Shor's factoring algorithm (SFA), by its ability to efficiently factor large numbers, has the potential to undermine contemporary encryption. At its heart is a process called order finding, which quantum mechanics lets us perform efficiently. SFA thus consists of a \emph{quantum order finding algorithm} (QOFA), bookended by classical routines which, given the order, return the factors. But, with probability up to
1/2, these classical routines fail, and QOFA must be rerun. We modify these routines using elementary results in number theory, improving the likelihood that they return the factors. The resulting quantum factoring algorithm is better than SFA at factoring safe semiprimes, an important class of numbers used in cryptography. With just one call to QOFA, our algorithm almost always factors safe semiprimes. As well as a speed-up, improving efficiency gives our algorithm other, practical advantages: unlike SFA, it does not need a randomly picked input, making it simpler to construct in the lab; and in the (unlikely) case of failure, the same circuit can be rerun, without modification. We consider generalizing this result to other cases, although we do not find a simple extension, and conclude that SFA is still the best algorithm for general numbers (non safe semiprimes, in other words). Even so, we present some simple number theoretic tricks for improving SFA in this case.
Abstract It’s well known that Shor[1] proposed a polynomial time algorithm for prime factorization by using quantum computers. For a given number n, he gave an algorithm for finding the order r of an element x (mod n) instead of giving an algorithm for factoring n directly. The indirect algorithm is feasible because factor-ization can be reduced to finding the order of an element by using randomization[2]. But a point should be stressed that the order of the number must be even. Actually, the restriction can be removed in a particular case. In this paper, we show that factoring RSA modulus (a product of two primes) only needs to find the order of 2, whether it is even or not. Keywords Shor’s quantum algorithm, RSA modulus. 1