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NAPQES: Noise Augmentation Post Quantum Encryption System. A Noise-Obfuscated Symmetric Cipher with Post-Quantum Resistance and Lightweight Operation

Abdeslam Jakjoud, Karim Ben Amor

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.13140/rg.2.2.36460.01925

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