Viable Worlds Theory: A Coherence Science Account of Quantum Coherence and World Viability

Matthew Ainsworth

Emily Adlam, Jacob A. Barandes

Any viable interpretation of quantum theory needs to account for the Born rule, from which the theory gets its probabilistic empirical predictions. In this paper, we give an overview of possible approaches to this problem in the context of the Many Worlds interpretation. We argue that, for structural reasons, none of them can possibly succeed. More precisely, we argue that the Many Worlds interpretation must obtain the Born rule by proceeding either axiomatically, deductively, or inductively, and that all three of these approaches run into general, fundamental obstructions.

Matthew Ainsworth

Viable Worlds Theory (VWT) presents a constraint-based framework for understanding why some worlds, systems, or environments are able to persist while others cannot. At its core, VWT is grounded in Quantum Coherence Theory (QCT), which provides a physical account of coherence, decoherence, and classical emergence without appeal to observer privilege, epistemic collapse, or branching ontologies. In QCT, the quantum–classical transition is treated not as a discontinuous event or interpretive choice, but as a continuous restriction of admissible configurations under increasing constraint density. Classical behavior emerges when alternative trajectories are no longer structurally viable, not because new laws are introduced, but because constraint accumulation renders deviation unsustainable. Decoherence is therefore understood as a structural phenomenon driven by environmental coupling, record formation, and invariant alignment, rather than as a measurement artifact or probabilistic selection. Viable Worlds Theory generalizes this insight beyond physics. It proposes that persistence under constraint is the primary explanatory primitive across domains. A “world” is defined not by belief, equilibrium, optimization, or narrative coherence, but by whether its structure can continue to exist under interaction, accumulated load, and environmental coupling. Many systems fail not because they are locally inconsistent or inefficient, but because they violate global viability conditions that only become visible under scale, interaction, or time. Within this framework, coherence is defined as the capacity of a system to maintain internal consistency relative to its own invariant structure while interacting with externally imposed invariants without loss of identity or stability. Where this condition fails, persistence fails with it—regardless of substrate or domain. Quantum systems provide the minimal physical test case for this claim, making QCT the foundational regime from which VWT is derived rather than merely illustrated. VWT explicitly distinguishes itself from Many-Worlds and other branching interpretations. While QCT allows for vast ontic possibility at the quantum level, it denies that unconstrained proliferation yields enduring worlds. Instead, only configurations that satisfy shared invariants and constraint compatibility can stabilize as persistent environments. The contribution of Viable Worlds Theory is not a new dynamics or a universal optimization principle, but a diagnostic framework for identifying why only certain structures—physical, informational, biological, cognitive, or engineered—are able to endure. By grounding world viability in quantum coherence and extending it through scale-agnostic constraint analysis, VWT offers a unified explanation for persistence, collapse, and the limits of admissible reality. (For ongoing discussion and additional material related to Coherence Science, Viable Worlds Theory (VWT), Quantum Coherence Theory (QCT), and Artificial Coherence Intelligence (ACI), see: r/CoherenceScience)

Kaj Börge Hansen

Casey Blood

The linear mathematics of quantum mechanics gives many versions of reality instead of the single version we perceive, with the perceived version chosen at random according to a probability law. Because of these peculiarities, the theory requires an interpretation to be fully understood. Over 50 years ago, Everett proposed in his many-worlds interpretation that these characteristics could be accounted for if the mathematics itself, with no collapse or hidden variables, was carefully analyzed. We show this is incorrect; the linear mathematics cannot account for the probability law. Thus the many-worlds interpretation is not viable. Some mechanism, such as collapse or hidden variables, must be added to obtain a satisfactory understanding of the physical universe.

Miguel Orszag