Historically, a significant dispute emerged between Albert Einstein and John Bell concerning the acceptance of nonlocal correlations in quantum mechanics. I intend to demonstrate that Albert Einstein’s stance is correct and he is the winner of this debate.
Despite their Nobel Prize-winning empirical falsification, the interpretation of the Bell inequality remains a subject of controversy. This article discusses and attempts to clarify the reasons John S. Bell and A. Einstein claimed that quantum entanglement implies puzzling nonlocal correlations that Einstein famously termed ``spooky action at a distance.'' The issue remains notoriously controversial and has roughly divided the scientific community into localists and nonlocalists. Without taking a stance on either side in the long-standing, polarized debate, we examine Bell's actual argument, highlighting how it differs from the current orthodoxy.
In 1964, John Bell proved that quantum mechanics is “unreasonable” (to use Einstein's term): there are nonlocal bipartite quantum correlations. But they are not the most nonlocal bipartite correlations consistent with relativistic causality (“no superluminal signalling”); maximally nonlocal “superquantum” (or “PR-box”) correlations are also consistent with relativistic causality. I show that – unlike quantum correlations – these correlations do not have a classical limit consistent with relativistic causality. The generalization of this result to all stronger-than-quantum nonlocal correlations is a derivation of Tsirelson's bound – a theorem of quantum mechanics – from the three axioms of relativistic causality, nonlocality, and the existence of a classical limit. But is it reasonable to derive (a part of) quantum mechanics from the unreasonable axiom of nonlocality?! I consider replacing the nonlocality axiom with an equivalent axiom that even Bell and Einstein might have considered reasonable: an axiom of local retrocausality. In 1964, John Bell [1] proved that quantum mechanics is “unreasonable,” as defined by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [2] in 1935: “No reasonable definition of reality could be expected to permit this.” “This” (i.e., violation of “Einstein separability,” to use a technical term, or “spooky action at a distance,” as Einstein put it) turns out to be endemic to quantum mechanics. For example, pairs of photons measured at spacelike separations may yield nonlocal quantum correlations, i.e., correlations that cannot be traced to any data or “programs” the photons carry with them. As Bell [3] put it 20 years later, “For me, it is so reasonable to assume that the photons in those experiments carry with them programs, which have been correlated in advance, telling them how to behave. This is so rational that I think that when Einstein saw that, and the others refused to see it, he was the rational man. The other people, although history has justified them, were burying their heads in the sand. I feel that Einstein's intellectual superiority over Bohr, in this instance, was enormous; a vast gulf between the man who saw clearly what was needed, and the obscurantist. So for me, it is a pity that Einstein's idea doesn't work. The reasonable thing just doesn't work.”
Through a historical analysis of John Stewart Bell's works, we confront a stance that distorts his views on the nature of quantum theory, more concretely, on quantum nonlocality. We briefly analyze Bell's arguments for quantum nonlocality as he developed them from 1964 until his sudden and unexpected death in 1990. As is well known, the alleged nonlocal character of quantum mechanics is inextricably related to the formulation of the Bell theorem. However, the departure from the clear line of reasoning that John Bell tried to convey has led to a polarization of part of the scientific community into radical irreconcilable positions. We show how the correct appreciation of Bell's work calls for reinterpreting the usual significance given to the Bell theorem yielding a more rational perspective of the problem. We formalize the correct argument sustaining the nonlocal character of quantum mechanics and comment on alternatives that may justify considering quantum mechanics as a local theory.
This preprint re-examines the widespread belief that “Einstein was wrong about quantum mechanics.” While Einstein is often portrayed as rejecting quantum theory due to his criticism of its probabilistic interpretation, this simplified narrative does not accurately reflect his actual position or the historical context. The paper organizes Einstein’s original arguments, clarifies common misunderstandings—such as the misattribution that he “advocated hidden variables”—and reviews the development of Bell’s inequalities and their experimental tests. These experiments ruled out simple local hidden-variable models but did not fully resolve Einstein’s deeper concern: the possible incompleteness of quantum mechanics as a physical theory. By revisiting historical documents and theoretical developments, this work argues that Einstein’s critique was not a fundamental mistake but has been misinterpreted over time. The goal is to provide a more accurate understanding of the Einstein–Bohr debates and the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics.
The alleged nonlocal character of quantum mechanics is inextricably related to the formulation of the Bell theorem. That relation, however, is commonly incorrectly assessed. The departure from the clear line of reasoning that John Bell tried to convey has led to a polarization of part of the scientific community into radical irreconcilable positions. We show how the correct appreciation of Bell's work calls for reinterpreting the usual significance given to the Bell theorem yielding a more rational perspective of the problem. We formalize the correct argument sustaining the nonlocal character of quantum mechanics and also comment on alternatives that may justify considering quantum mechanics as a local theory.