Physical layer security scheme based on channel estimation error compensation in non-orthogonal multiple access systems
Chaosheng Qiu, Xu Datong
Abstract
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has been regarded as a key enabling technology for sixth-generation (6G) communications, since resource utilization was significantly enhanced by allowing multiple users to share the same time-frequency and spatial resources. However, in power-domain NOMA systems, user privacy information may be eavesdropped due to the application of successive interference cancellation, which introduces potential security vulnerabilities. To address this issue, various physical layer security schemes have been proposed in the literature, while their performance was highly dependent on sufficiently accurate channel state information (CSI). When channel estimation accuracy was insufficient, the achievable security performance often failed to meet expectations. To overcome this limitation, a physical layer security scheme based on channel estimation error compensation was proposed under imperfect CSI conditions. First, channel estimation errors were compensated through an additional low-complexity estimation process. Then, the transceiver was redesigned based on the more accurate CSI obtained after error compensation. Simulation results demonstrated that the proposed scheme significantly improved the secrecy rate and transmission reliability under different levels of channel estimation errors and signal-to-noise ratio. This scheme now provides a feasible solution to the physical layer security problem in scenarios where channel estimation errors exist.