Isogeny-based cryptography represents a compelling direction in post-quantum security, distinguished by its exceptionally small key sizes and solid theoretical foundation based on the computational difficulty of finding isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves. This paper traces the foundation and developmental trajectory of isogeny-based cryptography, from its early theoretical proposals to significant advancements leading up to 2022. Special attention is devoted to the period between 2020 and 2022, which witnessed substantial progress in isogeny-based signature schemes, key exchange protocols, and computational optimizations, alongside emerging cryptanalytic challenges. The discussion concludes with a concise summary of the 2022 attack on the Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) scheme, avoiding in-depth technical details, and proceeds to compare isogeny-based cryptography with alternative post-quantum cryptographic approaches.This analysis affirms the ongoing relevance of isogeny-based techniques despite setbacks, while highlighting critical directions for future research.
Isogeny-based cryptography represents a compelling direction in post-quantum security, distinguished by its exceptionally small key sizes and solid theoretical foundation based on the computational difficulty of finding isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves. This paper traces the foundation and developmental trajectory of isogeny-based cryptography, from its early theoretical proposals to significant advancements leading up to 2022. Special attention is devoted to the period between 2020 and 2022, which witnessed substantial progress in isogeny-based signature schemes, key exchange protocols, and computational optimizations, alongside emerging cryptanalytic challenges. The discussion concludes with a concise summary of the 2022 attack on the Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) scheme, avoiding in-depth technical details, and proceeds to compare isogeny-based cryptography with alternative post-quantum cryptographic approaches.This analysis affirms the ongoing relevance of isogeny-based techniques despite setbacks, while highlighting critical directions for future research.
The emergence of quantum computing poses a significant threat to the security of currently deployed public-key cryptosystems, including those based on elliptic curves (ECC). Shor's algorithm can solve the underlying integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems in polynomial time, rendering established cryptographic standards obsolete. This has catalyzed the development of post-quantum cryptography (PQC), a new generation of algorithms resistant to attacks by both classical and quantum computers. Among the most promising PQC candidates are systems based on supersingular isogeny graphs. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the supersingular isogeny paradigm as a quantum-secure evolution of elliptic curve cryptography. It begins by introducing the mathematical foundations of elliptic curves and isogenies, which are structure-preserving maps between them. The core of isogeny-based cryptography lies in the conjectured hardness of finding an isogeny path between two given supersingular elliptic curves in the vast isogeny graph. This is fundamentally different from the discrete logarithm problem that underpins traditional ECC. We review the foundational Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) key exchange protocol and its subsequent realization as the Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) mechanism, which was a candidate in the NIST PQC standardization process. We discuss its advantages, such as small key sizes and perfect forward secrecy, which made it an attractive alternative. However, the paper also presents a balanced view by thoroughly examining the devastating cryptanalytic breakthroughs of 2022 that rendered the original SIDH/SIKE schemes insecure. These attacks, which exploit auxiliary point information, underscore the dynamic nature of PQC research. Despite this setback, the isogeny-based field remains active, with ongoing research into alternative constructions like CSIDH and other variants that are not vulnerable to the known attacks. We conclude that while the initial promise of SIDH/SIKE was broken, the underlying mathematical problem of finding isogenies remains a compelling basis for quantum-secure cryptography, representing a paradigm of active research rather than a discarded concept.
The rise of quantum computing poses a significant threat to contemporary public-key cryptography, which relies on problems like integer factorization and the discrete logarithm, both of which are solvable in polynomial time by Shor's algorithm. This has prompted a global effort to develop and standardize post-quantum cryptographic primitives that are resistant to attacks by both classical and quantum computers. Among the various families of post-quantum candidates, isogeny-based cryptography has emerged as a particularly compelling, albeit challenging, alternative. This paper explores the mathematical foundations of elliptic curve isogenies and their application as a basis for quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols. We delve into the structure of supersingular elliptic curves and the associated isogeny graphs, which form the basis for the conjectured hardness of the underlying computational problems. The Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) protocol and its derivative, Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE), are examined in detail as principal examples of this cryptographic paradigm. We analyze their key advantages, most notably their exceptionally small key sizes, which offer significant benefits for constrained environments. However, the security landscape of isogeny-based cryptography has been dramatically reshaped by recent cryptanalytic breakthroughs that completely broke the SIKE protocol. This paper analyzes the nature of these attacks, discussing the vulnerabilities they exploited and the profound implications for the field. We conclude by surveying the current state of isogeny-based cryptography in the aftermath of these developments, outlining the proposed countermeasures, alternative designs, and the open research questions that define the new frontier for this promising area of post-quantum cryptography.
Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) was a promising candidate in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization process, as it is distinguished by its exceptionally small key sizes, which makes it attractive for resource-constrained environments, and an elegant mathematical foundation rooted in supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. Its security based on the presumed hardness of computing isogenies between such curves. However, in August 2022, a groundbreaking attack by Castryck and Decru completely compromised SIKE, demonstrating its insecurity with practical polynomial-time complexity. This pivotal event led to SIKE`s immediate withdrawal from NIST`s standardization efforts, reshaping the evolving landscape of post-quantum cryptography and underscoring essential lessons in cryptographic design, evaluation, and diversity. A comprehensive academic analysis of the SIKE cryptographic scheme methodology and details of the specific nature of the Castryck-Decru attack that rendered it insecure is provided by this paper. It also discusses in brief the far-reaching implications for cryptographic design, standardization processes, and the pursuit of quantum-resistant algorithms, giving particular emphasis on the current state of post-quantum cryptography or PQC standardization as of 2025.
In this paper, we have discussed isogeny-based cryptography as a rather appealing option for post-quantum security. We provide analysis of current protocols like SIDH (Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman) and SIKE (Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation) setting up fundamental issues with their security and performance. In this work we introduce a novel isogeny pathfinding algorithm that employs graph theory as well as probabilistic models in order to lower its computational complexity. The results show significant improvement in both efficiency and security, strengthening the case for the use of isogeny based systems in a quantum-resilient cryptographic space.
The impending arrival of large-scale quantum computers poses a significant threat to modern public-key cryptography, which is largely based on the hardness of integer factorization and the discrete logarithm problem. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), a cornerstone of current digital security, is particularly vulnerable to attacks by quantum algorithms, notably Shor's algorithm. This has catalyzed the development of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), a new generation of cryptographic systems designed to be secure against both classical and quantum adversaries. Among the various PQC families, isogeny-based cryptography has emerged as a compelling, albeit complex, candidate. This paper explores the reimagination of elliptic curve principles for a post-quantum world through the lens of isogeny graphs. We provide a comprehensive overview of the transition from classical ECC to isogeny-based schemes, detailing the mathematical foundations of elliptic curve isogenies and the construction of supersingular isogeny graphs. The core of our analysis focuses on how the problem of finding a secret isogeny path between two curves in this graph forms the basis for quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols. We review the evolution of seminal protocols such as Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) and its variants, discussing their initial promise. Crucially, the paper also addresses the recent groundbreaking cryptanalytic attacks on SIDH, which have reshaped the landscape of isogeny-based cryptography. We analyze the implications of these attacks and the ongoing research to develop new, more secure isogeny-based schemes like SQISign. By comparing the performance metrics (key size, performance, security) of isogeny-based systems with other leading PQC candidates, such as those based on lattices and codes, this paper offers a balanced perspective on their potential role in future cryptographic standards.
In this article, we discuss how algebraic geometry, especially the isogenies and elliptic curves, have been used to construct secure post-quantum cryptographic systems. Since quantum computing is a very big threat to conventional cryptographic techniques, it is essential to develop new strategies that would enhance protection of data in quantum age. Algebraic geometry provides such solutions as the elliptic curve cryptography and the protocols based on isogenic, which is also resistant to the attacks of quantum algorithms. The article explores the mathematical basis of these cryptographic techniques, their effectiveness, scalability and security. It is noteworthy that isogeny-based cryptography schemes such as the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) and Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) prove that isogeny-based cryptography is capable of secure key exchange and encapsulation. The results indicate that algebraic geometry is not only enhancing the cryptography systems, but also opening up a reasonable channel in which strong post-quantum systems can be created. The future of secure communication in a quantum-driven world has profound implications to the methods.