This work is a direct continuation of the study [1] and is devoted to assessing the resistance of the neural network hash function NeuroHash to quantum attacks. Unlike the first publication, which focused on classical cryptography and NIST certification, this paper presents for the first time an analysis using Grover's algorithm. A simulation of quantum preimage search was performed on a classical computer using a developed C++ test bench. A theoretical assessment of the complexity of breaking NeuroHash in the post-quantum era is carried out. It is shown that even taking into account quadratic acceleration, the attack complexity is 2²⁵⁶ operations, which guarantees quantum resistance. Graphs of the dependence of success probability on the number of iterations and a comparative analysis with existing standards are presented.
This work is a direct continuation of the study [1] and is devoted to assessing the resistance of the neural network hash function NeuroHash to quantum attacks. Unlike the first publication, which focused on classical cryptography and NIST certification, this paper presents for the first time an analysis using Grover's algorithm. A simulation of quantum preimage search was performed on a classical computer using a developed C++ test bench. A theoretical assessment of the complexity of breaking NeuroHash in the post-quantum era is carried out. It is shown that even taking into account quadratic acceleration, the attack complexity is 2²⁵⁶ operations, which guarantees quantum resistance. Graphs of the dependence of success probability on the number of iterations and a comparative analysis with existing standards are presented.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing presents a fundamental challenge to modern cryptographic security, particularly in the domain of hash functions that ensure data integrity, authentication, and blockchain security. Traditional crypto graphic hash functions such as SHA-256, SHA-3, and BLAKE2 rely on computational hardness assumptions that become obsolete in the presence of large-scale quantum computers. Shor’s algorithm can efficiently break RSA and ECC-based cryptosys tems, while Grover’s algorithm reduces the security of traditional hash functions by square root complexity, significantly weakening their preimage and collision resistance. This quantum threat necessitates the development of post-quantum secure hashing techniques that remain resilient against both classical and quantum adversaries. This paper proposes Quantum Hashing, a novel cryptographic framework that integrates quantum entanglement, lattice-based cryptography, and hybrid quantum classical hashing to construct post-quantum secure hash functions. We introduce a formal model for Quantum Collision Resistance (QCR) and provide entropy-based ran domness enhancement to ensure unpredictable hash outputs. Unlike classical hashing approaches, our framework leverages the hardness of lattice problems (e.g., Shortest Vector Problem, Learning with Errors) to withstand quantum attacks while incorpo rating Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) mechanisms to enhance entropy and key management. Furthermore, we evaluate the security of Quantum Hashing under various attack models, comparing its resistance against Grover’s search and collision attacks. We benchmark its performance against NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) final ists, including CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM, SPHINCS+, and Falcon, demonstrating that our approach offers superior resilience while maintaining computational feasibility. Additionally, we present an implementation of Quantum Hashing using Qiskit, show casing its practical applicability in quantum circuits and quantum-secure blockchain architectures. Our findings highlight that Quantum Hashing provides a scalable, entropy-efficient, and post-quantum resilient cryptographic primitive suitable for next-generation cryptographic applications. This work paves the way for secure post-quantum digital signatures, blockchain consensus mechanisms, and zero-knowledge proof systems that require tamper-resistant hashing in a quantum computing era.
Cryptographic hash functions are important building blocks of many security systems. A preimage attack on hash functions tries to find a message that has a specific hash value. A cryptographic hash function should resist attacks on its preimage. The current paper presents a new quantum algorithm for hash preimage attacks, which can break the preimage resistance with circuit complexity O(2n/3) using O(2n/3) running times, where n is the input bit length of the hash function. The quantum circuit complexity is apparently reduced from O(2n/2) to O(2n/3) at the cost of O(2n/3) running times requirements compared with the existing algorithms.
The advancement of quantum computing poses emerging challenges to cryptographic hash functions that underpin modern cyber defense systems. In particular, Grover’s algorithm theoretically offers a quadratic speedup for preimage search, potentially reducing the effective security margin of hash-based primitives used to protect long-lived strategic data. This study adopts a structure-oriented perspective to analyze ARX-like and sponge-like hash constructions using Grover-based oracle modeling. Reversible toy hash abstractions are employed to construct quantum oracles and simulate Grover attacks under both ideal (noise-free) and Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) conditions. The analysis evaluates success probability, oracle cost, and noise sensitivity. Results show non-monotonic amplitude amplification under ideal conditions, with structural differences affecting phase behavior. However, under realistic noise, amplitude amplification is significantly attenuated for both constructions, limiting practical quantum advantage. The findings further show that oracle complexity, reflected in circuit depth and multi-qubit gate usage, plays a dominant role in determining attack feasibility beyond asymptotic complexity reductions. This work provides a structure-level framework for assessing quantum risks to cryptographic hash functions and supports informed post-quantum cyber defense planning.
Abstract—The emergence of quantum computing represents a fundamental challenge to contemporary cryptographic infras- tructures, mandating immediate adoption of quantum-resistant cryptographic standards to ensure long-term security. This paper analyzes how Shor’s algorithm renders RSA , ECC vulnerable by solving integer factorization and discrete alogarithm problems in polynomial time, while Grover’s algorithm weakens symmetric encryption through quadratic speedup attacks. Through compre- hensive cryptanalysis, we evaluate the vulnerabilities of current public-key infrastructures, symmetric ciphers, and hash functions against quantum threats. Our research systematically examines post-quantum cryptographic candidates, including lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial schemes under NIST standardization, assessing their security guarantees and imple- mentation challenges. Furthermore, we investigate the broader implications for secure communications, blockchain networks, and authentication protocols in a post-quantum world. Based on our findings, we propose a practical transition framework featuring hybrid cryptographic systems, protocol enhancements, and policy updates to facilitate seamless migration. This work provides critical insights and actionable strategies for securing digital infrastructure against quantum threats while maintaining operational efficiency during the transition period. Index Terms—Cryptographic vulnerability, Grover’s algo- rithm, Post-quantum cryptography, Quantum computing, Quan- tum key distribution, Shor’s algorithm, Cybersecurity
The process of selecting post-quantum cryptography algorithms for standardization based on parameters proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is described. The resistance of post-quantum cryptography algorithms to attacks by classical and quantum computers is assessed, taking into account their specific features. The different numbers of operations for attacks by quantum and classical computers are substantiated. The parallelization potential of post-quantum cryptography algorithms is analyzed. It is noted that, despite the proposed use of quantum computers, the primary goal of cryptography is the application of algorithms based on problems that are not reducible to problems of P-class complexity.
The rapid advancements in quantum technologies have introduced significant threats to the security of conventional cryptographic systems. In particular, the evaluation of quantum resource requirements—measured in terms of circuit depth and qubit count—has become essential for analyzing the resilience of widely used schemes such as AES and RSA, as well as cryptographic hash functions like SHA-2. At the same time, the widespread adoption of Internet of Things (IoT) applications has increased the exposure to cybersecurity risks, which are further exacerbated by the emerging capabilities of quantum adversaries. To address these challenges, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched a competition to standardize lightweight hash functions and defined five quantum security levels to assess their robustness. In this work, we conduct a resource analysis of the NIST Lightweight Hash Function finalists against the Grover search algorithm, providing detailed insights into their quantum resistance. The findings contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the security strength of lightweight hash functions in the post-quantum era.