade, resulting in the square root law (SRL): only $L\sqrt n $ covert bits can be reliably transmitted over time-bandwidth product n, for constant L> 0. Transmitting more either results in detection or decoding errors. The SRL imposes significant constraints on hardware realization of mathematically guaranteed covert communication. Indeed, they preclude using standard link maintenance operations that are taken for granted in non-covert communication. Thus, experimental validation of covert communication is underexplored: to date, only two experimental studies of SRL-based covert communication are available, both focusing on optical channels. Here, we report a demonstration of provably secure covert radio-frequency (RF) communication using software-defined radios (SDRs). This validates theoretical predictions, opens practical avenues for implementing covert communication systems, and raises further research questions.