Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers provably secure, information-theoretic key exchange, but in long-distance scenarios without quantum repeaters, Trusted Nodes (TNs) are commonly employed despite introducing critical security risks. We propose a redundant key management method for QKD network that combines Twin Field QKD (TF-QKD) (or Measurement-Device Independent (MDI)-QKD) with a novel key-routing scheme to eliminate the need for truly trusted TNs. Quantum measurements are handled entirely within the network, minimizing end-user hardware requirements. Multiple QKD links connect intermediate nodes such that a successful attack requires the collusion of multiple adversarial nodes, greatly enhancing security over the traditional TN model. In this contribution, we discuss the tradeoff between security, key rates, and distances supported by the new method. Our analysis reveals that the improved redundant key management system may enable true end-to-end connectivity over several thousand kilometers while maintaining high security standards.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers provably secure, information-theoretic key exchange, but in long-distance scenarios without quantum repeaters, Trusted Nodes (TNs) are commonly employed despite introducing critical security risks. We propose a redundant key management method for QKD network that combines Twin Field QKD (TF-QKD) (or Measurement-Device Independent (MDI)-QKD) with a novel key-routing scheme to eliminate the need for truly trusted TNs. Quantum measurements are handled entirely within the network, minimizing end-user hardware requirements. Multiple QKD links connect intermediate nodes such that a successful attack requires the collusion of multiple adversarial nodes, greatly enhancing security over the traditional TN model. In this contribution, we discuss the tradeoff between security, key rates, and distances supported by the new method. Our analysis reveals that the improved redundant key management system may enable true end-to-end connectivity over several thousand kilometers while maintaining high security standards.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) offers provably secure, information-theoretic key exchange, but in long-distance scenarios without quantum repeaters, Trusted Nodes (TNs) are commonly employed despite introducing critical security risks. We propose a redundant key management method for QKD network that combines Twin Field QKD (TF-QKD) (or Measurement-Device Independent (MDI)-QKD) with a novel key-routing scheme to eliminate the need for truly trusted TNs. Quantum measurements are handled entirely within the network, minimizing end-user hardware requirements. Multiple QKD links connect intermediate nodes such that a successful attack requires the collusion of multiple adversarial nodes, greatly enhancing security over the traditional TN model. In this contribution, we discuss the tradeoff between security, key rates, and distances supported by the new method. Our analysis reveals that the improved redundant key management system may enable true end-to-end connectivity over several thousand kilometers while maintaining high security standards.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a key application in quantum communication, enabling secure key exchange between parties using quantum states. Twin-field (TF) QKD offers a promising solution that surpasses the repeaterless limits, and its measurement-device-independent nature makes it suitable for star-type network architectures. In this work, we propose a scalable TF-QKD network with adaptable architecture, where users prepare quantum signals and send them to network nodes. These nodes use an optical switch to route the signals to multi-user measurement units, enabling secure key distribution among arbitrary users and adapting to complex connection demands of the network. A proof-of-principle demonstration with three users successfully achieved secure key sharing over simulated link losses of up to 30 dB, with an average rate of 19.57 bit/s. Additionally, simulations show that the proposed architecture can achieve a total secure key rate of 4.84×104 bit/s at 100 km in a symmetric 32-user network. This approach represents a significant advancement in the topology of untrusted-node QKD networks and holds promise for practical, large-scale applications in secure communication.
The feasibility of trust-free long-haul quantum key distribution (QKD) networks is addressed. We combine measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), as an access technology, with a quantum repeater setup, at the core of future quantum communication networks. This will provide a quantum link none of whose intermediary nodes need to be trusted, or, in our terminology, a trust-free QKD link. As the main figure of merit, we calculate the secret key generation rate when a particular probabilistic quantum repeater protocol is in use. We assume the users are equipped with imperfect single photon sources, which can possibly emit two single photons, or laser sources to implement decoy-state techniques. We consider apparatus imperfection, such as quantum efficiency and dark count of photodetectors, path loss of the channel, and writing and reading efficiencies of quantum memories. By optimizing different system parameters, we estimate the maximum distance over which users can share secret keys when a finite number of memories are employed in the repeater setup.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information theoretic security. However, the distances over which complete security can be achieved are fundamentally limited in the absence of quantum repeaters. Thus, a key question is how to build a quantum network (QN) given this restriction. One paradigm that has been considered is trusted node (TN) quantum networks where intermediate trusted nodes are used as relays of quantum keys. Another paradigm is to route key channels through intermediate nodes optically, either through wavelength or fiber switching, thus avoiding the use of TNs. In both of these paradigms, a QKD receiver or transmitter at a specific node can be shared between multiple QKD transmitters or receivers at different nodes in order to reduce the overall costs; this sharing can be enabled via an optical switch. In this paper, we investigate the two paradigms for designing QNs. In the TN model we assume the Decoy BB84 protocol, whereas in the non-TN model, we employ twin-field QKD (TF-QKD) due to the increased single hop distances. We present mixed integer linear program models to optimize network design in both of these paradigms and use these to investigate the viability of switching in the network models as a method of sharing devices. We show that sharing of devices can provide cost reduction in QNs up to a certain transmission requirement rate between users in the TN model, while also providing benefits even at significantly higher transmission requirements in the TF-QKD model. The specific value of this rate is dependent on the network graph; however, for mesh topology TN networks this is expected to occur at average key transmission requirements of ∼1000−5000bits/s. We further use the models to investigate the effects of different network parameters, such as cooling costs, switch frequency, and device costs. We show that cooled detectors are useful in large TF-QKD networks, despite higher costs, but are only useful in TN networks when transmission requirements are very high or cooling is cheap. We also investigate how network costs vary with switching frequency and switch loss, showing that compromising for slightly faster switching times and higher loss switches does not significantly increase network costs; thus a significant effort in improving switch loss may not be necessary. Finally, we look at how the benefits of sharing devices change as the cost of devices changes, showing that for any non-negligible device cost, device sharing is always beneficial at low transmission requirements.
We study how to use quantum key distribution (QKD) in common optical network infrastructures and propose a method to overcome its distance limitations. QKD is the first technology offering information theoretic secret-key distribution that relies only on the fundamental principles of quantum physics. Point-to-point QKD devices have reached a mature industrial state; however, these devices are severely limited in distance, since signals at the quantum level (e.g. single photons) are highly affected by the losses in the communication channel and intermediate devices. To overcome this limitation, intermediate nodes (i.e. repeaters) are used. Both, quantum-regime and trusted, classical, repeaters have been proposed in the QKD literature, but only the latter can be implemented in practice. As a novelty, we propose here a new QKD network model based on the use of not fully trusted intermediate nodes, referred as weakly trusted repeaters. This approach forces the attacker to simultaneously break several paths to get access to the exchanged key, thus improving significantly the security of the network. We formalize the model using network codes and provide real scenarios that allow users to exchange secure keys over metropolitan optical networks using only passive components.
In this paper we explore how recent technologies can improve the security of optical networks. In particular, we study how to use quantum key distribution (QKD) in common optical network infrastructures and propose a method to overcome its distance limitations. QKD is the first technology offering information theoretic secret-key distribution that relies only on the fundamental principles of quantum physics. Point-to-point QKD devices have reached a mature industrial state; however, these devices are severely limited in distance, since signals at the quantum level (e.g., single photons) are highly affected by the losses in the communication channel and intermediate devices. To overcome this limitation, intermediate nodes (i.e., repeaters) are used. Both quantum-regime and trusted, classical repeaters have been proposed in the QKD literature, but only the latter can be implemented in practice. As a novelty, we propose here a new QKD network model based on the use of not fully trusted intermediate nodes, referred to as weakly trusted repeaters. This approach forces the attacker to simultaneously break several paths to get access to the exchanged key, thus improving significantly the security of the network. We formalize the model using network codes and provide real scenarios that allow users to exchange secure keys over metropolitan optical networks using only passive components. Moreover, the theoretical framework allows one to extend these scenarios not only to accommodate more complex trust constraints, but also to consider robustness and resiliency constraints on the network.