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Astronaut Development and Deployment of a Secure Quantum Space Network

Christopher Altman

Published Jan 30, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We propose a fundamentally new quantum communication system based on continuous-variable quantum teleportation that will provide space-based NASA assets with unconditional information security. All command-and-control inputs to spacecraft sent over our network will be guaranteed to be impossible to spoof by any US adversary, protected by the fundamental laws of physics, whereas there is currently no security proof for conventional secure communication such as SSL, RSA, et al. This type of absolute security is even guaranteed if the encrypted traffic must pass over insecure and public networks not under NASA, or even US, control. This capability will provide NASA with a permanent solution for its secure communication needs and is directly responsive to requirements for unconditional information security as referenced in the NASA Roadmap. Our visionary approach brings together the expertise of the two leading European groups involved in the world’s-first demonstration of entangled quantum communications over a 144km free-space optical path, with the quantum and optical communications expertise of NASA JPL, the continuous-variable quantum communications expertise of Quintessence Labs, and the lunar and astronaut training facilities at the Pacific International Space Center for Exploration Systems (PISCES) on the summit of Mauna Kea, an active volcano on the Big Island of Hawaiʻi. Consequently, we offer the best global team for developing a free-space continuous-variable quantum communications prototype and demonstrating the feasibility for it to be set up and calibrated by NASA-trained astronauts conducting an analogue lunar training mission on the same terrain used to train Apollo 11 astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin, echoing the famous placement of the lunar retroreflectors by the Apollo astronauts. NASA is moving to optical communications for higher bandwidth channels. The security of those channels is based on standard public key infrastructure (PKI). As PKI is only conditionally secure, it can in principle be compromised with sufficient computing power. This exposes NASA’s space assets — and astronauts — to potential harm if an adversary inserts damaging control inputs into communications used for command-and- control of space assets. We propose a functional system that an astronaut can set up to demonstrate the feasibility of deploying a secure quantum communications network between the Earth, the Moon, Mars, and deep space missions based on the use of continuous-variable quantum communications . This type of communications is ideally suited to integration into conventional NASA optical communications as it relies upon similar types of lasers and optical elements.

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.18426409

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We propose a fundamentally new quantum communication system based on continuous-variable quantum teleportation that will provide space-based NASA assets with unconditional information security. All command-and-control inputs to spacecraft sent over our network will be guaranteed to be impossible to spoof by any US adversary, protected by the fundamental laws of physics, whereas there is currently no security proof for conventional secure communication such as SSL, RSA, et al. This type of absolute security is even guaranteed if the encrypted traffic must pass over insecure and public networks not under NASA, or even US, control. This capability will provide NASA with a permanent solution for its secure communication needs and is directly responsive to requirements for unconditional information security as referenced in the NASA Roadmap. Our visionary approach brings together the expertise of the two leading European groups involved in the world’s-first demonstration of entangled quantum communications over a 144km free-space optical path, with the quantum and optical communications expertise of NASA JPL, the continuous-variable quantum communications expertise of Quintessence Labs, and the lunar and astronaut training facilities at the Pacific International Space Center for Exploration Systems (PISCES) on the summit of Mauna Kea, an active volcano on the Big Island of Hawaiʻi. Consequently, we offer the best global team for developing a free-space continuous-variable quantum communications prototype and demonstrating the feasibility for it to be set up and calibrated by NASA-trained astronauts conducting an analogue lunar training mission on the same terrain used to train Apollo 11 astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin, echoing the famous placement of the lunar retroreflectors by the Apollo astronauts. NASA is moving to optical communications for higher bandwidth channels. The security of those channels is based on standard public key infrastructure (PKI). As PKI is only conditionally secure, it can in principle be compromised with sufficient computing power. This exposes NASA’s space assets — and astronauts — to potential harm if an adversary inserts damaging control inputs into communications used for command-and- control of space assets. We propose a functional system that an astronaut can set up to demonstrate the feasibility of deploying a secure quantum communications network between the Earth, the Moon, Mars, and deep space missions based on the use of continuous-variable quantum communications . This type of communications is ideally suited to integration into conventional NASA optical communications as it relies upon similar types of lasers and optical elements.
The deeper into space, the more secure and high-speed missions targeting Mars and lunar habitats are needed. As our needs for secure and high-speed communication and also for powerful computing capabilities grow increasingly critical, it becomes evident that classical systems are not capable of meeting the extreme demands of space. This chapter explores how recent advances in quantum computing and quantum communication could come forward to meet these challenges head-on. Based on QKD and entanglement-based protocols of communication, it investigates how mission data, commands, and telemetry can be shielded from intercept or tamper also how some complex calculations and various data processing tasks that require quantum computing can be performed in deep space. Real world projects regarding Micius satellite of China act as case studies to demonstrate how theory is pitted against practice. In addition, the major technical hurdles are outlined, ranging from photon loss to synchronization problems. The path ahead for enabling the next generation of space communications infrastructure is also presented.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is currently the only known technique that is able to guarantee information-theoretic secure communications.While many countries have already started developing use-cases based mostly on terrestrial links, the high losses that afflict fiber-based channels make them unsuitable for very-long-distance communications.Taking the quantum networks to a national and global scale thus requires the use of satellite-based quantum communications, as the attenuation experienced by photons in space communications is order of magnitudes lower than the one that characterizes terrestrial networks.Thales Alenia Space in Italy (TAS-I) is positioning itself as a key actor in the development of the technology needed to perform space quantum communications.In this work, we present an overview of the initiatives that are currently being carried out by TAS-I, and define a roadmap whose steps are planned to take the current laboratory experimentation towards the development of a fully operational QKD constellation meant to provide secret keys on a global scale.We also describe a possible implementation of an Italian demonstrator mission based on a LEO satellite that acts as a trusted node to distribute shared keys among a certain number of ground stations; we study the effects of some major system choices and assess the overall achievable performance in terms of Secret Key Volume (SKV).
Free-space quantum key distribution opens up new possibilities for the development of quantum communication systems, facilitating the deployment of quantum networks in physically hard-to-reach areas and across wide landscapes without the use of optical fibers. This approach overcomes restrictions associated with cable laying and provides a more flexible infrastructure for quantum information transmission. Together with the use of continuous-variable protocols, it becomes possible to organize secure information transfer using optimal scalable communication systems despite deleterious environmental influences. This paper reviews key achievements and technical aspects of implementing continuous-variable quantum key distribution in atmospheric channels, considering the main atmospheric effects such as turbulence, scattering, and beam wandering. We present the current state of continuous-variable quantum key distribution systems in free space and their practical implementations, including successful experimental projects and prototypes. Prospects for further development, including integration with existing telecommunications networks and potential application areas, are discussed.
In this society people are always connected, and everyday they manage a lot of personal data also risking to be eavesdropped. Quantum science is one the most promising field of the next years, from quantum computing to quantum communications and above all quantum cryptography. Quantum cryptography is the first commercial application of quantum physics and moreover it results one of the most reliable solution for security problem. Using Quantum Physic law's it is possible to establish secure communications between two users, guaranteeing unconditionally security in the transmission of data. Unfortunately due to the intrinsic losses inside optical fibers, it is not possible to establish a quantum link over 300300300 km until quantum repeater will be achievable. The natural extension of terrestrial quantum links are space communications, where however the problems due to environment, temperature and pressure are totally new for quantum devices. The study investigated the possibility of sending quantum signals through atmosphere, in particular trying to realize quantum communications between Earth and Space. In this perspective we used Laser Ranging corner-cubes mounted into satellites to recreate a space quantum link. It was possible to prove that even with high losses, variable attenuation, and high backgorund a quantum key distribution system works, and an unconditionally secure key, needful for encryption, can be generated. With this experiments we demonstrate that not only free-space quantum key distribution is a ready technology, but also that quantum satellite communications is nowadays possible and realizable. Moreover these results open the way to look towards a global space quantum network, where optical station (OGS) could talk with satellite and vice-versa. This work was supported by the Strategic Project QUANTUMFUTURE of University of Padova, by ESAGNSS program and realized in Luxor laboratories in Padova. The principal tests were made at Telespazio (Matera) using the Matera Laser Ranging Observatory and into Thales Alenia Space (Torino).
Satellite systems rely on a robust yet light weight cryptographic solution for the security of ground systems, communications links, Telemetry, Tracking and Command (TT&C), payloads, onboard systems and associated subsystems. Cryptography ensures data integrity and overall security especially for satellites whose missions and data transmitted are in general and by global practices included in Critical National Infrastructures (CNIs). But emerging cybersecurity threats might render cryptographic solutions such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Diffie–Hellman (DH) and Elliptic-Curve Cryptography (ECC) ineffective in securing space assets. Quantum cryptography offers a better solution to the emerging threats of relentless and sophisticated systems and adversaries. This paper evaluates the performance of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) when deployed. The research explored the various standards mapped out by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for PQC deployment. Current security architecture of satellite systems was compared to what the PQC solution will offer to these highly classified assets. The paper further explored algorithms in place and how effective they could be in the space industry. In the space sector, deploying PQC requires a beta analysis of its performance; which was explored in the third chapter of this work. Challenges and Deployment Considerations and Computational and Resource Constraints of PQC deployment was evaluated in the fifth and sixth sections of this work. The paper concluded by acknowledging the potential complexities in the eventual wholistic adoption and deployment of Quantum Cryptography.
Quantum information processing uses the laws of quantum physics to perform tasks that are infeasible or impossible classically. Within this broader programme, quantum communication has emerged as one of the most practically mature sub-fields of quantum information science, with several proposed protocols having already been demonstrated over deployed optical fibre and free-space links. Of the various platforms available for encoding quantum information for communication, the continuous-variable (CV) framework encodes information in the quadratures of the electromagnetic field and is therefore directly compatible with the existing machinery of classical coherent optical communications. The most prominent CV protocol is continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD), which establishes an information-theoretically secure cryptographic key between two spatially separated parties. Because CV-QKD reuses much of the hardware of classical coherent telecommunications, including off-the-shelf lasers, modulators, and balanced detectors, it is a leading candidate for the deployment of quantum-secured communication over standard optical fibre networks. The development of CV-QKD has typically proceeded with the underlying physics dictating the engineering. Security proofs, often relying on the Gaussian optimality of collective attacks, set the structure of the protocol, and the practical system is then built to satisfy the assumptions on which those proofs depend. Contributions of this thesis adopt the opposite view, taking the practical engineering of high-rate CV-QKD systems as the starting point and developing the theoretical machinery required to support it. The first contribution is the formalisation of one-round sliced reconciliation with guard-band post-selection as a key distillation scheme designed for real-time, high-throughput operation. Originally introduced experimentally as a means to stabilise bit error rates and enable the use of fixed-rate error correction codes at high symbol rates, guard-band post-selection is shown here to identify the guard-band span as a free parameter that can be tuned to hold the quantum bit error rate approximately constant across a range of channel conditions. However, conditioning on accepted data produces non-Gaussian post-selected statistics that lie outside the reach of standard Gaussian-optimality security arguments, which motivates the remaining two contributions. The second contribution is an asymptotic security analysis of guard-band post-selected CV-QKD against arbitrary collective attacks, no longer restricted to Gaussian adversaries. By using a quantum channel estimate as side information and by lifting reduced-state distances to purification distances via entropic continuity bounds, security is certified against the class of channels lying close to a Gaussian thermal-loss reference, with a key-rate penalty that scales with the energy-constrained diamond distance to that reference. The third contribution is the experimental basis required to apply this framework in practice. A lightweight three-stage protocol for quantum channel estimation is proposed and demonstrated, which repurposes the Gaussian probe constellation already present in the CV-QKD signal and requires no additional hardware or modifications to the underlying protocol. Over single-mode optical fibre at distances from 10 km to 50 km, the protocol produces physically valid process tensor estimates whose energy-constrained diamond distances to a Gaussian reference channel remain on the order of 10^(-3) throughout. Together, these three contributions provide a treatment of post-selected Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD in which the engineering, the security theory, and the channel characterisation are designed to operate together within a deployable system.