How companies prepare for the migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) remains an open and important question, despite growing awareness of the threat posed by cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs). While PQC standards released by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2024 aim to resist both quantum and classical attacks, migrating to these standards presents significant technical and organizational challenges. Existing research has focused on algorithm design and migration frameworks, but little is known about how companies approach this migration in practice. Through semi-structured interviews, we explore how four companies address the CRQC threat and PQC migration. We have found that companies perceive the timing and threat of CRQC differently, which implies that these perceptions influence PQC migration.
How companies prepare for the migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) remains an open and important question, despite growing awareness of the threat posed by cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs). While PQC standards released by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2024 aim to resist both quantum and classical attacks, migrating to these standards presents significant technical and organizational challenges. Existing research has focused on algorithm design and migration frameworks, but little is known about how companies approach this migration in practice. Through semi-structured interviews, we explore how four companies address the CRQC threat and PQC migration. We have found that companies perceive the timing and threat of CRQC differently, which implies that these perceptions influence PQC migration.
Cryptographic algorithms are an essential measure to ensure confidentiality and integrity of internet communication. The development of quantum computers (QCs) and their potential to utilize Shor’s Law, is increasingly recognized as a threat to asymmetric cryptography. In response, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is gaining prominence as a notable field of research aiming to standardize quantum resistant algorithms before the operational usage of QCs. This paper is addressed to people with preliminary knowledge in the field of cryptography and QC. Based on a literature review, the authors provide an overview of challenges faced by the research community and elaborate the advancements in addressing post-quantum threats. A migration strategy from classical cryptosystems to PQC systems is in development, but obstacles such as time constraints and improper implementation complicate the process. Full implementation could take a decade or more. Until then, our paper aims to create awareness for potential challenges when transitioning towards PQC. As categorization scheme for these potential obstacles, we refer to a well- established model in cybersecurity – the McCumber Cube. Conclusions embrace preparing for risks of improper implementation and deriving a multi-step migration. Special attention is expected to be needed for data migration of existing data sets. As a request for future research in PQC, the authors identified the process of implementing post-cryptography standards, e.g., from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and an assessment of the perceived readiness of industry to adapt.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to current cryptographic systems, particularly public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks like Shor's algorithm. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) aims to develop and standardize quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms to secure digital communications in the quantum era. This paper examines the current landscape of PQC, focusing on the evaluation and standardization efforts led by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We analyze the major families of quantum-resistant algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based cryptography, discussing their security guarantees, performance trade-offs, and implementation challenges. Furthermore, we review NIST's PQC standardization process, highlighting selected finalists and alternate candidates, and explore the ongoing transition challenges in adopting these algorithms across industries. Finally, we discuss future directions for PQC research, including hybrid cryptographic systems and the need for continued cryptanalysis to ensure long-term security. This work provides a comprehensive overview of the progress and challenges in deploying quantum-resistant cryptography to safeguard against emerging quantum threats.
Abstract The imminent threat posed by quantum computers to modern public key cryptography has spurred the development of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms. Over the last two decades, the field of PQC research has thrived, yielding a diverse range of algorithms resilient against quantum attacks. These PQC algorithms are undergoing selection and standardization by prominent bodies ; such as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). However, the challenge remains substantial, given the monumental task of migrating numerous new devices to PQC algorithms. This complex, multi-decade transition from classical cryptography to PQC, necessitates careful survey of research articles to consider the current post quantum cryptographic schemes, and key protective strategies against quantum threats, implementation feasibility, compliance and challenges of implementations. This will provide insight and future directions for new researchers and organizations. .
Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a rapidly developing field that addresses the potential threat quantum computers pose to the security of current cryptographic algorithms. With the rapid advancement of quantum computing technologies, it has become imperative to identify and standardize new cryptographic techniques that can withstand attacks from quantum computers. This paper explores the motivation behind PQC and provides an overview of the experimental research conducted in the field. It highlights the vulnerabilities of traditional cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA and ECC, to quantum attacks and emphasizes the need for transitioning to quantum-resistant alternatives. The experiments conducted in the PQC domain encompass the evaluation and analysis of candidate algorithms submitted to the NIST PQC competition. These experiments involve comprehensive security assessments, performance evaluations, and code audits to ensure the suitability and effectiveness of the proposed algorithms in real-world scenarios. This paper provides guidelines for organizations and practitioners adopting PQC. It discusses considerations for selecting and implementing post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, including security levels, algorithmic characteristics, performance tradeoffs, and integration challenges. It also outlines the importance of a smooth transition from classical to post-quantum cryptographic systems and highlights the need for standardization efforts to ensure interoperability and compatibility.
Current cryptographic systems, heavily reliant on classical algorithms, are increasingly vulnerable to the formidable capabilities of quantum computing. Notably, quantum algorithms such as Shor’s and Grover’s pose profound threats by accelerating decryption processes, which could soon make existing cryptosystems ineffective. This paper stresses the critical need and complexity of shifting to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to safeguard encrypted communications against these emerging quantum threats. It outlines the timeline of the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) efforts in standardizing PQC, elucidating the significant challenges and the essential nature of adopting these new standards. While NIST provides structured guidance, transitioning to PQC presents substantial risks and difficulties, particularly in terms of organizational adaptation and the technical overhaul required. The discourse further explores the tangible implications of quantum advancements on both symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography, highlighting the potential vulnerabilities and the increased risk of security breaches. The paper underscores the imperative for immediate action in initiating the transition towards robust PQC systems, given the rapid development and anticipated deployment of quantum computing technologies capable of decrypting currently secure information. This transition is not merely a technical upgrade but a crucial strategic move to preemptively counteract quantum threats, ensuring the continued confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data across various sectors.
The imminent emergence of quantum computers poses unprecedented challenges to the current cryptographic standards that secure vital digital communications and data worldwide. This paper addresses the vulnerabilities of existing cryptographic systems susceptible to quantum-based attacks and emphasizes a dedicated transition plan to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). We first examine the current state of cryptographic practices, highlight the quantum threat, and present the framework and need for PQC. In addition, a comprehensive strategy is presented that encompasses the identification, protection, detection, response, and recovery phases and integrates PQC into existing security infrastructures, specifically the Cybersecurity Framework Version 2.0 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Methods and technologies discussed include the development of robust PQC algorithms, tools for their large-scale implementation, and hybrid cryptographic systems that combine traditional and quantum-resistant techniques. Practical implementations on various hardware and software platforms are also presented in case studies that provide real-world insight into the challenges and innovations in using PQC. We conclude with a discussion of hybrid approaches, regulatory considerations, and recommendations derived from early adopters to guide future efforts to create a quantum-resilient digital landscape.