The idea of resolving a philosophical problem by reference to the authority of science is problematic. Nevertheless, such attempts spread among philosophers especially after the development of quantum theory. In this thesis I will argue that quantum mechanics cannot be used to support any forms of idealism or relativism. To this end, I introduce a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics which is in many respects more favorable than the other alternatives suggested so far. The interpretation that I propose is based on a recent approach, namely the theory of decoherence to replace the postulate of wave-function collapse. The major advantage of the realist interpretation that I propose is that it does not change the ^deterministic character of quantum mechanics. I also introduce a sufficient condition for progress in science and argue that according to this criterion the decoherence theory should be accepted as a progress over the quantum mechanics.
The idea of resolving a philosophical problem by reference to the authority of science is problematic. Nevertheless, such attempts spread among philosophers especially after the development of quantum theory. In this thesis I will argue that quantum mechanics cannot be used to support any forms of idealism or relativism. To this end, I introduce a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics which is in many respects more favorable than the other alternatives suggested so far. The interpretation that I propose is based on a recent approach, namely the theory of decoherence to replace the postulate of wave-function collapse. The major advantage of the realist interpretation that I propose is that it does not change the ^deterministic character of quantum mechanics. I also introduce a sufficient condition for progress in science and argue that according to this criterion the decoherence theory should be accepted as a progress over the quantum mechanics.
We argue that quantum mechanics makes sense without such controversial postulates as the wave function collapse, the quantum probability rule and the observable postulate. We only need the existence of a wave function as a representation of a state, its dynamical evolution rule and another rather trivial postulate proposed here (Read-Off Postulate). The wave function collapse and the probability rule are replaced with intrinsic properties of the theory, i.e. decoherence and relative frequency, respectively. Interpretation of the wave function as a faithful representation of the reality naturally emerges, although quantum reality has a peculiar feature which distinguishes it from classical reality.
According to scientific realism, science gives us an approximately true description of what the world is like. But what does it mean? In this chapter, we focus on the ontological and metaphysical aspects of this discussion. That is, we are concerned with the following questions: what there is, according to our best scientific theories? And how are these things that theories say exist? We start from the assumption that a genuine scientific realism must deal with these issues. Taking non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study, we discuss some of the challenges currently faced by a genuinely realistic stance. We argue, first, that in the ontological aspect, realists are in the same boat as science, that is, without sufficient epistemic justification to adopt the belief in the entities postulated by a single quantum theory, given that experience (currently) is not able to decide between rival theories; in the metaphysical aspect, realists also encounter problems with theory choice, given the possibility of associating more than one metaphysical theory with the description of the entities postulated by each quantum theory. The same goes for structuralist alternatives, since, even if we accept that scientific theories are committed to the existence of structures, but not objects, we still do not know what structures are, metaphysically. Finally, we move forward in the discussion with the meta-Popperian method, which serves to reduce the metaphysical alternatives associated with the ontological postulates of scientific theories. We may not know what the correct alternative is, but we have been able to progressively check which metaphysical alternatives are incompatible with each scientific theory.
By means of the GRW flash theory and Bohmian mechanics, the paper shows how quantum mechanics accommodates a classical ontology of localised objects with a dynamics that describes the evolution of these objects. That dynamics is non-classical due to the entanglement of the wave function; but it can be entirely deterministic as illustrated by Bohmian mechanics. The wave function is a nomological parameter that can be construed according to any of the major philosophical stances with respect to laws. Against this background, the paper argues that quantum mechanics fits into the paradigm of modern physics as set out by Descartes. The far-reaching claims that call for receiving quantum mechanics as opening up a new paradigm of science are based on a confusion between science and scientism.
The foundations of quantum mechanics have been plagued by controversy throughout the 85 year history of the field. It is argued that lack of clarity in the formulation of basic philosophical questions leads to unnecessary obscurity and controversy and an attempt is made to identify the main forks in the road that separate the most important interpretations of quantum theory. The consistent histories formulation, also known as "consistent quantum theory", is described as one particular way (favored by the author) to answer the essential questions of interpretation. The theory is shown to be a realistic formulation of quantum mechanics, in contrast to the orthodox or Copenhagen formulation which will be referred to as an operationalist theory.
The aim of the present paper is to sbo» that anti-realism in science, 1vhich has a1;guab/y become more fashionable in recentyears, contrary to tuha: its proponents assert, cannot make use of quantum mechanics and its impressiue achievements as a frump card in justifying its claims. I will argue that scientific anti-realism far from providing scientific communiry with a progressive methodologicalframeuorle is a restrictive approach wbicb would hamper scientific progress. Focusing on the historical evidence of the 1vqys in subicb quantum mechanics was deueloped, I 1vill further argue that the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics due to Bohr and Heisenberg, among others, iuith its in-built anti-realistic elements provides a damning verdict against the claims of anti-realists. Following a critical assessment of a number of alternative interpretations or the calculus of quantum mechanics, I shall present realistic approaches which provide more effective and frudful conceptualframeu;orks for the advancement of research in the quantum
Quantum mechanics has engendered some philosophical disputes surrounding its conceptual foundation.To solve these disputes,some alternative interpretations which are different from orthodox(and Copenhagen) interpretation have been engendered.In the recent twenty years,the idea of decoherence has aroused attention among physicists and physical philosophers.Decoherence effects alone cannot solve the measurement problem.But decoherence including environmental interactions not only poses new conceptual questions but also suggests solutions to fundamental problems.