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Levels of Description and Conditions of Applicability of Physical Explanation: A Functional-Logical Analysis

Harald Zierhut, Thomas Schwarz

Published Feb 1, 2026• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Debates in the foundations of physics have long been characterized by strikingly persistent unre- solved problems. This paper advances the thesis that at least part of this persistence is not due to missing physical mechanisms, but to a systematic conflation of different levels of description. On the basis of a functional-logical analysis, the concept of conditions of applicability of physical description is introduced and explicitly distinguished from both ontological entities and purely conventional stipulations. Building on this distinction, a framework of levels of description is developed, differentiating between a pre-physical level of applicability clarification, a theoretical level of formal models, and a physical-descriptive level of empirical application. The central claim is that certain explanatory demands in physics are structurally unsatisfiable because pre-physical conditions are implicitly treated as objects of physical explanation. Using the quantum-mechanical measurement problem as a controlled exemplar, the paper shows that the demand for a physical mechanism producing definite measurement outcomes constitutes such a misaddressing. The methodological contribution of the framework lies in the explication of structural limits of physical explanation and in the diagnosis of persistent foundational debates. Unlike prior approaches that focus on theory-relative constitutive principles, this framework identifies conditions that remain invariant across any conceivable physical theory.

DOI
10.5281/zenodo.18434312

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Debates in the foundations of physics have long been characterized by strikingly persistent unre- solved problems. This paper advances the thesis that at least part of this persistence is not due to missing physical mechanisms, but to a systematic conflation of different levels of description. On the basis of a functional-logical analysis, the concept of conditions of applicability of physical description is introduced and explicitly distinguished from both ontological entities and purely conventional stipulations. Building on this distinction, a framework of levels of description is developed, differentiating between a pre-physical level of applicability clarification, a theoretical level of formal models, and a physical-descriptive level of empirical application. The central claim is that certain explanatory demands in physics are structurally unsatisfiable because pre-physical conditions are implicitly treated as objects of physical explanation. Using the quantum-mechanical measurement problem as a controlled exemplar, the paper shows that the demand for a physical mechanism producing definite measurement outcomes constitutes such a misaddressing. The methodological contribution of the framework lies in the explication of structural limits of physical explanation and in the diagnosis of persistent foundational debates. Unlike prior approaches that focus on theory-relative constitutive principles, this framework identifies conditions that remain invariant across any conceivable physical theory.
This preprint presents a foundations-level analysis of physical description based on structural dependency rather than dynamical construction. Quantum mechanics, classical mechanics, and relativistic spacetime are treated as effective regimes arising under different structural conditions, rather than as competing ontologies. The analysis identifies persistence under interaction, irreversible constraint accumulation, stable relational structure, and interaction as minimal requirements for physical behaviour. Collapse is characterised as irreversible loss of compatibility between alternative continuations, without appeal to observers, stochastic dynamics, or additional postulates. Time is treated as structural ordering induced by exclusion, rather than as a primitive background parameter. No new dynamics are proposed and no empirically successful theories are modified. The aim is to clarify explanatory dependencies that underlie familiar physical regimes and to dissolve persistent foundational problems that arise when regime-level descriptions are misidentified as foundations.
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Operatoric Research CorpusStudies in World-Formation Section I Ontology and Physics Volume 2 The Ontological Limits of Physical ExplanationMeasurement, Collapse and Boundary Phenomena in Quantum Physics This volume brings together a series of contributions on the ontology of fundamental problems in physics, in particular the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, the collapse of the wave function, the relationship between quantum mechanics and relativity theory, as well as boundary phenomena such as black holes, renormalization, and vacuum energy. The point of departure of these investigations is the thesis that numerous paradoxes of modern physics do not primarily result from insufficient physical theories, but from a categorical misaddressing. Transitions that concern the very conditions of world stability—especially the transition from possibility to facticity—are often interpreted as dynamical processes within an already stabilized world. This gives rise to explanatory programs that attempt to bridge this boundary by means of additional mechanisms, ontologies, or informational structures. The texts collected in this volume pursue an alternative strategy. They understand the so-called collapse of the wave function not as a physical process, but as an irreversible constriction of a space of possibility through which objectivity and the direction of time first emerge at all. The concept of indimergence designates the boundary act in which possibility passes into facticity without itself being describable as an event within the world. On the basis of this determination, central approaches in the foundations of quantum mechanics—particularly dynamical collapse models, Many-Worlds interpretations, and information-theoretic ontologies—are comparatively analyzed. It becomes evident that, despite their differences, they share a common presupposition: the assumption that the transition from possibility to facticity must itself be explicable within physical description. The contributions in this volume instead propose to read the measurement problem and related paradoxes as indications of structural limits of physical description. From this perspective, other fundamental problems—such as the tension between quantum mechanics and relativity theory, the information paradoxes of black holes, or divergences in field theory—no longer appear primarily as unsolved technical puzzles, but as boundary phenomena of world formation itself. The volume therefore does not present itself as an alternative physical theory, but as an ontological clarification of the conditions under which physical theories are able to describe a world at all.
Abstract This work presents a structural ontology of quantum mechanics grounded in the limits of formal description, rather than in interpretative models. Instead of proposing a new interpretation, modification of equations, or metaphysical extension, the text identifies a missing structural layer implicitly assumed by quantum theory: the necessity of filtration in systems operating beyond formal completeness. Drawing on Gödel’s incompleteness theorems as a structural precedent, the analysis reframes core quantum phenomena — superposition, collapse, entanglement, uncertainty, and wave–particle duality — as expressions of constrained potential rather than paradoxical physical behavior. Quantum mechanics is shown to operate in a pre-physical regime, describing admissible possibilities prior to enforced resolution, while classical physics describes the outcome of irreversible constraint. From this perspective, collapse is not caused by observation, randomness, or consciousness, but by saturation of coherence under applied constraints. Uncertainty emerges as a logical consequence of non-coexistent descriptions within a single formal frame, rather than as an epistemic limitation. The work then generalizes this framework beyond physics, demonstrating that entropy, irreversibility, and systemic collapse arise when systems continue operating beyond their Gödelian limits without a heuristic capable of recognizing formal exhaustion. This leads to a distinction between reintegrative (pre-Gödel) entropy and residual (post-Gödel) entropy regimes, with implications for computation, cognition, artificial systems, and large-scale systemic viability. This document is descriptive, not prescriptive.It introduces no implementations and proposes no cosmological mechanisms.Its contribution is the explicit articulation of structural constraints that any coherent physical or systemic description must satisfy.
Every physical theory is constructed from observations performed within a physical frame, and this frame enters the theory at a level antecedent to its equations — in the categorical structure through which observations are organized into a formalism. This is a structural condition on physical theory as such, not a hypothesis about any particular physical phenomenon; its character is analogous to the principle of general covariance, which constrains the form of physical laws without predicting the behavior of any specific system. The condition has a precise formal consequence in the geometric setting: for any non-invariant tensor field under a frame- transformation group, the components specified in any single frame are insufficient to determine the underlying geometric object without explicit specification of the frame. This consequence has been articulated four times in the foundations of physics — in the tensor reformulation of electrodynamics, in the relativity of simultaneity, in the unification of energy and momentum, and in the geometric unification of space and time — each time by identifying a frame-dependence carried implicitly in the prevailing formalism and absorbing it into a geometric object across the class of frames. Rovelli’s (1996) relational quantum mechanics is the most explicit contempo- rary articulation of the structural condition: the frame is the physical system to which a quantum state is referred, and the relational structure is exhibited directly at the level of the measurement interaction. The condition implies that relationality must arise wherever current physics is examined at the level of its foundations — not because relationality is a fundamental feature of the physics under description, but because it is a necessary feature of any theory constructed from observations performed within physical frames, and open foundational problems are most plausibly resolved by making implicit frame-dependences explicit rather than by eliminating them.
This work proposes a minimal ontological framework aimed at systematically resolving key conceptual paradoxes of contemporary physics. The central claim is that many foundational difficulties of twentieth- and twenty-first-century physics arise not from empirical anomalies or mathematical inconsistencies, but from a conflation of mathematical formalism with ontological interpretation. On the basis of a small set of minimal ontological axioms, the work addresses and resolves ten fundamental paradoxes, including wave–particle duality, the measurement problem and collapse, the arrow of time, irreversibility, quantization, the nature of gravity, cosmological origin, the finiteness of the Universe, the status of singularities, and the information paradox. The proposed framework introduces no new physical entities and does not modify existing physical equations. Instead, it imposes strict ontological constraints from which these phenomena follow as necessary consequences. The work does not present an alternative physical theory, but rather an ontological foundation explaining why modern physical theories are successful and why they encounter inherent explanatory limits.