A security enhancement scheme based on post-quantum cryptography (PQC) was presented to address the security threats posed to cell broadcast systems in the quantum computing era. Firstly, the cell broadcast system and its security architecture were analyzed to identify potential vulnerabilities in a quantum computing environment. Subsequently, mainstream PQC digital signature algorithms were evaluated in terms of their security and performance characteristics. Three types of post-quantum digital certificate structures—pure post-quantum certificates, hybrid certificates, and composite certificates—were designed, and a key management mechanism, message transmission process, and message format extension scheme compatible with existing systems were proposed. Finally, the proposed scheme was experimentally validated from perspectives such as computational overhead, storage occupancy, and message length adaptability. The results demonstrate the deployment feasibility of the scheme, indicating that it could provide technical reference and an implementation path for the evolution of cell broadcast systems toward a post-quantum security architecture.
A security enhancement scheme based on post-quantum cryptography (PQC) was presented to address the security threats posed to cell broadcast systems in the quantum computing era. Firstly, the cell broadcast system and its security architecture were analyzed to identify potential vulnerabilities in a quantum computing environment. Subsequently, mainstream PQC digital signature algorithms were evaluated in terms of their security and performance characteristics. Three types of post-quantum digital certificate structures—pure post-quantum certificates, hybrid certificates, and composite certificates—were designed, and a key management mechanism, message transmission process, and message format extension scheme compatible with existing systems were proposed. Finally, the proposed scheme was experimentally validated from perspectives such as computational overhead, storage occupancy, and message length adaptability. The results demonstrate the deployment feasibility of the scheme, indicating that it could provide technical reference and an implementation path for the evolution of cell broadcast systems toward a post-quantum security architecture.
The emergence of quantum computing introduces unprecedented risks to classical cryptographic schemes, particularly digital signatures that safeguard authentication, confidentiality, and data integrity across digital ecosystems. To address these concerns, this paper investigates the adoption of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) within Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) frameworks, emphasizing its role in strengthening electronic signature (eSign) systems against quantum threats. Traditional PKI implementations rely on algorithms such as RSA and ECC in combination with Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) for secure key management; however, these methods are vulnerable to quantum algorithms like Shor's. We examine how quantum-resistant alternatives-including lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial-based schemes standardized by NIST-can be integrated into PKI without compromising interoperability and compliance. A comparative evaluation highlights trade-offs in performance, storage, and computational complexity while demonstrating the feasibility of embedding PQC into existing eSign infrastructures. Our findings underscore the urgency of transitioning towards quantum-safe digital signatures to ensure resilience, regulatory alignment, and long-term trust in national-scale digital services.
The potential of quantum computing to compromise traditional public-key cryptography (PKC) has led to a pressing need for more efficient and resilient cryptographic methods. Recent advancements, such as the 800x improvement in the logical error rate by Microsoft and QUANTINUUM, underscore the urgency of this issue. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) offers a promising solution designed to withstand quantum attacks. This paper examines how PQC and other advanced cryptographic techniques can enhance the security and efficiency of PKC in the quantum era. Current PKC methods, despite revolutionizing secure online communication, are vulnerable to flaws in their underlying algorithms. The proposed hybrid model integrates PQC with traditional PKC, leveraging both technologies' strengths to mitigate quantum threats while preserving established security benefits. The investigation addresses critical research questions: how to enhance PKC key management for better efficiency and security, and which PQC techniques can protect PKC from quantum attacks. This paper's contribution includes identifying vulnerabilities in existing PKC, comparing RSA and post-quantum algorithms, and implementing a PQC algorithm between a client and server to analyze integration with existing protocols. Finally, the paper recommends security mechanisms to improve PQC protocols, ensuring robust protection against emerging quantum computing capabilities.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a critical threat to classical cryptographic schemes that secure modern distributed systems. As the deployment of distributed infrastructures—including blockchains, cloud-native applications, and edge networks—continues to grow, there is an urgent need to transition towards quantum-resistant security mechanisms. This paper provides a comprehensive examination of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms and their applicability in distributed system architectures. We analyze the impact of quantum threats on key components of distributed systems such as communication protocols, identity management, data integrity, and consensus mechanisms. Furthermore, we evaluate current NIST-standardized PQC algorithms in terms of computational efficiency, scalability, and integration overhead within distributed environments. Challenges in key management, performance trade-offs, and implementation considerations are discussed. Finally, we propose best practices and future directions for secure, quantum-resilient distributed systems.
Public key cryptography plays a pivotal role in maintaining digital security and privacy, with its foundations built on the hardness of certain mathematical problems. However, the emergence of quantum computing threatens the security of current cryptographic systems, making the adoption of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) an urgent necessity. Digital signature schemes are essential components in secure communications, providing authentication, non-repudiation, and data integrity. This paper examines the state of post-quantum digital signature schemes across various cryptographic approaches, including lattice-based, code-based, multivariate polynomial-based, hash-based, symmetric-key-based, and isogeny-based systems, alongside advancements in Multi-Party Computation in the Head (MPC-in-the-head) schemes. The paper then explores application-specific signatures such as blind, undeniable, threshold, chameleon, aggregate, and ring signatures, explaining their main use cases and the existing post-quantum cryptographic classifications that support these constructions individually. Software implementations of selected prominent PQC digital signature schemes were carried out, and their performance was systematically analysed using metrics such as bandwidth consumption, latency, and computational efficiency. These results provide key observations regarding the suitability of different schemes for both resource-constrained and high-performance environments. Subsequently, a detailed literature review of implementations on embedded and hardware platforms is presented, focusing on ARM-based devices and FPGA accelerators to evaluate deployment feasibility beyond general-purpose processors. Based on the software and implementation-level findings, a comparative analysis across software, embedded, and hardware platforms is conducted to highlight architectural influences on performance, scalability, and practicality. Furthermore the cryptanalytic attacks on post-quantum digital signature schemes across various PQC classifications are examined in this paper, taking into account both classical and quantum adversarial models. To evaluate realistic security constraints, implementation-oriented vulnerabilities such as side-channel and fault-based attacks are also examined. In addition, the applicability of post-quantum digital signature schemes within TLS, IoT, and related practical deployment scenarios is analysed. The study also discusses possible directions for further investigation, focusing on the requirement for effective and expandable PQC systems that can satisfy changing cybersecurity requirements. In order to protect sensitive data in the digital era, this study emphasizes the need for implementing quantum-secure systems by fusing theoretical understandings with real-world applications.
The impending arrival of viable quantum computing is a major worry to modern-day identity management systems that mainly depend on classical public-key cryptography techniques such as RSA and elliptic curve. Such systems are the basis of secure infrastructure in digital identities such as authentication, digital signature and trust models based on certificates. These cryptographic primitives can be broken using quantum algorithms like Shor and Grover, compromising the privacy of credentials and sessions stored and authenticated on digital ecosystems. The paper provides the necessity of the transition of identity management systems to post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms that will be resistant to quantum attacks. It gives a general overview of quantum-exposed identity protocols, as well as a look at the up-and-coming PQC algorithms under development, with a special call to digital signature algorithms capable of identity provision, authentication, and credential lifecycle management. Moreover, the paper isolates the problems of integration which include key size overhead, legacy system compatibility and performance trade-offs and suggests integration to take place through the use of hybrid and decentralized framework to allow a secure migration. This study will form part of a strategic plan to a post-quantum identity infrastructure, with the long term reliability, validity, and withstanding of quantum-era vulnerabilities.
The rapid development in quantum computers brings huge risks to traditional cryptographic systems. This paper talks about the integration of PQC-based digital signature schemes to solve challenges posed on Transport Layer Security certificates. In this paper, we give an analysis of the efficacy, security, and performance implications of various schemes in PQC—particularly lattice-based, hash-based, and multivariate polynomial-based algorithms. We detail more closely the challenges of the real deployment, directly connected with these digital signatures, considering communication overhead and computational costs. Our findings indicate that hybrid certificate chains, which integrate multiple PQC schemes, offer a feasible solution for a seamless transition to quantum-resistant standards with manageable performance trade-offs. Moreover, our study extends to the quantification of security benefits these PQC schemes provide against both quantum and classical computational attacks, underscoring their potential in enhancing the resilience of digital communication systems. This paper aims to contribute valuable insights to ongoing standardization discussions and support the broader adoption of PQC, thereby ensuring robust and future-proof security in digital communications amidst the advancing quantum computing era.