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Applied Mathematics

An Inequality for Experimentally Testing the Violation of Savage’s Sure-Thing Principle

Taiki Takahashi

Published Jan 1, 2026• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Recent advances in behavioral economics and quantum cognition and decision elucidated a number of deviations of actual human decisions and choices from mathematical principles of normative decision theory, which are referred to as “anomalies”. One of the prominent anomalies is that the violations of Savage’s sure-thing principle, which is the fundamental axiom of the rational theory of decision under uncertainty. It states that if prospect x is preferred to y knowing that Event A occurred, and if x is preferred to y knowing that A did not occur, then x should be preferred to y even when it is not known whether A occurred. I explicitly derive an inequality for testing the violations of Savage’s principle in behavioral experiments on decision under uncertainty. The derivation suggests that the violation of Savage’s sure-thing principle may be due to the violation of the rule of complementarity in probability theory. Future applications for behavioral and neuro- economics and quantum cognition and decision theory are discussed.

DOI
10.4236/am.2026.171002

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Recent advances in behavioral economics and quantum cognition and decision elucidated a number of deviations of actual human decisions and choices from mathematical principles of normative decision theory, which are referred to as “anomalies”. One of the prominent anomalies is that the violations of Savage’s sure-thing principle, which is the fundamental axiom of the rational theory of decision under uncertainty. It states that if prospect x is preferred to y knowing that Event A occurred, and if x is preferred to y knowing that A did not occur, then x should be preferred to y even when it is not known whether A occurred. I explicitly derive an inequality for testing the violations of Savage’s principle in behavioral experiments on decision under uncertainty. The derivation suggests that the violation of Savage’s sure-thing principle may be due to the violation of the rule of complementarity in probability theory. Future applications for behavioral and neuro- economics and quantum cognition and decision theory are discussed.
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The core assumptions of modern economic utility theories such as rationality have been placed under scrutiny by recent studies in decision theory and behavioural economics and fi?nance. The main questions that were explored in these studies could be expressed as follows: do people always make rational choices? Do they make use of the normative rules of traditional logic and probability when dealing with risk and uncertainty? Are there any alternative methods to capture choices and reasoning when individuals are faced with uncertainty and risk? In this thesis I will elaborate on an interdisciplinary application of so-called QL (quantum-like) models to decision-making problems in ?finance and other socio-economic contexts. The core inquiry of this work is related to experimental tests of decision making with the help of investment related questions. Calculus and logic borrowed from quantum physics will be used to develop probabilistic models for the formation and evolution of decisions in ?finance context with the potential to generalize to other social decision- making settings. The main fi?ndings of this thesis can be summarized as follows: individuals exhibit preference reversals and context-dependent behaviour in different informational contexts. In particular, in condition of risk individuals exhibit uncertainty aversion and thus aversion to participating in other investment task, violating the postulates of classical probability theory. The core principle of rational (consequential) behaviour conceived by Savage (1954) [207], that is the "Savage Sure Thing" principle, was shown to be violated. In mathematical language, this violation is equivalent to the violation of the "Law of total probability". Implying contextuality of human judgement, different events cannot be jointly evaluated in a single probability space. Moreover, additional experimental fi?ndings showed that participants exhibited reference dependence in their risk attitudes depending on the preceding gain respective loss. These fi?ndings were statistically signi?cant and a quantum model for accommodating the above effects of contextual behaviour is introduced. A geometric depiction of the experimental fi?ndings was proposed. A so-called `state reconstruction' procedure from statistical data was performed via the inverse Born's rule (1926) [47], allowing the construction of a complete representation of agents' resolution from indeterminacy.
Classical models of decision-making under uncertainty, grounded in expected utility theory and Bayesian probability, often fail to account for systematic cognitive anomalies such as preference reversals, order effects, ambiguity aversion, and context-dependent choices. Quantum cognition models offer a novel theoretical framework that applies the mathematical principles of quantum probability—such as superposition, interference, and non-commutativity—to cognitive processes without assuming physical quantum mechanisms in the brain. By representing cognitive states as probabilistic superpositions that collapse through decision “measurements,” these models provide parsimonious explanations for violations of classical rationality. This paper examines how quantum cognition frameworks capture contextual influence, belief updating, and interference effects in uncertain decision environments. Drawing on findings from cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, the study highlights the relevance of quantum cognition for applications in economic choice modeling, legal decision analysis, and artificial intelligence. The analysis suggests that quantum probability offers a robust alternative to classical approaches when modeling human decision-making in complex, ambiguous, and context-sensitive situations.
The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes show that the expected utility hypothesis and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions.The popular explanation in terms of ambiguity aversion is not completely accepted.On the other hand, we have recently introduced a notion of contextual risk to mathematically capture what is known as ambiguity in the economics literature.Situations in which contextual risk occurs cannot be modeled by Kolmogorovian classical probabilistic structures, but a non-Kolmogorovian framework with a quantum-like structure is needed.We prove in this paper that the contextual risk approach can be applied to the Ellsberg paradox, and elaborate a sphere model within our hidden measurement formalism which reveals that it is the overall conceptual landscape that is responsible of the disagreement between actual human decisions and the predictions of expected utility theory, which generates the paradox.This result points to the presence of a quantum conceptual layer in human thought which is superposed to the usually assumed classical logical layer.
One of the most complex systems is the human brain whose formalized functioning is characterized by decision theory. We present a "Quantum Decision Theory" of decision-making, based on the mathematical theory of separable Hilbert spaces. This mathematical structure captures the effect of superposition of composite prospects, including many incorporated intentions, which allows us to explain a variety of interesting fallacies and anomalies that have been reported to particularize the decision-making of real human beings. The theory describes entangled decision-making, non-commutativity of subsequent decisions, and intention interference of composite prospects. We demonstrate how the violation of the Savage's sure-thing principle (disjunction effect) can be explained as a result of the interference of intentions, when making decisions under uncertainty. The conjunction fallacy is also explained by the presence of the interference terms. We demonstrate that all known anomalies and paradoxes, documented in the context of classical decision theory, are reducible to just a few mathematical archetypes, all of which allow the finding of straightforward explanations in the frame of the developed quantum approach.