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Lecture notes in computer science

On Succinct Non-interactive Secure Computation with Malicious Security

Maya Farber Brodsky, Arka Rai Choudhuri, Abhishek Jain, Omer Paneth

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-032-25324-8_20

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