The purpose of this paper is to revisit a neglected understanding of quantum mechanics, the so-called propensity theory and to propose a amended version of it. According to this version, the causal-structural approach adopted here, a quantum system has a physical structure, consisting of relata (components, say electrons) and relations (determining the interrelations between the components). This structure is mathematically encoded in wave functions and forms the base, on which propensities supervene. This paper proposes that propensities or intrinsic dispositions supervene on the structural properties of the system. A propensity is a disposition of a quantum system to display selective aspects in response to an encounter with a measurement situation. The selective propensities manifest themselves as probabilities, in accordance with the application of the Born rule to respective wave functions.
The purpose of this paper is to revisit a neglected understanding of quantum mechanics, the so-called propensity theory and to propose a amended version of it. According to this version, the causal-structural approach adopted here, a quantum system has a physical structure, consisting of relata (components, say electrons) and relations (determining the interrelations between the components). This structure is mathematically encoded in wave functions and forms the base, on which propensities supervene. This paper proposes that propensities or intrinsic dispositions supervene on the structural properties of the system. A propensity is a disposition of a quantum system to display selective aspects in response to an encounter with a measurement situation. The selective propensities manifest themselves as probabilities, in accordance with the application of the Born rule to respective wave functions.
In quantum physics the tests of most properties do not have predetermined outcomes. The latter have nevertheless well-defined probabilities of being realized during a test. Following Popper we interpret these probabilities as physical propensities. A first purpose of the present article is to formalize the propensity interpretation in the framework of state-property structures. Next, Gleason’s theorem asserts that in the Hilbert space there exists a unique propensity function (i.e., one probability measure for each state vector); the propensities are thus uniquely determined by the state vector. Conversely, we prove that if the state-property structure admits one and only one propensity function, then the set ℒ of all properties is a complete atomic orthomodular lattice. We point out that according to our assumption the probabilistic aspect of the system is entirely determined by its deterministic aspect. Assuming furthermore that each property can be ideally tested, it follows that ℒ is isomorphic to the direct union of Hilbertian space lattices. We recover thus the purely classical and purely quantum frameworks as the two extreme cases. The intermediate cases correspond to quantum mechanics with—possibly continuous—superselection variables. Finally, we prove that a system is classical, i.e., all properties are mutually compatible, if and only if the propensity function is dispersion free. In our approach the quantum probabilities appear thus as a generalization of classical determinism rather than a generalization of classical probabilities.
Given the controversial status of the various interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM for short), it may seem crazy to use the philosophy of quantum physics to try to learn some lessons about the prevailing problems in the literature on dispositions and causal powers. However, such an attempt seems worthwhile for at least three reasons. The first is more internal to the philosophy of QM. Apart from a seminal paper by Robert Clifton and Constantine Pagonis (1995), who investigated the issue of dispositional properties in Bohmian mechanics, very little has been done to shed This neglect seems particularly surprising, especially if one considers that some of the founding fathers of quantum physics, notably Werner Heisenberg, have made direct reference to Aristotelian potentiae to refer to and interpret the elusive nature of the atomic and subatomic world ‘in se’, that is, before measurement: ‘Such a probability function [i.e. the statistical algorithm of quantum theory] combines objective and subjective elements. It contains statements on possibilities, or better tendencies (“potentiae” in Aristotelian philosophy), and such statements are completely objective, they don’t depend on any observer the passage from the “possible” to the Some years before, Henry Margenau3 had already characterized the properties of quantum systems as merely latent, in contrast to the properties intervening in the description of classical systems, which are always definite even when they are merely dispositional. Similarly, Karl Popper4 and Nicholas Maxwell5 have defended some sort of a propensity interpretation of probability, and a view of quantum reality essentially characterized by irreducibly probabilistic propensities. Influenced by this tradition, Michael Redhead’s influential textbook on the philosophy of QM distinguishes among three different interpretations of the theory, the second of which presupposes real propensities and potentialities and attributes to measurements the function of ‘converting latent values in possessed values’.6 Clearly, for this second interpretation to make less than an instrumentalistic sense, one needs to construe potentialities and dispositions as real properties of systems. Consequently, it seems important to try to get a firmer grasp of the sense in which QM might need irreducible dispositions to shed light on the nature of the properties of quantum systems before measurements, in particular when the state of such systems is not an eigenstate of the relevant physical observable.
The Born-rule, which assigns probabilities to measurement outcomes, is one of the fundamental axioms of quantum physics. It dates back to the time of the establishment of the formalism of quantum physics in the first half of the 20th century. From the beginning, and particularly in connection with the development of different interpretations of the theory, there has been a desire/need to better understand the true nature of the Born-probabilities. Are they classical/epistemic of origin or are they irreducible and of on tic stature as a kind of intrinsic propensities of physical systems? We show that, by only using the mathematical formalism of the original theory, we find a possible answer.
Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabiities for physical events: both state and probability are objective--not because they represent elements of phyiscal reality, but because each exerts norrmative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not "collapse" on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violations of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate "spooky" non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps us to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner's friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.
Applications of quantum mechanics have led to many successful predictions and explanations of puzzling phenomena, and we now apply quantum mechanics to gain, process, and communicate information in novel ways. We can understand quantum mechanics by understanding how we have applied it. We should not seek agreement on the nature of the world it represents, because this theory does not itself represent the physical world (though its applications do help us to represent it better). When applied to a quantum state, quantum mechanics yields probabilities for physical events: both state and probability are objective—not because they represent elements of physical reality, but because each exerts normative authority over the beliefs of anyone who accepts quantum mechanics and applies it relative to a physical situation they may (but need not) occupy. These events may be described by statements (about values of magnitudes) that are meaningful in an appropriate environmental context, and quantum mechanics can help one to say when that is. Measurement creates an appropriate context, so here the Born rule indirectly yields probabilities of measurement outcomes. The quantum state of a system does not “collapse” on measurement: a new state must be assigned relative to a physical situation in which information about the outcome is accessible. Understood this way, there is no measurement problem, and violation of Bell inequalities does not demonstrate “spooky” non-local action. Quantum field theories have no physical ontology of their own: a quantum field is a mathematical object in a model whose application helps to improve and extend our descriptions of the world in other terms. We cannot realise the scenario of Wigner’s friend and its recent extensions: but the data that provide overwhelming evidence for quantum mechanics are objective in the same sense as the relative measurement outcomes described in those scenarios.
The paper is concentrated on the special changes of the conception of causalityfrom quantum mechanics to quantum information meaning as a background the revolution implemented by the former to classical physics and science after Max Born’s probabilistic reinterpretation of wave function. Those changes can be enumerated so: (1) quantum information describes the general case of the relation of two wave functions, and particularly, the causal amendment of a single one; (2) it keeps the physical description to be causal by the conservation of quantum information and in accordance with Born’s interpretation; (3) it introduces inverse causality, “backwards in time”, observable “forwards in time” as the fundamentally random probability density distribution of all possible measurements of any physical quantity in quantum mechanics; (4) it involves a kind of “bidirectional causality” unifying (4.1) the classical determinism of cause and effect, (4.2) the probabilistic causality of quantum mechanics, and (4.3) the reversibility of any coherent state; (5) it identifies determinism with the function successor in Peano arithmetic, and its proper generalized causality with the information function successor in Hilbert arithmetic.