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Practical quantum key distribution protocol without monitoring signal disturbance

Sasaki Toshihiko, Y. Yamamoto, Koashi Masato

Published May 22, 2014• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Quantum cryptograph exploits the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics to provide a secure way to exchange private information. Such an exchange requires a common random bit sequence, called a key, to be shared secretly between the sender and the receiver. The basic idea behind quantum key distribution (QKD) has widely been understood as the property that any attempt to distinguish encoded quantum states causes a disturbance in the signal. As a result, implementation of a QKD protocol involves an estimation of the experimental parameters influenced by the eavesdropper’s intervention, which is achieved by randomly sampling the signal. If the estimation of many parameters with high precision is required, the portion of the signal that is sacrificed increases, thus decreasing the efficiency of the protocol. Here we propose a QKD protocol based on an entirely different principle. The sender encodes a bit sequence onto non-orthogonal quantum states and the receiver randomly dictates how a single bit should be calculated from the sequence. The eavesdropper, who is unable to learn the whole of the sequence, cannot guess the bit value correctly. An achievable rate of secure key distribution is calculated by considering complementary choices between quantum measurements of two conjugate observables. We found that a practical implementation using a laser pulse train achieves a key rate comparable to a decoy-state QKD protocol, an often-used technique for lasers. It also has a better tolerance of bit errors and of finite-sized-key effects. We anticipate that this finding will give new insight into how the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics can be related to secure communication, and will facilitate the simple and efficient use of conventional lasers for QKD.

Related papers

Establishing security of quantum key distribution without monitoring disturbance

Masato Koashi

In conventional quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, the information leak to an eavesdropper is estimated through the basic principle of quantum mechanics dictated in the original version of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. The amount of leaked information on a shared sifted key is bounded from above essentially by using information-disturbance trade-off relations, based on the amount of signal disturbance measured via randomly sampled or inserted probe signals. Here we discuss an entirely different avenue toward the private communication, which does not rely on the information disturbance trade-off relations and hence does not require a monitoring of signal disturbance. The independence of the amount of privacy amplification from that of disturbance tends to give it a high tolerance on the channel noises. The lifting of the burden of precise statistical estimation of disturbance leads to a favorable finite-key-size effect. A protocol based on the novel principle can be implemented by only using photon detectors and classical optics tools: a laser, a phase modulator, and an interferometer. The protocol resembles the differential-phase-shift QKD protocol in that both share a simple binary phase shift keying on a coherent train of weak pulses from a laser. The difference lies in the use of a variable-delay interferometer in the new protocol, which randomly changes the combination of pulse pairs to be superposed. This extra randomness has turned out to be enough to upper-bound the information extracted by the eavesdropper, regardless of how they have disturbed the quantum signal.

Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE•Oct 13, 2015•0 citations

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Conventional quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes determine the amount of leaked information through estimation of signal disturbance. Here we present a QKD protocol based on an entirely different principle, which works without monitoring the disturbance. The protocol is implemented with a laser, an interferometer with a variable delay, and photon detectors. It is capable of producing a secret key when the bit error rate is high and the communication time is short.

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The performance of a practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system is often limited by the multi-photon state emission of its source and the dark counts of its detectors. Here, we present two methods to improve its performance. The first method is decoy state QKD: the sender randomly sends out weak coherent states with various average photon numbers (which are named as signal state and decoy states). In [14,15], we have performed the first experimental implementation of decoy state QKD over 15km and 60km respectively, thus dramatically increasing the distance and secure key generation rate of practical QKD systems. Our work has been followed up by many research groups worldwide [16-18]. The second scheme is QKD with "dual detectors" [19]: the legitimate receiver randomly uses either a fast (but noisy) detector or a quiet (but slow) detector to measure the incoming quantum signals. The measurement results from the quiet detector can be used to upper bound the eavesdropper's information, while the measurement results from the fast detector are used to generate a secure key. We applied this idea to various QKD protocols. Simulation results demonstrated significant improvements in both BB84 protocol with ideal single photon source and Gaussian-modulated coherent states protocol.

Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE•Sep 11, 2007•2 citations

QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION LABORATORY DEMONSTRATION

Brault, Jack R.

Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method of secure key distribution which provides protection against the tampering and interception of information. Following the Bennet-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol of QKD, we select randomly from a set of bases in which to produce polarized photons and send the photons to a receiver, who measures them in a basis randomly selected from the same set. The fact that quantum mechanics prohibits the exact copying of a photon ensures that any eavesdropper who intercepts, measures, and attempts to pass the photons on to the receiver will be unable to faithfully reproduce that signal. The presence of the eavesdropper can then be detected, prior to any exchange of information, by an examination of the error rate between portions of the keys generated by the sender and receiver. Using a biphoton source, we have constructed a QKD system for use in research towards naval applications.

•Dec 1, 2021•0 citations
Quantum cryptograph exploits the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics to provide a secure way to exchange private information. Such an exchange requires a common random bit sequence, called a key, to be shared secretly between the sender and the receiver. The basic idea behind quantum key distribution (QKD) has widely been understood as the property that any attempt to distinguish encoded quantum states causes a disturbance in the signal. As a result, implementation of a QKD protocol involves an estimation of the experimental parameters influenced by the eavesdropper’s intervention, which is achieved by randomly sampling the signal. If the estimation of many parameters with high precision is required, the portion of the signal that is sacrificed increases, thus decreasing the efficiency of the protocol. Here we propose a QKD protocol based on an entirely different principle. The sender encodes a bit sequence onto non-orthogonal quantum states and the receiver randomly dictates how a single bit should be calculated from the sequence. The eavesdropper, who is unable to learn the whole of the sequence, cannot guess the bit value correctly. An achievable rate of secure key distribution is calculated by considering complementary choices between quantum measurements of two conjugate observables. We found that a practical implementation using a laser pulse train achieves a key rate comparable to a decoy-state QKD protocol, an often-used technique for lasers. It also has a better tolerance of bit errors and of finite-sized-key effects. We anticipate that this finding will give new insight into how the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics can be related to secure communication, and will facilitate the simple and efficient use of conventional lasers for QKD.
In conventional quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, the information leak to an eavesdropper is estimated through the basic principle of quantum mechanics dictated in the original version of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. The amount of leaked information on a shared sifted key is bounded from above essentially by using information-disturbance trade-off relations, based on the amount of signal disturbance measured via randomly sampled or inserted probe signals. Here we discuss an entirely different avenue toward the private communication, which does not rely on the information disturbance trade-off relations and hence does not require a monitoring of signal disturbance. The independence of the amount of privacy amplification from that of disturbance tends to give it a high tolerance on the channel noises. The lifting of the burden of precise statistical estimation of disturbance leads to a favorable finite-key-size effect. A protocol based on the novel principle can be implemented by only using photon detectors and classical optics tools: a laser, a phase modulator, and an interferometer. The protocol resembles the differential-phase-shift QKD protocol in that both share a simple binary phase shift keying on a coherent train of weak pulses from a laser. The difference lies in the use of a variable-delay interferometer in the new protocol, which randomly changes the combination of pulse pairs to be superposed. This extra randomness has turned out to be enough to upper-bound the information extracted by the eavesdropper, regardless of how they have disturbed the quantum signal.
Abstract Ideal quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols require perfect single photon sources, detectors, and lossless channels. However, the present technology cannot ensure all of the requirements. Among the variants of practical QKD schemes, decoy state QKD in its present form approaches nearly the theoretical security. In any decoy state method, a compromise is made between the security of the key distribution and the rate of key generation by optimizing the two major protocol parameters: the number of decoy states and their relative intensities, and the length of the data string as well. Use of more number of decoy states and higher range of intensities though improve security, their optimization becomes too complex. Therefore, from practical consideration, some restrictions are to be imposed on the choice of decoy states and their intensities. In addition, the treatment of correlations among the laser pulses in security analysis is not fully understood. Normally, lack of correlations or randomness among the signal states is considered to gain security, but, in a different approach, described in the proposed protocol, additional correlation is introduced to improve key generation rate without compromising security. To do that, a one-way function is shared among the legitimate users to provide a semi-random choice of bases depending on the outcome of the receiver’s detector. The initial communication is made through a set of bits with predefined bases and intensity distribution. Then, with the help of the positive outcome of the receiver’s detector, the basis set as well as the length of the bit string for subsequent communications are computed. This results in correlation among the bases and the relative intensities of the signal states and provides a self-checking mechanism to identify eavesdropping. The security analysis of the protocol provides a low error rate and a relatively high key generation rate.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables secure key exchange, based on fundamental laws of quantum mechanics [1] . There exist various protocols which are mathematically proven to be secure, however, for an actual implementation vulnerabilities, due to non-ideal components, must be considered. For example, the usage of faint lasers instead of single-photon sources undermines the security, as even for mean photon numbers per pulse µ ≪ 1 there is a non-vanishing probability of emitting multiple photons. The decoy protocol [2] , [3] offers a countermeasure. When randomly switching between two or more different pulse intensity levels, by exploiting their non-orthogonality, the so-called photon number splitting (PNS) attack can be revealed.
The performance of a practical quantum key distribution (QKD) system is often limited by the multi-photon state emission of its source and the dark counts of its detectors. Here, we present two methods to improve its performance. The first method is decoy state QKD: the sender randomly sends out weak coherent states with various average photon numbers (which are named as signal state and decoy states). In [14,15], we have performed the first experimental implementation of decoy state QKD over 15km and 60km respectively, thus dramatically increasing the distance and secure key generation rate of practical QKD systems. Our work has been followed up by many research groups worldwide [16-18]. The second scheme is QKD with "dual detectors" [19]: the legitimate receiver randomly uses either a fast (but noisy) detector or a quiet (but slow) detector to measure the incoming quantum signals. The measurement results from the quiet detector can be used to upper bound the eavesdropper's information, while the measurement results from the fast detector are used to generate a secure key. We applied this idea to various QKD protocols. Simulation results demonstrated significant improvements in both BB84 protocol with ideal single photon source and Gaussian-modulated coherent states protocol.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a method of secure key distribution which provides protection against the tampering and interception of information. Following the Bennet-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol of QKD, we select randomly from a set of bases in which to produce polarized photons and send the photons to a receiver, who measures them in a basis randomly selected from the same set. The fact that quantum mechanics prohibits the exact copying of a photon ensures that any eavesdropper who intercepts, measures, and attempts to pass the photons on to the receiver will be unable to faithfully reproduce that signal. The presence of the eavesdropper can then be detected, prior to any exchange of information, by an examination of the error rate between portions of the keys generated by the sender and receiver. Using a biphoton source, we have constructed a QKD system for use in research towards naval applications.