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Journal of Optics

A secure optical image encryption approach with triplet perfect forward secrecy keys against modified known- and chosen-plaintext attacks

Hukum Singh, Savita Anjana, Kapil Shankar Gaur

Published Mar 10, 2026• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s12596-026-03053-x

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In this paper, the security of an optical cryptosystem based on double random phase encoding (DRPE) with perfect forward secrecy (PFS) is analyzed for a particular session. In the cryptosystem, the PFS strategy is utilized to enhance the security and key management of the traditional DRPE scheme. Our analysis reveals that the use of PFS has certain advantages in the key management approach, but the method is still vulnerable against modified plaintext attacks when the attack is performed in the same session. Also, it is noted that the method is safe against conventional plaintext attacks, but it is vulnerable to the modified chosen and known plaintext attacks. The original plaintext can be easily retrieved with the proposed attack algorithms. Numerical simulation results are presented to validate the effectiveness of the proposed attack algorithms.
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In conventional symmetric encryption, it is common for the encryption/decryption key to be reused for multiple plaintexts. This gives rise to the concept of a known-plaintext attack. In optical image encryption systems, such as double random phase encoding (DRPE), this is also the case. With optical encryption, if one knows a plaintext-ciphertext pair, one can carry out a known-plaintext attack more efficiently than a bruteforce attack, using heuristics based on phase retrieval or simulated annealing. However, it is more likely that an attacker will find an imperfect encryption/decryption key using such heuristics. Such an imperfect key will work for the known plaintext-ciphertext pair, but not an arbitrary unseen plaintext-ciphertext pair using the original key. In this paper, we illustrate the problem and attempt to characterise the increase in security it affords optical encryption.