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Losing sight of the forest for the psi: Beyond the wavefunction hegemony

Alisa Bokulich

Published Jan 1, 2020• 0 citations
OpenAlex

Abstract

Traditionally Ψ is used to stand in for both the mathematical wavefunction (the representation) and the quantum state (the thing in the world).This elision has been elevated to a metaphysical thesis by advocates of the view known as wavefunction realism.My aim in this paper is to challenge the hegemony of the wavefunction by calling attention to a little-known formulation of quantum theory that does not make use of the wavefunction in representing the quantum state.This approach, called Lagrangian quantum hydrodynamics (LQH), is not an approximation scheme, but rather a full alternative formulation of quantum theory.I argue that a careful consideration of alternative formalisms is an essential part of any realist project that attempts to read the ontology of a theory off of the mathematical formalism.In particular, I show that LQH undercuts the central presumption of wavefunction realism and falsifies the claim that one must represent the many-body quantum state as living in a 3n-dimensional configuration space.I conclude by briefly sketching three different realist approaches one could take toward LQH, and argue that both models of the quantum state should be admitted.When exploring quantum realism, regaining sight of the proverbial forest of quantum representations beyond the Ψ is just the first step.I. Introduction II.Quantum Realism a. Wavefunction Realism b.A Few Cautionary Tales III.Hydrodynamic Representations at the Classical Scale IV.Hydrodynamic Representations at the Quantum Scale a. Eulerian Quantum Hydrodynamics b.Lagrangian Quantum Hydrodynamics V. Exploring Lagrangian Quantum Hydrodynamics a. LQH is not the de Broglie-Bohm Interpretation b.Symmetries in Quantum Hydrodynamics c.Is the Lagrangian Picture More Fundamental?VI.Beyond the Ψ Hegemony

Related papers

Losing Sight of the Forest for the ψ: Beyond the Wavefunction Hegemony

Alisa Bokulich

Traditionally \1 is used to stand for both the mathematical wavefunction (the representation) and the quantum state (thing in the world). This elision has been elevated to a metaphysical thesis by advocates of wavefunction realism. The aim of Chapter 10 is to challenge the hegemony of the wavefunction by calling attention to a littleknown formulation of quantum theory that does not make use of the wavefunction in representing the quantum state. This approach, called Lagrangian quantum hydrodynamics (LQH), is a full alternative formulation, not an approximation scheme. A consideration of alternative formalisms is essential for any realist project that attempts to read the ontology of a theory off the mathematical formalism. The chapter shows that LQH falsifies the claim that one must represent the many-body quantum state as living in 3n-dimensional configuration space. When exploring quantum realism, regaining sight of the proverbial forest of quantum representations beyond the \1 is just the beginning.

Oxford University Press eBooks•Feb 27, 2020•6 citations

On Hydrodynamic Formulations of Quantum Mechanics and the Problem of Sparse Ontology

Aric Hackebill, Bill Poirier

Hydrodynamic reformulations of the Schrödinger equation suggest an interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of a fluid flowing on configuration space. In the discrete hydrodynamic view, this fluid is not fundamental but emerges from many underlying microscopic fluid components whose collective behavior reproduces quantum phenomena. The most developed realization of this idea is the discrete many interacting worlds (MIW) framework, in which discrete particle-like worlds interact via inter-world forces and quantum probabilities are grounded in direct world counting. But there is also an older, continuous version of MIW. After reviewing the hydrodynamic and MIW formalisms, and emphasizing some of their interpretational advantages over the Everettian Many Worlds and Bohmian approaches, we argue that all discrete hydrodynamic models face a generic structural difficulty, which we call the problem of sparse ontology. Because wavefunctions typically branch under decoherence, the discrete components of the fluid are repeatedly partitioned into sub-ensembles, thereby thinning their density in configuration space and driving the dynamics away from the quantum regime once the components become sufficiently sparse. We conclude that successful hydrodynamic completions of quantum mechanics plausibly require an essentially continuous ontology.

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Scientific Realism and the Quantum

Steven French, Juha T. Saatsi

Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?

Oxford University Press eBooks•Feb 27, 2020•67 citations

Symmetries and conservation laws in the Lagrangian picture of quantum hydrodynamics

Peter Holland

Quantum hydrodynamics represents quantum mechanics through two complementary models: the Eulerian picture, a direct transcription of wave mechanics, and the Lagrangian picture, in which the quantum state is represented by the collective motion of a continuum of fluid particles, the latter being obtained by continuously varying the particle label. The Lagrangian picture thus adds variables to the quantum formalism and exhibits a corresponding new quantum symmetry viz. a continuous particle-relabelling covariance group. Using Noether's theorem, the relabelling symmetry is derived as a component of a general investigation of symmetries and conservation laws in the quantum Lagrangian picture. Relations with symmetries and conservation laws in the Eulerian picture are explored in detail. Alongside the infinite relabelling group, the 12-parameter kinematical covariance group of the Schrödinger equation is derived. It is stressed that the role of label transformations extends beyond the class corresponding to Eulerian invariance. As an example, it is shown that the linear superposition of waves, a fundamental symmetry of the quantum Eulerian picture, can be generated by a deformation-dependent label transformation in the Lagrangian picture.

arXiv:1211.0983•Nov 5, 2012•4 citations

Quantum Mechanics in Terms of Realism

Arthur Jabs

We expound an alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation of the formalism of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. The basic difference is that the new interpretation is formulated in the language of epistemological realism. It involves a change in some basic physical concepts. The ψ function is no longer interpreted as a probability amplitude of the observed behavior of an elementary particle but as an objective physical field representing the particle itself. The particles are thus extended objects whose extension varies in time according to the variation of ψ. They are considered as fundamental regions of space with no internal structure. This implies some kind of nonlocality. Symmetrization of the configuration space wave function is interpreted as a mathematical description of a physical process, which also leads to nonlocal effects. Special consideration

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Varieties of Wave Function Realism, or, WTF is WFR?

Myrvold, Wayne C.

The phrase “Wave Function Realism” (WFR) has come to be used for a family of views according to which quantum theory motivates us to think that quantum wave functions are fields on a space of extremely high dimension, which is in some sense more fundamental that ordinary three-dimensional space or four-dimensional spacetime. With an aim at gaining clarity about the nature of the project, I distinguish between varieties of Wave Function Realism that one might hold. I focus on two axes of distinction. One has to do with the nature of the project. Is it an Interpretive project, one of accepting standard quantum theory pretty much as we have it, and exploring its implications for ontology? Or is it a Constructive project, which finds standard quantum theory wanting in crucial aspects, and seeks to construct a new theory that will satisfy some set of metaphysical constraints? The other has to do with how radical the claims are that are made about the nature of spacetime. Does the fundamental space on which the wave functions of WFR are defined have intrinsic structure corresponding to the low-dimensional spacetime structure? I call versions of WFR on which this is so “Mild” versions, as on such a view any sense in which the low-dimensional spatial structure is non-fundamental would be at best a highly attenuated one. A more radical view, which I call “Spicy,” has it that the fundamental space has no intrinsic structure corresponding to our low dimension spacetime, and that such structure is emergent from the structure and evolution of certain sort of wave functions. Judging from what they say about the view, it seems that proponents of WFR intend it to be Interpretive and Spicy. I will argue that there can be no such position. Standard quantum mechanics makes such heavy use of low-dimensional spacetime structure that an Interpretive version of WFR must be Extremely Mild. A Spicy but Constructive version has yet to be formulated.

•Apr 1, 2025•0 citations
Traditionally Ψ is used to stand in for both the mathematical wavefunction (the representation) and the quantum state (the thing in the world).This elision has been elevated to a metaphysical thesis by advocates of the view known as wavefunction realism.My aim in this paper is to challenge the hegemony of the wavefunction by calling attention to a little-known formulation of quantum theory that does not make use of the wavefunction in representing the quantum state.This approach, called Lagrangian quantum hydrodynamics (LQH), is not an approximation scheme, but rather a full alternative formulation of quantum theory.I argue that a careful consideration of alternative formalisms is an essential part of any realist project that attempts to read the ontology of a theory off of the mathematical formalism.In particular, I show that LQH undercuts the central presumption of wavefunction realism and falsifies the claim that one must represent the many-body quantum state as living in a 3n-dimensional configuration space.I conclude by briefly sketching three different realist approaches one could take toward LQH, and argue that both models of the quantum state should be admitted.When exploring quantum realism, regaining sight of the proverbial forest of quantum representations beyond the Ψ is just the first step.I. Introduction II.Quantum Realism a. Wavefunction Realism b.A Few Cautionary Tales III.Hydrodynamic Representations at the Classical Scale IV.Hydrodynamic Representations at the Quantum Scale a. Eulerian Quantum Hydrodynamics b.Lagrangian Quantum Hydrodynamics V. Exploring Lagrangian Quantum Hydrodynamics a. LQH is not the de Broglie-Bohm Interpretation b.Symmetries in Quantum Hydrodynamics c.Is the Lagrangian Picture More Fundamental?VI.Beyond the Ψ Hegemony
Traditionally \1 is used to stand for both the mathematical wavefunction (the representation) and the quantum state (thing in the world). This elision has been elevated to a metaphysical thesis by advocates of wavefunction realism. The aim of Chapter 10 is to challenge the hegemony of the wavefunction by calling attention to a littleknown formulation of quantum theory that does not make use of the wavefunction in representing the quantum state. This approach, called Lagrangian quantum hydrodynamics (LQH), is a full alternative formulation, not an approximation scheme. A consideration of alternative formalisms is essential for any realist project that attempts to read the ontology of a theory off the mathematical formalism. The chapter shows that LQH falsifies the claim that one must represent the many-body quantum state as living in 3n-dimensional configuration space. When exploring quantum realism, regaining sight of the proverbial forest of quantum representations beyond the \1 is just the beginning.
Hydrodynamic reformulations of the Schrödinger equation suggest an interpretation of quantum mechanics in terms of a fluid flowing on configuration space. In the discrete hydrodynamic view, this fluid is not fundamental but emerges from many underlying microscopic fluid components whose collective behavior reproduces quantum phenomena. The most developed realization of this idea is the discrete many interacting worlds (MIW) framework, in which discrete particle-like worlds interact via inter-world forces and quantum probabilities are grounded in direct world counting. But there is also an older, continuous version of MIW. After reviewing the hydrodynamic and MIW formalisms, and emphasizing some of their interpretational advantages over the Everettian Many Worlds and Bohmian approaches, we argue that all discrete hydrodynamic models face a generic structural difficulty, which we call the problem of sparse ontology. Because wavefunctions typically branch under decoherence, the discrete components of the fluid are repeatedly partitioned into sub-ensembles, thereby thinning their density in configuration space and driving the dynamics away from the quantum regime once the components become sufficiently sparse. We conclude that successful hydrodynamic completions of quantum mechanics plausibly require an essentially continuous ontology.
Scientific realism has traditionally maintained that our best scientific theories can be regarded as more or less true and as representing the world as it is (more or less). However, one of our very best current theories—quantum mechanics—has famously resisted such a realist construal, threatening to undermine the realist stance altogether. The chapters in this volume carefully examine this tension and the reasons behind it, including the underdetermination generated by the multiplicity of formulations and interpretations of quantum physics, each presenting a different way the world could be. Authors in this volume offer a range of alternative ways forward: some suggest new articulations of realism, limiting our commitments in one way or another; others attempt to articulate a ‘third way’ between traditional forms of realism and antirealism, or are critical of such attempts. Still others argue that quantum theory itself should be reconceptualised, or at least alternative formulations should be considered in the hope of evading the problems faced by realism. And some examine the nature of these issues when moving beyond quantum mechanics to quantum field theory. Taken together they offer an exciting new set of perspectives on one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of modern physics: how can one be a realist about quantum theory, and what does this realism amount to?
Quantum hydrodynamics represents quantum mechanics through two complementary models: the Eulerian picture, a direct transcription of wave mechanics, and the Lagrangian picture, in which the quantum state is represented by the collective motion of a continuum of fluid particles, the latter being obtained by continuously varying the particle label. The Lagrangian picture thus adds variables to the quantum formalism and exhibits a corresponding new quantum symmetry viz. a continuous particle-relabelling covariance group. Using Noether's theorem, the relabelling symmetry is derived as a component of a general investigation of symmetries and conservation laws in the quantum Lagrangian picture. Relations with symmetries and conservation laws in the Eulerian picture are explored in detail. Alongside the infinite relabelling group, the 12-parameter kinematical covariance group of the Schrödinger equation is derived. It is stressed that the role of label transformations extends beyond the class corresponding to Eulerian invariance. As an example, it is shown that the linear superposition of waves, a fundamental symmetry of the quantum Eulerian picture, can be generated by a deformation-dependent label transformation in the Lagrangian picture.
We expound an alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation of the formalism of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. The basic difference is that the new interpretation is formulated in the language of epistemological realism. It involves a change in some basic physical concepts. The ψ function is no longer interpreted as a probability amplitude of the observed behavior of an elementary particle but as an objective physical field representing the particle itself. The particles are thus extended objects whose extension varies in time according to the variation of ψ. They are considered as fundamental regions of space with no internal structure. This implies some kind of nonlocality. Symmetrization of the configuration space wave function is interpreted as a mathematical description of a physical process, which also leads to nonlocal effects. Special consideration
The phrase “Wave Function Realism” (WFR) has come to be used for a family of views according to which quantum theory motivates us to think that quantum wave functions are fields on a space of extremely high dimension, which is in some sense more fundamental that ordinary three-dimensional space or four-dimensional spacetime. With an aim at gaining clarity about the nature of the project, I distinguish between varieties of Wave Function Realism that one might hold. I focus on two axes of distinction. One has to do with the nature of the project. Is it an Interpretive project, one of accepting standard quantum theory pretty much as we have it, and exploring its implications for ontology? Or is it a Constructive project, which finds standard quantum theory wanting in crucial aspects, and seeks to construct a new theory that will satisfy some set of metaphysical constraints? The other has to do with how radical the claims are that are made about the nature of spacetime. Does the fundamental space on which the wave functions of WFR are defined have intrinsic structure corresponding to the low-dimensional spacetime structure? I call versions of WFR on which this is so “Mild” versions, as on such a view any sense in which the low-dimensional spatial structure is non-fundamental would be at best a highly attenuated one. A more radical view, which I call “Spicy,” has it that the fundamental space has no intrinsic structure corresponding to our low dimension spacetime, and that such structure is emergent from the structure and evolution of certain sort of wave functions. Judging from what they say about the view, it seems that proponents of WFR intend it to be Interpretive and Spicy. I will argue that there can be no such position. Standard quantum mechanics makes such heavy use of low-dimensional spacetime structure that an Interpretive version of WFR must be Extremely Mild. A Spicy but Constructive version has yet to be formulated.