ABSTRACT Unmanned aerial‐vehicle (UAV) networks have been ubiquitous and play an inevitable role in internet‐of‐drones. Their reliance on mesh networking and the MAVLink protocol makes them highly vulnerable to severe and potentially lethal cyberattacks. The classical public‐key encryption/decryption scheme employing integer‐factorization and primitive‐root‐type problems (such as the RSA system) has been commonly used for many years; however, its security is compromised by future advancements in quantum computing (through Shor's algorithm). In this work, we present a quantum‐secure authentication protocol for UAV‐based IoD applications, emphasizing user anonymity. A security analysis is presented which guarantees correctness, privacy, and robustness against numerous active and passive attacks in both the classical and quantum settings. Moreover, a real‐time testbed experiment of running time on Raspberry Pi 5 boards to evaluate the computational overhead of different cryptographic primitives illustrates its practicality. Finally, a performance comparison of filtering accuracy and resistance to unknown attacks with related existing schemes demonstrates its scalability and usefulness in real‐world applications.
ABSTRACT Unmanned aerial‐vehicle (UAV) networks have been ubiquitous and play an inevitable role in internet‐of‐drones. Their reliance on mesh networking and the MAVLink protocol makes them highly vulnerable to severe and potentially lethal cyberattacks. The classical public‐key encryption/decryption scheme employing integer‐factorization and primitive‐root‐type problems (such as the RSA system) has been commonly used for many years; however, its security is compromised by future advancements in quantum computing (through Shor's algorithm). In this work, we present a quantum‐secure authentication protocol for UAV‐based IoD applications, emphasizing user anonymity. A security analysis is presented which guarantees correctness, privacy, and robustness against numerous active and passive attacks in both the classical and quantum settings. Moreover, a real‐time testbed experiment of running time on Raspberry Pi 5 boards to evaluate the computational overhead of different cryptographic primitives illustrates its practicality. Finally, a performance comparison of filtering accuracy and resistance to unknown attacks with related existing schemes demonstrates its scalability and usefulness in real‐world applications.
The proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) networks and their numerous benefits in critical scenarios, UAV become crucial for Internet of Drones (IoD) operations. However, due to their communication methods, such as the micro-air-vehicle communication (MAVlink) protocol, wireless connections, and potentially insecure Internet channels, UAV networks are highly vulnerable to potentially lethal attacks. To overcome such issues, public key cryptographic techniques relying on integer factorization problem (IFP) and discrete logarithm problems (DLP) have been used form decades. However, with the significant advancements in quantum computing and adaptation of Shor's algorithm such cryptographic techniques based on IFP and DLP become insecure today and vulnerable to quantum attacks, which demand new ways of thinking about security. In this paper, we propose a quantum-secure access control protocol for UAV-based IoD applications, and its primary focus is on preserving user anonymity. A comprehensive security analysis validates the accuracy, security, and resilience against various active and passive attacks in both classical and quantum scenarios. A thorough formal security verification using the Scyther automated software validation tool to showcases the robustness of the proposed scheme. Furthermore, a real-time testbed experiment on Raspberry Pi 4 devices to assess the computational overhead of various cryptographic primitives demonstrates its practicality. Lastly, a detailed comparative performance evaluation, including authentication accuracy, performance under unknown attacks with existing related schemes illustrates its scalability and efficiency in real-world applications.
The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) network serves as the core infrastructure of the future low-altitude intelligent network, providing flexible aerial smart services for various industries through inter-UAV collaboration and ground-air connectivity. With the advancement of quantum computing, quantum algorithms pose a serious threat to UAV communication networks. Traditional authentication protocols based on classical number-theoretic problems are no longer secure against quantum attacks. To address the challenges of quantum threats and the inherent characteristics of UAVs, such as high mobility and resource constraints, this paper proposes a quantum resistant authentication and key agreement protocol for UAV networks. The comprehensive informal security analysis demonstrates the robustness of the protocol against various attacks, particularly attacks based on quantum computing. Furthermore, the authentication component of the protocol adopts a lightweight design, reducing computational overhead by up to 53.57%, thereby balancing security and efficiency.
The rapid advance of manufacturing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs, aka drones) has led to a rise in the use of their civilian and commercial applications. The access of these drones to controlled airspace can be efficiently coordinated through particular layered network architecture, often referred to as the Internet-of-Drones (IoD). The nature of IoD, which is deployed in an open-access environment, brings significant safety and security concerns. Classical cryptosystems such as elliptic curve cryptography, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, and Diffie-Hellman are essential building blocks to secure communication in the IoD. However, with the rapid development of quantum computing, it will be easy to break public-key cryptosystems using efficient quantum algorithms like Shor’s algorithm. Thus, building quantum-safe solutions to enhance IoD security has become imperative. Fortunately, quantum technologies can provide unconditional security solutions to protect data and communications in the IoD environment. This paper proposes a quantum-based scheme to prevent unauthorized drones from accessing a specific flight zone and authenticates the identities and shared secret messages of involved entities. To do so, we used a quantum channel to encode the private information based on a pre-shared key and a random key generated in session. The involved entities also perform mutual authentication and share a secret key. We also provide the security proofs and analysis of the proposed scheme that indicates its resistance to well-known attacks.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, are increasingly being employed across a broad spectrum of applications, ranging from military operations to commercial purposes. However, as UAVs become more integrated into everyday life, security and privacy concerns are similarly escalating due to vulnerabilities arising from operating on open wireless channels and having limited onboard computational resources. Moreover, with the emergence of quantum computers, conventional cryptographic methods that ensure the security and privacy of UAV communications are at severe risk. These risks encompass the possibility of unauthorized access, breaches of data, and cyber-physical attacks that jeopardize the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of UAV operations. Quantum computers are expected to break the conventional cryptography methods, such as symmetric and asymmetric schemes, with the support of Grover’s and Shor’s algorithms, respectively. Consequently, traditional cryptographic algorithms must give way to quantum-resistant algorithms, referred to as Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms. Although researchers actively develop, test, and standardize new PQC algorithms, the threat persists despite the progress made through these consistent efforts. This review article first examines the security and privacy landscape, including threats and requirements of UAVs. This article also discusses PQC and various PQC families and the status of the NIST’s implementation and standardization process. Lastly, we explore challenges and future directions in implementing PQC for UAVs.
Secure communication in unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) networks is critical for a wide range of civil and military applications, from precision agriculture and disaster response to critical infrastructure monitoring. These missions require lightweight, tamper-resistant, and quantum-secure authentication mechanisms. We examine the recently proposed Quantum-Resistant Identity Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme for UAV Networks Based on the Kyber Algorithm (LIGKYX) and demonstrate its critical weaknesses, including a lack of Perfect Forward/Backward Secrecy (PFS/PBS), and desynchronization vulnerabilities. To address these limitations, we propose a novel authentication and key agreement protocol that integrates SRAM-based Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) with the Kyber post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism, eliminating the reliance on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and stateful counters used in LIGKYX. The security of the proposed protocol is validated through both formal and informal analyses, demonstrating strong resistance to replay, impersonation, man-in-the-middle, desynchronization, and UAV capture attacks. Performance evaluation confirms its efficiency: the total communication overhead is reduced by 7.1% (from 1836 bytes in LIGKYX to 1705 bytes in the proposed scheme), and the total authentication time is reduced by more than 54%, from 87.84 ms in LIGKYX to 40.23 ms in the proposed scheme. These improvements demonstrate that the protocol not only strengthens security but also significantly reduces computation and communication costs. Overall, the proposed solution offers a lightweight, scalable, and quantum-resistant authentication framework tailored for resource-constrained UAV environments, representing a substantial advancement over existing schemes such as LIGKYX.
The Internet of Drones (IoD) is a network layer control system that manages the communication of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Drones have emerged as a novel approach to addressing everyday human challenges and are now used in a variety of domains, such as personal activities (e.g., photography and videography), urban applications (e.g., traffic monitoring and structural inspection), commercial operations (e.g., power line and tower inspection), agriculture, and military operations. Given the rapid growth of UAVs and their expanding applications, interconnecting drones to form an IoD is a desirable trend for enhancing flight safety and quality. However, challenges related to security, privacy, and inter-drone communication remain significant obstacles. Numerous authentication protocols have been developed to address these concerns. Recently, Zhang et al. proposed a PUF-based authentication scheme that uses unique identifiers and hash functions to secure authentication in the IoD environment. However, in this paper, we demonstrate that Zhang et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to several attacks, including secret value disclosure, integrity violation, key extraction, traceability, and anonymity violation. The presented attacks are shown to have a success probability of one. We also introduce two enhanced protocols that, through both informal and formal security proofs using the Scyther tool, demonstrate that they do not suffer from the vulnerabilities found in the earlier protocol. The communication costs of the proposed protocols (a) and (b) have increased by [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text], respectively, compared to the previous protocol. The computational costs for the proposed protocols (a) and (b) have also increased by [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text], respectively, while the storage costs in both proposed protocols remain unchanged compared to the previous protocol. It is true that the costs in the proposed protocols have risen; however, the previous design was vulnerable to various attacks, whereas the proposed protocols have demonstrated better security and have successfully achieved all their security objectives.