The proliferation of Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) and wireless Electroencephalography (EEG) devices necessitates security protocols that are simultaneously quantum-resistant and intrinsically linked to users’ biological identity. While standard post-quantum cryptography like ML-KEM provides foundational security, it fails to address critical neurotechnology requirements: integrated biometric authentication, efficient long-term session management, and resilience to signal noise. This paper presents Neural-LWE (NLWE), a novel biometric-anchored authenticated key agreement protocol for quantum-secure Brain-Computer Interfaces. We introduce five fundamental innovations: (1) integration of Kalman-filtered EEG features with ML-KEM encapsulation for biometric two-factor authentication; (2) Zero-Communication-Round Rekeying (ZCRR) enabling 250× more efficient forward secrecy updates; (3) entropy-adaptive security dynamically scaling lattice parameters based on real-time EEG quality; (4) ternary-entropy masking for side-channel resistance; and (5) manifold-based anomaly detection against presentation attacks. NLWE establishes IND-CCA2 security under the Module-LWE (MLWE) assumption while addressing unique BCI constraints through formal cryptographic-biometric binding. Implementation results using physiologically plausible synthetic data confirm that ZCRR achieves 0.45μJ rekeying energy with sub-millisecond latency. While experimental validation is performed in a controlled environment, the results indicate NLWE is a promising proof-of-concept for continuous neural applications requiring persistent quantum security.
The proliferation of Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) and wireless Electroencephalography (EEG) devices necessitates security protocols that are simultaneously quantum-resistant and intrinsically linked to users’ biological identity. While standard post-quantum cryptography like ML-KEM provides foundational security, it fails to address critical neurotechnology requirements: integrated biometric authentication, efficient long-term session management, and resilience to signal noise. This paper presents Neural-LWE (NLWE), a novel biometric-anchored authenticated key agreement protocol for quantum-secure Brain-Computer Interfaces. We introduce five fundamental innovations: (1) integration of Kalman-filtered EEG features with ML-KEM encapsulation for biometric two-factor authentication; (2) Zero-Communication-Round Rekeying (ZCRR) enabling 250× more efficient forward secrecy updates; (3) entropy-adaptive security dynamically scaling lattice parameters based on real-time EEG quality; (4) ternary-entropy masking for side-channel resistance; and (5) manifold-based anomaly detection against presentation attacks. NLWE establishes IND-CCA2 security under the Module-LWE (MLWE) assumption while addressing unique BCI constraints through formal cryptographic-biometric binding. Implementation results using physiologically plausible synthetic data confirm that ZCRR achieves 0.45μJ rekeying energy with sub-millisecond latency. While experimental validation is performed in a controlled environment, the results indicate NLWE is a promising proof-of-concept for continuous neural applications requiring persistent quantum security.
Introduction: Distributed electroencephalography (EEG) brain-computer interface (BCI) systems increasingly transmit neural data and control messages between a head-worn device, a nearby hub, and cloud-assisted services. These links require integrity, authenticity, replay protection, and low latency, while migration to post-quantum cryptography can increase session-establishment cost. Methods: We present PQ-NeuroLink, a latency-aware post-quantum-ready communication framework that separates authenticated session establishment from the symmetric streaming fast path. The design supports classical X25519, post-quantum ML-KEM-768, and hybrid ML-KEM-768 plus X25519 key establishment, with pinned ML-DSA public keys for endpoint identity binding. The prototype was evaluated using EEG-derived traffic from public datasets over BLE-like and Wi-Fi-like link profiles, 1-hop and 2-hop topologies, symmetric key-update and public-key refresh events, active tampering scenarios, and MCU-informed resource and processing-energy projections. Results: Identity pinning and transcript binding prevented successful modeled session-splicing attempts. Post-quantum and hybrid modes primarily increased handshake bytes rather than steady-state streaming latency. In the most constrained BLE 1-hop summary condition, the hybrid M3 mode increased p95 latency by 0.45 ms relative to the unsecured M0 baseline while maintaining 99.0% packet delivery. Discussion: Post-quantum-ready authenticated session establishment can be integrated into distributed EEG communication prototypes when public-key operations are kept off the per-frame path. PQ-NeuroLink provides a reproducible communication-layer basis for secure next-generation BCI deployment studies requiring low-latency operation and long-horizon post-quantum protection.
In emerging environments such as cloud computing and the Internet of Things (IoT), secure authentication and key negotiation play a crucial role in protecting data transmitted over public networks. However, many existing authentication protocols are still designed based on classical public-key cryptography primitives, and quantum computing may threaten their security. To address this challenge, we propose a post-quantum authentication and key agreement protocol that uses the lattice-based Kyber key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). Our proposed protocol integrates cryptographic authentication, smart card protection, and post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms, enabling mutual authentication between users and servers and securely establishing session keys. The security of the protocol is formally analyzed in the Real-or-Random (ROR) model under the random oracle assumption and the IND-CCA security of the underlying KEM scheme. Furthermore, through informal security analysis, we have further demonstrated that the protocol possesses important security properties, including anonymity, untraceability, perfect forward confidentiality, and resistance to known attacks. In addition, the computational cost and communication overhead of the proposed scheme are evaluated and compared with several representative authentication protocols. The results show that the proposed protocol can provide strong security while maintaining low computational cost and communication overhead.
The impending advent of cryptographically relevant quantum computers threatens classical public-key primitives that underpin 5G and IoT security, including key exchange, authentication, and device onboarding. Ultra-dense networks, constrained endpoints, and long device lifetimes heighten exposure to “harvest-now, decrypt-later” risks. Mobile operators and IoT platform providers need migration ready cryptography that fits radio-access latency budgets, scales to billions of low-power nodes, and integrates cleanly with 3GPP and IETF protocols without degrading quality of service. Many post quantum options impose prohibitive bandwidth and compute costs or lack deployment guidance tuned to network slices and massive machine-type communications. We propose a lattice-based encryption and key-encapsulation framework grounded in Module-LWE/LWR assumptions. The design pairs an IND-CCA-secure KEM for control plane bootstrapping with lightweight AEAD for user-plane data, delivered through a hybrid handshake combining classical ECDH with a post-quantum KEM to ensure continuity during transition. Parameter tiers align with eMBB, URLLC, and mMTC device classes. Implementation emphasizes constant-time polynomial arithmetic, NTT-accelerated convolution, centered-binomial noise sampling, public-key compression, and stateless hash-based signatures for attestation. A gNB-assisted enrollment workflow and session-key rotation via 5G NAS/RRC are specified. Analytical modeling and prototype measurements indicate sub-millisecond encapsulation on ARM Cortex-M33 microcontrollers and ~1.5 ms on RAN baseband paths, while handshake message growth remains within existing NAS and RRC budgets. In ns-3 simulations of dense mMTC topologies, the hybrid handshake achieves >99.99% success under 1% packet loss, and energy profiling shows <5% battery impact for weekly rekeying. Security analysis demonstrates resistance to known lattice attacks at NIST Levels 3–5, forward secrecy via ephemeral KEMs, downgrade resistance through authenticated algorithm negotiation, and post compromise security with frequent rekeying.
In user–server authentication environments, persistent server-side verification tables, such as password verifiers, shared authentication records, or per-user secret tables, may become a critical point of failure once leaked. To address this problem in the post-quantum setting, this paper proposes an ML-DSA-specific verification-table-free authenticated key agreement (AKA) scheme based on the NIST-standardized Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA). The main contribution is a protocol-level use of the signer-recoverable masking vector in ML-DSA as an on-demand reconstruction mechanism for user-related authentication material. This enables the server to reconstruct the required user-related authentication material from its own signature and long-term secret key. This architecture reduces the exposure associated with centralized verification-table leakage, but it should be understood as a storage-relocation tradeoff rather than a storage-free design, because each user must retain the issued signature and the corresponding hash-derived authentication value. By combining the recovered value with identity information through a quantum-resistant one-way hash function, the server can authenticate the user and establish a session key. Its security is analyzed within a Canetti–Krawczyk-style adversarial model and further discussed in the random-oracle setting through a sequence-of-games argument. The analysis supports session-key indistinguishability under the stated freshness and exposure assumptions, while explicitly excluding full forward secrecy under compromise of the server’s long-term ML-DSA secret key. In addition, an operation-level comparison is provided to clarify computational, storage, and communication tradeoffs relative to representative post-quantum AKA schemes. Since the present work does not include implementation-level benchmarking, the performance discussion should be interpreted as analytical rather than empirical validation. The proposed scheme is therefore most suitable for account-login-oriented applications in which reducing centralized verification-table leakage is a primary design objective and where user-side credential storage can be securely managed.
Key agreement in open networks must not only resist quantum computing threats but also establish keys and authenticate counterparties without explicitly revealing identities. Existing solutions often rely on additional certificates or explicit signature-based authentication or require multiple rounds of interaction and complex state management, thereby imposing burdens on deployment and scalability. To address this, we propose a key agreement protocol based on a post-quantum identity-matching scheme, which unifies identity binding, implicit authentication, and session key establishment into a single key agreement process. Specifically, the initiator generates a ciphertext based on the peer’s identity and embeds session-related information within it, enabling the recipient to verify the peer’s identity and confirm the consistency of the key while decrypting and recovering the shared material. Additionally, bidirectional confirmation messages are used to eliminate negotiation deviations such as the sharing of unknown keys. Furthermore, a version control mechanism is introduced as a synchronization tag for key evolution, allowing the session key to be naturally updated within a predetermined time window. Concurrently, a revocation list maintained by a blockchain is established, enabling distributed verification and auditing of revocation status. This supports key update and revocation management without increasing the number of negotiation rounds. Performance evaluations and security analyses indicate that the protocol incurs a single-end computational overhead of less than 100 μs and a communication overhead of approximately 17.1 KB, trading moderate performance overhead for strong security semantics.
This paper introduces PQ-LiteKEM, a formally verified, lightweight post-quantum security protocol for energy- and resource-constrained Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) devices. Addressing near-term quantum threats and emerging regulatory mandates such as the EU Cyber Resilience Act, the protocol mitigates the ‘harvest-now-decrypt-later’ (HNDL) quantum threat by securing sensitive physiological data over low-powered wireless channels. PQ-LiteKEM's architecture pairs lightweight symmetric-key mutual authentication, tied to dynamic hardware fingerprints, with ML-KEM-512 encapsulation and AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption. Formal verification through ProVerif and Scyther confirms security against key compromise, replay, and man-in-the-middle attacks, with provable session forward secrecy, mutual authentication, and session integrity. PQ-LiteKEM is validated on an ESP32-S3-powered wearable sensor communicating with a Raspberry Pi edge gateway over a BLE testbed. Performance profiling measured a total cryptographic latency of 5.9 ms and a peak memory footprint of 9 kB, approximately 0.1% of available RAM. These results show that post-quantum cryptographic guarantees are achievable on constrained medical sensors without sacrificing runtime efficiency, and that the approach generalises beyond BLE to other wireless channels.