Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Quantum Information Processing

Dynamics of quantum commons games with bounded rationality

Kai Gu, Xingjing Zhang, Nengfa Wang, Zixin Liu

Published Jan 19, 2026• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/s11128-026-05051-1

Related papers

Nonlinear dynamics of continuous-variable quantum games with bounded rationality

Zhe Yang, Qingbin Gong

Quantum Information Processing•Sep 27, 2018•28 citations

Bounded rationality quantum duopoly games with asymmetric information

Yalin Wang, Yanlong Yang, Xicai Deng

Quantum Information Processing•Jun 19, 2025•6 citations

Complex dynamical analysis of the Frackiewicz quantum commons game with bounded rationality

Xingjing Zhang, Nengfa Wang, Kai Gu +1 more

Abstract In the classical commons game, shepherds’ complete rationality causes the Tragedy of the Commons (ToC). Based on bounded rationality, we develop a dynamic Frackiewicz quantum commons game model to explore quantum entanglement’s effects on grazing strategies and profits, analyze quantum equilibrium stability, and apply synchronization control. Our Contributions: (1) The stability of quantum equilibrium depends on the adjustment speed and the squeezing parameter: it remains stable at low adjustment speeds and when the squeezing parameter is close to its critical value (i.e., π 4 ), but exhibits bifurcation or chaos otherwise. (2) Enhanced entanglement expands the stability region, mitigates individual rationality-induced conflicts, and boosts collective profits. Within the Frackiewicz framework, the quantum model optimizes ToC outcomes: the number of sheep never exceeds the classical level, while profits rise with entanglement and never fall below the classical level. (3) Synchronization control ensures strategy evolution convergence to stabilize the system. Physically, entanglement strengthens strategy correlations, suppresses bounded rationality-induced chaos, and expands the stable parameter region, offering a quantum solution to ToC.

Physica Scripta•Nov 27, 2025•1 citation

Static and evolutionary quantum public goods games

Zeyang Liao, Gan Qin, Ling-Zhi Hu +3 more

Physics Letters A•Feb 15, 2008•2 citations

Dynamics of a Quantum Common-Pool Resource Game with Homogeneous Players’ Expectations

Juan Grau-Climent, Luis García-Pérez, Ramón Alonso‐Sanz +1 more

In this work, we analyse a common-pool resource game with homogeneous players (both have boundedly rational expectations) and entanglement between players' strategies. The quantum model with homogeneous expectations is a differential approach to the game since, to the best of our knowledge, it has hardly been considered in previous works. The game is represented using a Cournot type payoff functions, limited to the maximum capacity of the resource. The behaviour of the dynamics is studied considering how the fixed points (particularly the Nash equilibrium) and the stability of the system vary depending on the different values of the parameters involved in the model. In the analysis of this game, it is especially relevant to consider the extent to which the resource is exploited, since the output of the players is highly affected by this issue. It is studied in which cases the resource can be overexploited, adjusting the parameters of the model to avoid this scenario when it is possible. The results are obtained from an analytical point of view and also graphically using bifurcation diagrams to show the behaviour of the dynamics.

Entropy•Nov 25, 2023•2 citations

Evolutionarily stable strategies in quantum games

A. Iqbal, A.H. Toor

arXiv:quant-ph/0007100•Physics Letters A•Mar 1, 2001•110 citations
Abstract In the classical commons game, shepherds’ complete rationality causes the Tragedy of the Commons (ToC). Based on bounded rationality, we develop a dynamic Frackiewicz quantum commons game model to explore quantum entanglement’s effects on grazing strategies and profits, analyze quantum equilibrium stability, and apply synchronization control. Our Contributions: (1) The stability of quantum equilibrium depends on the adjustment speed and the squeezing parameter: it remains stable at low adjustment speeds and when the squeezing parameter is close to its critical value (i.e., π 4 ), but exhibits bifurcation or chaos otherwise. (2) Enhanced entanglement expands the stability region, mitigates individual rationality-induced conflicts, and boosts collective profits. Within the Frackiewicz framework, the quantum model optimizes ToC outcomes: the number of sheep never exceeds the classical level, while profits rise with entanglement and never fall below the classical level. (3) Synchronization control ensures strategy evolution convergence to stabilize the system. Physically, entanglement strengthens strategy correlations, suppresses bounded rationality-induced chaos, and expands the stable parameter region, offering a quantum solution to ToC.
In this work, we analyse a common-pool resource game with homogeneous players (both have boundedly rational expectations) and entanglement between players' strategies. The quantum model with homogeneous expectations is a differential approach to the game since, to the best of our knowledge, it has hardly been considered in previous works. The game is represented using a Cournot type payoff functions, limited to the maximum capacity of the resource. The behaviour of the dynamics is studied considering how the fixed points (particularly the Nash equilibrium) and the stability of the system vary depending on the different values of the parameters involved in the model. In the analysis of this game, it is especially relevant to consider the extent to which the resource is exploited, since the output of the players is highly affected by this issue. It is studied in which cases the resource can be overexploited, adjusting the parameters of the model to avoid this scenario when it is possible. The results are obtained from an analytical point of view and also graphically using bifurcation diagrams to show the behaviour of the dynamics.