Epistemic Physics: Scope, Boundaries, and Structural Commitments (Version 2.0) This article develops a formally delimited account of “Epistemic Physics” as a structural research program situated at the intersection of quantum foundations, relational approaches, information-theoretic reconstruction, and scientific machine learning. The term is not introduced as a new metaphysical doctrine, but as a rigorously constrained framework in which epistemic commitments are considered operative only when they modify admissible state spaces, transformation rules, or stability structures of physical description. The paper proceeds in three stages. First, it reconstructs the historical trajectories through which epistemic considerations became structurally relevant in modern physics. Second, it formalizes Epistemic Measurement Dynamics (EMD) within C*-algebraic quantum theory, introducing sensitivity metrics, spectral stability constraints, completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) contractivity, and a bounded-sensitivity theorem under weak-* compactness. Third, it clarifies the relationship of this structural layer to ontological-model no-go theorems, including the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph result, and to QBist approaches, establishing domain separation rather than refutation. The deposit includes two canonical publication-rendered PDF variants and the full canonical release archive (ZIP). Canonical Release SHA256: 1CD95CEDCF03EBFA77B7C5074F7C2B281A73FE77F31CB3F1D1BA6266521850EB This SHA256 corresponds to: EpistemicPhysics_v2_0_RELEASE.zip Any modification of the archive will alter the hash. Integrity may be independently verified using SHA256. Date: 2026-02-27
Epistemic Physics: Scope, Boundaries, and Structural Commitments (Version 2.0) This article develops a formally delimited account of “Epistemic Physics” as a structural research program situated at the intersection of quantum foundations, relational approaches, information-theoretic reconstruction, and scientific machine learning. The term is not introduced as a new metaphysical doctrine, but as a rigorously constrained framework in which epistemic commitments are considered operative only when they modify admissible state spaces, transformation rules, or stability structures of physical description. The paper proceeds in three stages. First, it reconstructs the historical trajectories through which epistemic considerations became structurally relevant in modern physics. Second, it formalizes Epistemic Measurement Dynamics (EMD) within C*-algebraic quantum theory, introducing sensitivity metrics, spectral stability constraints, completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) contractivity, and a bounded-sensitivity theorem under weak-* compactness. Third, it clarifies the relationship of this structural layer to ontological-model no-go theorems, including the Pusey–Barrett–Rudolph result, and to QBist approaches, establishing domain separation rather than refutation. The deposit includes two canonical publication-rendered PDF variants and the full canonical release archive (ZIP). Canonical Release SHA256: 1CD95CEDCF03EBFA77B7C5074F7C2B281A73FE77F31CB3F1D1BA6266521850EB This SHA256 corresponds to: EpistemicPhysics_v2_0_RELEASE.zip Any modification of the archive will alter the hash. Integrity may be independently verified using SHA256. Date: 2026-02-27
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and then formalizes a physically relevant concept that I have called “Epistemic Constraint.” Here, epistemic constraints are the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid’s fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and formalizes physical knowability constraints, understood here as constraints on what any conceivable observer can know about the physical world; I henceforth call these “epistemic constraints” for terseness. Here, epistemic constraints concern the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid’s fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and then formalizes a physically relevant concept that I have called "Epistemic Constraint." Here, epistemic constraints are the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid's fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
This doctoral dissertation on the foundations of quantum theory isolates and formalizes physical knowability constraints, understood here as constraints on what any conceivable observer can know about the physical world; I henceforth call these “epistemic constraints” for terseness. Here, epistemic constraints concern the definite, intersubjectively agreeable, ordinary-language conditions under which experiments are described. The usual formulation of the quantum measurement problem, which I call the Schrodingerian measurement problem, has the structure of an anomaly: if we take quantum theory at face value, we expect no definite values, and yet we see definite values in experiments. The responses to this problem have been either to solve it or to dissolve it. These responses, which have taken the form of interpretation, modification, or reconstruction of quantum mechanics, seek either to derive (conceptually or mathematically) epistemic constraints from within quantum mechanics or suitable modifications of it, as is the case with certain interpretations and modifications, or to posit the epistemic constraint, or parts of it, as a primitive assumption with the goal of deriving quantum mechanics, as is the case in some reconstruction programs. In contrast to the Schrodingerian measurement problem, which had the structure of an anomaly, this dissertation develops the Bohrian Program, which (for lack of a better comparison) has a structure similar to the problem historically associated with Euclid’s fifth postulate. It seeks to keep epistemic constraints as primitive in an onto-epistemic sense. It then seeks new physical conclusions from the joint consideration of quantum mechanics and epistemic constraints, without seeking to derive one from the other. Among other results, this leads to a notion of the probability of instantiability of the Born Rule that specifies when to apply the Born Rule and when to apply a unitary transformation to a quantum state.
The 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) challenged the completeness of the quantum-mechanical description of physical reality. In contemporary discussions, this challenge is often taken to have been decisively answered by Bell’s theorem and by the experimental violation of Bell inequalities. This article argues that such a conclusion involves an additional interpretive step not warranted by the logical structure of Bell-type results themselves. By formulating Bell-inequality violations as conditional exclusion results on classes of ontological models, and by distinguishing theoretical constraint from unique ontological confirmation, the analysis shows that Bell-type no-go theorems do not by themselves establish the ontological completeness of the quantum state. The same point is extended to the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem: although it further restricts admissible ψ-epistemic models under preparation independence, it does not uniquely fix quantum ontology. The combined lesson of these no-go results is therefore one of constrained but non-unique admissibility, rather than direct confirmation of wave-function completeness. From this perspective, the methodological core of Einstein’s incompleteness concern remains open—not as a defense of local hidden variables, but as a continuing question about the relation between empirical success, theoretical constraint, and ontological commitment in quantum foundations.