The imminent appearance of Quantum Computers poses a threat to the cryptographic algorithms used by public key infrastructure (PKI) of world-wide used communication protocols. High performance computing (HPC) data centers, among others entities, being well aware of the catastrophic consequences of quantum attacks to their PKI, are transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptographic (PQC), despite the considerable associated overhead on handling the incoming network packets. This work helps with the transition to PQC providing an implementation of a quantum-resilient security protocol for communication between data processing units (DPU). Our solution ensures quantum security providing PQ authentication by means of CRYSTALS-Dilithium, PQ authenticated Key exchanges by means of CRYSTALS-Kyber and confidential transmission of data by means of AES-256. Additionally, the implementation on DPUs help reducing the computational load on the HPC data centers.
The imminent appearance of Quantum Computers poses a threat to the cryptographic algorithms used by public key infrastructure (PKI) of world-wide used communication protocols. High performance computing (HPC) data centers, among others entities, being well aware of the catastrophic consequences of quantum attacks to their PKI, are transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptographic (PQC), despite the considerable associated overhead on handling the incoming network packets. This work helps with the transition to PQC providing an implementation of a quantum-resilient security protocol for communication between data processing units (DPU). Our solution ensures quantum security providing PQ authentication by means of CRYSTALS-Dilithium, PQ authenticated Key exchanges by means of CRYSTALS-Kyber and confidential transmission of data by means of AES-256. Additionally, the implementation on DPUs help reducing the computational load on the HPC data centers.
Abstract The appearance of quantum computing in the short foreseeable future and its capability to break conventional cryptographic algorithms forces to change the paradigm of secure real‐time communications. Thus, government organizations, data centers, and enterprises among others are migrating their public key infrastructure towards using post‐quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms in order to mitigate the security threats posed by quantum computers. This letter presents the first quantum resilient secure end‐to‐end communication link based on PQC algorithms operating between two data‐processing units DPU. Both data‐processing units employ on‐board ARM processors to perform the computationally expensive cryptographic building blocks—in that case CRYSTALS‐Kyber as a key encapsulation mechanism and CRYSTALS‐Dilithium for digital signature scheme in combination with advanced encryption standard with 256‐bit key.
As quantum computing advances, current cryptographic protocols are increasingly vulnerable to quantum attacks, particularly those based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) like RSA or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). This paper presents a comprehensive review of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) as a solution to protect digital systems in the quantum era. We provide an in-depth analysis of various quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, including lattice-based, code-based, hash-based, isogeny-based, and multivariate approaches. The review highlights the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) PQC standardization process, highlighting key algorithms, such as CRYSTALS–Kyber, CRYSTALS–Dilithium, Falcon, and SPHINCS+, and discusses the strengths, vulnerabilities, and implementation challenges of the leading algorithms. In addition, we explore transition strategies for organizations, emphasizing hybrid cryptography to ensure backward compatibility during migration. This study offers key insights into the future of cryptographic standards and the critical steps necessary to prepare for the transition from classical to quantum-resistant systems.
The development of quantum computers poses a risk to the cryptographic algorithms utilized by current public key infrastructure (PKI). High performance computing (HPC), inter- and intra-datacenter communications, and governmental communications are particularly vulnerable to security attacks by quantum computers. In response, there are on-going efforts on implementing post-quantum cryptography (PQC) despite the considerable overhead involved in processing PQC encrypted data packets in comparison with their classical counterparts. This work aims to help with the transition to quantum resistant cryptographic schemes by means of providing a thorough experimental performance comparison of the four algorithms selected by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for standardization when implemented in a data processing unit (DPU). The experiments are conducted at line-rate, demonstrating for the first time operation at almost 100 Gbit/s and hence suitability for high-capacity data center environments.
The potential of the swift development of quantum computing is an extreme danger to the traditional cryptographic programs, and they are the foundation of the modern communication infrastructure. RSA and ECC are classical public-key algorithms that can be successfully quantum-attacked, in particular, Shor's algorithm can easily factor large integers and calculate discrete logarithms (Bernstein et al., 2017). The Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has become the key to secure the next-generation communication networks against these threats, which relies on lattice problem-based algorithms, hash-based based algorithms, multivariate polynomials-based algorithms, and code-based cryptography. The paper examines the concepts, design, and implementation issues of PQC within current network infrastructure focusing on the secure transmission of data, authentication, and key management in the upcoming 5G and 6G networks. The approach will include the survey of existing algorithms of PQC, model the integration of protocol in the communication systems and test computational efficiency, security strength, and scalability. It has been found that PQC is suitable to protect network communications against quantum attackers, and achieves reasonable performance, though trade-offs can be seen in terms of computation overhead, key size, and latency. The research offers understanding to the researcher, network engineers and policy makers in order to adopt quantum resistant cryptography protocols to secure the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of information in the future communication networks.
As the advent of quantum computing threatens traditional cryptographic protocols, hybrid classical-quantum secure communication infrastructures have emerged as a critical frontier in cybersecurity. This paper explores the integration of post-quantum cryptographic algorithms—specifically CRYSTALS-Kyber for key encapsulation and CRYSTALS-Dilithium for digital signatures—into hybrid communication architectures designed to resist quantum-level attacks. Leveraging lattice-based cryptographic primitives, both algorithms have been selected for standardization by NIST due to their robust security and performance characteristics. This study evaluates their implementation in real-world communication stacks, assesses latency and throughput under hybrid channel configurations, and proposes a layered security architecture combining classical and quantum-resilient mechanisms. Furthermore, it examines key management, digital trust, and infrastructure scalability in a post-quantum context. Simulation results and hardware-based validations are used to determine practical deployment feasibility in critical sectors such as finance, defense, and healthcare. The findings offer a comprehensive framework for securing data in transitional computing eras, ensuring forward secrecy, and maintaining operational integrity against future adversarial quantum threats.
The accelerating development of large-scale quantum computers poses an existential threat to the public-key cryptographic infrastructure that underpins modern digital communication. Algorithms such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which currently secure internet traffic, digital signatures, and data-at-rest, are vulnerable to Shor's algorithm running on a sufficiently powerful quantum processor. In response, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalized the first post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards in August 2024—FIPS 203 (ML-KEM/Kyber), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA/Dilithium), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA/SPHINCS+)—marking the beginning of a global migration toward quantum-resistant cryptography. This paper presents a hybrid C++/Python secure storage and communication platform (source code available at https://github.com/Sujithb128989/Quantum-Safe-Backend) that implements NIST-selected PQC algorithms in a production-oriented architecture. The backend employs CRYSTALS-Dilithium5 for quantum-resistant transport authentication, Kyber for key encapsulation, and AES-256-GCM for symmetric encryption-at-rest, delivered through a dual-stack gRPC/HTTP architecture containerized with Docker. We describe the system's design rationale, detail the cryptographic pipeline from certificate generation to atomic key rotation, and discuss the engineering challenges of integrating post-quantum primitives into real-world software systems.