Matthieu R. Bloch, João Barros
In this chapter, we discuss the construction of practical codes for secrecy. The design of codes for the wiretap channel turns out to be surprisingly difficult, and this area of information-theoretic security is still largely in its infancy. To some extent, the major obstacles in the road to secrecy capacity are similar to those that lay in the path to channel capacity: the random-coding arguments used to establish the secrecy capacity do not provide explicit code constructions. However, the design of wiretap codes is further impaired by the absence of a simple metric, such as a bit error rate, which could be evaluated numerically. Unlike codes designed for reliable communication, whose performance is eventually assessed by plotting a bit-error-rate curve, we cannot simulate an eavesdropper with unlimited computational power; hence, wiretap codes must possess enough structure to be provably secure. For certain channels, such as binary erasure wiretap channels, the information-theoretic secrecy constraint can be recast in terms of an algebraic property for a code-generator matrix. Most of the chapter focuses on such cases since this algebraic view of secrecy simplifies the analysis considerably. As seen in Chapter 4, the design of secret-key distillation strategies is a somewhat easier problem insofar as reliability and security can be handled separately by means of information reconciliation and privacy amplification. Essentially, the construction of coding schemes for key agreement reduces to the design of Slepian–Wolf-like codes for information reconciliation, which can be done efficiently with low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes or turbo-codes.
Cambridge University Press eBooks•Sep 22, 2011•3 citations