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Computer Networks

Comparative analysis of post-quantum handshake performance in QUIC and TLS protocols

José Antonio Montenegro, Rubén Rı́os, Javier Bonilla

Published Dec 23, 2025• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The rapid advancement of quantum computing threatens the security foundations of today’s communication protocols. On the web, the traditional approach to securing web traffic has been to couple HTTP with TLS over TCP, but QUIC over UDP has recently emerged as an alternative to reduce latency and improve performance over unreliable networks. The need for an urgent transition to quantum-resistant web protocols demands further examination of both stacks. Consequently, in this work we evaluate their performance when combined with post-quantum primitives. To this end, we devise a practical evaluation framework that integrates the cryptographic primitives into TLS and QUIC implementations. Our analysis focuses on comparing the impact of hybrid and post-quantum primitives on TLS and QUIC under both ideal and realistic network conditions, providing quantitative insights into the performance cost and feasibility of transitioning toward a post-quantum web. Our results indicate that hybrid KEMs incur the highest handshake latency and bandwidth overhead, while pure post-quantum KEMs offer a favorable trade-off between security and performance, with only moderate costs. Moreover, QUIC consistently reduces the performance penalty of post-quantum primitives compared to TLS, especially in lossy network environments.

DOI
10.1016/j.comnet.2025.111957

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The rapid advancement of quantum computing threatens the security foundations of today’s communication protocols. On the web, the traditional approach to securing web traffic has been to couple HTTP with TLS over TCP, but QUIC over UDP has recently emerged as an alternative to reduce latency and improve performance over unreliable networks. The need for an urgent transition to quantum-resistant web protocols demands further examination of both stacks. Consequently, in this work we evaluate their performance when combined with post-quantum primitives. To this end, we devise a practical evaluation framework that integrates the cryptographic primitives into TLS and QUIC implementations. Our analysis focuses on comparing the impact of hybrid and post-quantum primitives on TLS and QUIC under both ideal and realistic network conditions, providing quantitative insights into the performance cost and feasibility of transitioning toward a post-quantum web. Our results indicate that hybrid KEMs incur the highest handshake latency and bandwidth overhead, while pure post-quantum KEMs offer a favorable trade-off between security and performance, with only moderate costs. Moreover, QUIC consistently reduces the performance penalty of post-quantum primitives compared to TLS, especially in lossy network environments.
Quantum computers pose a significant threat to widely used cryptographic schemes, making it crucial to urgently shift to post-quantum protocols that ensure the long-term security of communications. This paper presents a framework for facilitating the transition to a quantum-resistant web by enabling the evaluation of the impact of integrating post-quantum and hybrid cryptographic primitives in the TLS protocol. By leveraging the OpenSSL library, the framework enables the seamless evaluation and comparison of key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) and signature schemes provided by the Open Quantum Safe project. The proposed framework is used to analyze different TLS configurations involving classic, hybrid and post-quantum primitives, with a focus on those selected by NIST. The study concentrates on evaluating the performance impact and the data overhead introduced by configurations involving primitives at different security levels. It starts by benchmarking standalone cryptographic primitives and continues with the evaluation of TLS configurations with hybrid and post-quantum KEMs under controlled network conditions, as this is the first natural step for a transition to a quantum-safe TLS. An impact analysis on real-world scenarios follows. Finally, our evaluation concentrates on providing insight into the cost of shifting to TLS configurations involving only hybrid or post-quantum primitives.
The emergence of cryptographically relevant quantum computers threatens the security ofclassical public-key cryptography, necessitating the transition toward post-quantum cryptographic (PQC)algorithms standardized by NIST. At the same time, modern Internet protocols such as HTTP/3—runningover the QUIC transport protocol—are becoming widely deployed, offering reduced latency and improvedreliability compared to traditional TCP+TLS stacks. Ensuring that HTTP/3 infrastructure remains secure inthe post-quantum era requires practical implementations that integrate PQC algorithms without causingprohibitive performance overheads. In this study, we present the development of a PQC–enabled Apacheweb server that supports HTTP/3 through a custom OpenSSL 3.5.4 provider embedding the NISTstandardized ML-KEM and ML-DSA algorithms. Our implementation integrates PQC primitives into theQUIC handshake via modified OpenSSL EVP interfaces and enables PQC-based certificates and keyencapsulation mechanisms within a Caddy reverse proxy + Apache server architecture. Performanceevaluations were conducted on heterogeneous hardware, including a Raspberry Pi 4 and an Intel-baseddesktop system, under realistic network conditions. Experimental results show that ML-KEM and MLDSA introduce moderate handshake latency (≈18%) and minimal throughput reduction (4–8%). Across allconfigurations, HTTP/3's multiplexed, UDP-based design mitigated PQC-related delays, maintaining morethan 90% of classical throughput. The results demonstrate that integrating standardized PQC algorithmsinto modern web servers is both feasible and efficient, validating HTTP/3 as a strong foundation forquantum-resilient Internet communication. This work provides an operational reference for deploying PQCwithin web infrastructures and highlights pathways for future enhancements such as hybrid key exchange,certificate compression, and hardware acceleration.
The transition to a quantum-resistant Internet is a complex process that depends on the integration of post-quantum cryptographic primitives into existing security protocols. This paper analyzes the impact that the primitives selected by NIST in their post-quantum cryptography competition has on a critical Internet security protocol, the TLS protocol. The analysis is facilitated by a framework that enables the implementation of an evaluation scenario in which different post-quantum primitives can be tested under identical conditions, ensuring a fair comparison. Our results indicate that the computational overhead introduced by current post-quantum standards in TLS is comparable to that of traditional algorithms, and even more efficient at high security levels. However, their significant impact on data transmission constrains the transition to a full-fledged quantum-safe web.
The emergence of quantum computing presents a significant threat to classical cryptographic primitives, particularly those employed in securing internet communications via widely used protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS). As conventional key exchange mechanisms will become increasingly vulnerable in the post-quantum era, the integration of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms into existing security protocols is of utmost importance. This study investigates the impact of incorporating PQC key encapsulation mechanisms—specifically, the recent standards CRYSTALS-Kyber and HQC, in conjunction with the candidate standard BIKE—into the TLS 1.3 handshake. A comprehensive experimental evaluation was conducted to measure handshake latency under emulated network conditions with varying packet loss probabilities. The findings offer useful insights into the performance trade-offs introduced by PQC integration and further highlight the necessity of a timely transition to post-quantum cryptographic standards.
The advances in quantum computing present a threat to public key primitives due to their ability to solve hard cryptographic problems in polynomial time. To address this threat to critical Internet security protocols like the Transfer Layer Security (TLS), and Secure Shell (SSH), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is currently working on the new generation of quantum-resistant key encapsulation and authentication schemes. In this paper, we evaluate protocol handshake performance when both post-quantum key exchange and authentication are integrated into TLS and SSH. Our experiments consider realistic network conditions and reveal that the introduced handshake latency ranges between 1-300% for TLS and 0.5-50% for SSH depending on the post-quantum algorithms used. In addition, we examine how the initial TCP window size affects post-quantum TLS and SSH performance, and show that even a small size increase can reduce the observed post-quantum slowdown by 50%. Finally, we discuss alternatives that can encourage the early adoption of post-quantum cryptography with minimum protocol performance degradation.
The advancement of quantum computing creates a big threat to classical cryptographic protocols, including TLS, which is responsible for secure internet communications. While recent industry and academic efforts have focused on integrating lattice-based post-quantum key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) such as Kyber+X25519 into hybrid TLS handshakes, these approaches often prioritize performance at the cost of cryptanalytic diversity. Code-based KEMs, despite their proven security measure they remain underexplored in hybrid frameworks due to some limitations like large key sizes and integration complexity. This paper proposes a novel hybrid TLS framework that explicitly incorporates code-based post-quantum cryptography—specifically McEliece—alongside classical key exchange mechanisms. The framework introduces a dual-handshake mechanism, adaptive parameter selection, and seamless fallback negotiation, enabling flexible deployment across heterogeneous networks while ensuring backward compatibility. Integration with Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNGs) and multifactor authentication further increases entropy quality and session security. We implemented and evaluated the framework using an OpenSSL-OQS integration. We measure handshake latency, CPU utilization, memory usage, and throughput across emulated and real-world testbeds. Results show that the proposed hybrid approach achieves up to 30% lower latency and significantly reduced resource overhead compared to pure post-quantum TLS variants, while maintaining near-classical efficiency levels. Mathematical modeling formalizes these trade-offs which offers a foundation for optimizing deployment in both resource-constrained IoT devices and high-performance servers. By advancing cryptographic diversity and aligning with emerging NIST and IETF standardization efforts, the proposed framework provides a practical pathway toward quantum-resilient secure communication.It shows that code-based post-quantum cryptography can be added to current TLS systems without any problems, keeping security, performance, and compatibility in mind as we get ready for the quantum age.