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Lecture notes in computer science

A Practical Framework for Lattice-Based Non-interactive Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing

Behzad Abdolmaleki, John Clark, Mohammad Foroutani, Shahram Khazaei, Sajjad Nasirzadeh

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-032-22698-3_4

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Practical Post-Quantum Secure Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing and Applications

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We present a new framework for constructing practically efficient publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) with non-interactive dealers , in that the dealer may go offline after sending a single message, and is not involved in the share verification process. We use identity-based encryption (IBE) and commitments as the main ingredients and avoid expensive zero-knowledge proofs. By instantiating them with post-quantum secure schemes, a lattice-based IBE and a hash-based commitment, we obtain our first construction: a post-quantum secure PVSS with non-interactive dealers that outperforms the prior lattice-based practical construction by Gentry et al. [Eurocrypt 2022]. However, to enable the aggregation of PVSS transcripts (which facilitates many additional applications such as secure voting), we propose our second construction by replacing hash-based commitments with Pedersen's homomorphic commitments. While this does not achieve full-fledged post-quantum security (as Pedersen's scheme is not quantum safe), it still provides privacy against a post-quantum adversary. We prove the security of this construction in a new model, which we call long-lasting security. This model guarantees that the protocol is secure in the present (pre-quantum era) while maintaining privacy in the long term (post-quantum era). This new model is of independent interest for constructing efficient schemes that are resilient to the harvest-now-decrypt-later line of attacks. In this model, we propose a blockchain-compatible secure voting scheme using our PVSS scheme. Our PVSS schemes demonstrate practical efficiency: our post-quantum PVSS shares a secret among 1024 receivers in 667 ms and verifies the dealing in < 5 ms, and communicates 4.4MB, overall whereas the state of the art [Gentry et al., Eurocrypt 2022] communicates 251MB and requires 2060s for dealing the secret.

ACM Conference on Post-Quantum and Quantum-based Security•Oct 26, 2026•0 citations
We present a new framework for constructing practically efficient publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) with non-interactive dealers , in that the dealer may go offline after sending a single message, and is not involved in the share verification process. We use identity-based encryption (IBE) and commitments as the main ingredients and avoid expensive zero-knowledge proofs. By instantiating them with post-quantum secure schemes, a lattice-based IBE and a hash-based commitment, we obtain our first construction: a post-quantum secure PVSS with non-interactive dealers that outperforms the prior lattice-based practical construction by Gentry et al. [Eurocrypt 2022]. However, to enable the aggregation of PVSS transcripts (which facilitates many additional applications such as secure voting), we propose our second construction by replacing hash-based commitments with Pedersen's homomorphic commitments. While this does not achieve full-fledged post-quantum security (as Pedersen's scheme is not quantum safe), it still provides privacy against a post-quantum adversary. We prove the security of this construction in a new model, which we call long-lasting security. This model guarantees that the protocol is secure in the present (pre-quantum era) while maintaining privacy in the long term (post-quantum era). This new model is of independent interest for constructing efficient schemes that are resilient to the harvest-now-decrypt-later line of attacks. In this model, we propose a blockchain-compatible secure voting scheme using our PVSS scheme. Our PVSS schemes demonstrate practical efficiency: our post-quantum PVSS shares a secret among 1024 receivers in 667 ms and verifies the dealing in < 5 ms, and communicates 4.4MB, overall whereas the state of the art [Gentry et al., Eurocrypt 2022] communicates 251MB and requires 2060s for dealing the secret.