The main aim of this thesis is to study the suitability of Semi Definite Programs (SDPs) as a method to solve problems in multipartite Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Using SDPs to solve quantum information problems numerically is interesting because the solutions give strict upper (or lower) bounds which can be used to prove the security of protocols. In this thesis the security of QKD protocols is studied considering individual attacks and prepare and measure scenarios. When necessary to deal with non-linear constraints the SDPs have been relaxed using a block matrix approach. The code for performing the block matrix relaxations have been developed as part of this project. With these tools both a sequential and parallel state distribution scheme has been studied. While efforts to show a positive secure key rate for the sequential protocol were unsuccessful it is shown that the methods employed in this thesis can be used to evaluate the security of a parallel key distribution scheme. The code used to generate the data for this project is available on GitHub (https://github.com/SimonBir/Multipartite-Quantum-Key-Distribution).
The main aim of this thesis is to study the suitability of Semi Definite Programs (SDPs) as a method to solve problems in multipartite Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Using SDPs to solve quantum information problems numerically is interesting because the solutions give strict upper (or lower) bounds which can be used to prove the security of protocols. In this thesis the security of QKD protocols is studied considering individual attacks and prepare and measure scenarios. When necessary to deal with non-linear constraints the SDPs have been relaxed using a block matrix approach. The code for performing the block matrix relaxations have been developed as part of this project. With these tools both a sequential and parallel state distribution scheme has been studied. While efforts to show a positive secure key rate for the sequential protocol were unsuccessful it is shown that the methods employed in this thesis can be used to evaluate the security of a parallel key distribution scheme. The code used to generate the data for this project is available on GitHub (https://github.com/SimonBir/Multipartite-Quantum-Key-Distribution).
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows for secure communications safe against attacks by quantum computers. QKD protocols are performed by sending a sizeable, but finite, number of quantum signals between the distant parties involved. Many QKD experiments, however, predict their achievable key rates using asymptotic formulas, which assume the transmission of an infinite number of signals, partly because QKD proofs with finite transmissions (and finite-key lengths) can be difficult. Here we develop a robust numerical approach for calculating the key rates for QKD protocols in the finite-key regime in terms of two semi-definite programs (SDPs). The first uses the relation between conditional smooth min-entropy and quantum relative entropy through the quantum asymptotic equipartition property, and the second uses the relation between the smooth min-entropy and quantum fidelity. The numerical programs are formulated under the assumption of collective attacks from the eavesdropper and can be promoted to withstand coherent attacks using the postselection technique. We then solve these SDPs using convex optimization solvers and obtain numerical calculations of finite-key rates for several protocols difficult to analyze analytically, such as BB84 with unequal detector efficiencies, B92, and twin-field QKD. Our numerical approach democratizes the composable security proofs for QKD protocols where the derived keys can be used as an input to another cryptosystem.
This work is concerned with the issue of applications of the semi-definite programming (SDP) in the field of quantum information science. Our results of the analysis of certain quantum information protocols using this optimization technique are presented, and an implementation of a relevant numerical tool is introduced. The key method used is NPA discovered by Navascues et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 010401 (2007)]. In chapter 1 a brief overview of mathematical methods used in this work is presented. In chapter 2 an introduction to quantum information science is given. Chapter 3 concerns the device-independent (DI) and semi-device-independent (SDI) approaches in quantum cryptography. In chapter 4 our results regarding quantum information protocols which we developed using SDP are described. The results include a new type of quantum key distribution protocol based on Hardy's paradox; several protocols for quantum random number expansion; a method of formulation of SDP relaxations of SDI protocols; and a DI Santha-Vazirani source of randomness amplification protocol. In chapter 5 an introduction to interior point methods is given. In chapter 6 the implementation of our numerical tool dedicated to problems occurring in chapter 4 are discussed and compared with other solutions.
This thesis applies numerical methods to analyze the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols. The main theoretical problem in QKD security proofs is to calculate the secret key generation rate. Under certain assumptions, this problem has been formulated as a convex optimization problem and numerical methods have been proposed to produce reliable lower bounds for discrete-variable QKD protocols. We investigate the applicability of these numerical approaches and apply the numerical methods to study a variety of protocols, including measurement-device-independent (MDI) protocols, variations of the BB84 protocol with a passive countermeasure against Trojan horse attacks, and the phase-encoding BB84 protocol using attenuated laser sources without continuous phase randomization.
Computing the key rate in quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols is a long standing challenge. Analytical methods are limited to a handful of protocols with highly symmetric measurement bases. Numerical methods can handle arbitrary measurement bases, but either use the min-entropy, which gives a loose lower bound to the von Neumann entropy, or rely on cumbersome dedicated algorithms. Based on a recently discovered semidefinite programming (SDP) hierarchy converging to the conditional von Neumann entropy, used for computing the asymptotic key rates in the device independent case, we introduce an SDP hierarchy that converges to the asymptotic secret key rate in the case of characterised devices. The resulting algorithm is efficient, easy to implement and easy to use. We illustrate its performance by recovering known bounds on the key rate and extending high-dimensional QKD protocols to previously intractable cases. We also use it to reanalyse experimental data to demonstrate how higher key rates can be achieved when the full statistics are taken into account.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be proved to be secure by laws of quantum mechanics. In this thesis, we review security proof methods in Renner's framework and discuss numerical methods to calculate asymptotic and finite key rates. These methods are highly versatile and applicable to general device-dependent QKD protocols. We also discuss analytical tools that extend the applicability of these numerical methods. We then present the asymptotic security proof against collective attacks for a variant of the twin-field QKD protocol, which can overcome the repeaterless secret-key capacity bound. Our variant reduces the sifting cost and uses non-phase-randomized coherent states as both signals and test states. We confirm the loss scaling of this protocol. Another important family of protocols that we investigate here are discrete-modulated continuous-variable QKD protocols. They are interesting due to their experimental simplicity and their great potential for massive deployment in the quantum-secured networks. Our security proof method can provide tight asymptotic key rates. We demonstrate that the postselection of data in combination with reverse reconciliation can improve the key rates. We analyze both untrusted and trusted detector noise scenarios. Our results in the trusted detector noise scenario show that we can thus cut out most of the effect of detector noise and obtain asymptotic key rates similar to those had we access to ideal detectors. Finally, we present several simple examples to illustrate our newly developed method for the numerical finite-key analysis against the most general attacks via the entropy accumulation theorem.
The counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics make it possible to solve problems and perform tasks that are beyond the abilities of non-quantum (classical) computers and communication devices. The field of quantum information processing studies how we can achieve such improvements by representing information as quantum states.One of the early achievements of quantum information processing is the development of quantum key distribution (QKD). QKD protocols allow two participants (Alice and Bob) to achieve the classically-impossible task of generating a secret shared key even if their adversary is computationally unlimited.Unfortunately, the security promises of QKD are true only in theory; practical implementations of QKD deviate from the theoretical protocols, and many of these deviations give rise to practical attacks. In this research thesis, we study the security properties of various QKD protocols in many practical settings:First, we study practical security of semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols, where either Alice or Bob is non-quantum (classical). Following practical security problems in previous SQKD protocols, we suggest a new SQKD protocol (the "Mirror protocol") which can be securely implemented, and we prove it robust and secure against a wide range of attacks (the "uniform collective attacks").Then, we study "composable security" of the first QKD protocol created by Bennett and Brassard (BB84). BB84 has its unconditional security proved against adversaries performing the most general attacks in a theoretical (idealized) setting; however, some security approaches do not prove "composable security", which requires the secret key to remain secret even when Alice and Bob actually use it for cryptographic purposes. We generalize an algebraic security approach for BB84, making it prove composable security of BB84 (and many variants of BB84) against the most general attacks.Finally, we analyze an important practical attack (named "Bright Illumination"), showing how it can be modeled as a theoretical "Reversed-Space" attack.Overall, all results aim to enhance our understanding on how to bridge the gap between theory and practice in various sub-fields of QKD, and they may help solve a major open problem in the field of QKD: constructing a realistic QKD implementation that can be proved truly and unconditionally secure against any possible attack.