This article concerns the problem of identity and individuality of quantum particles. It has been suggested that ensembles of indistinguishable particles (e.g. electrons) can be treated in the way that is analogous to the way we refer to continuous matter using so-called mass terms (such as “water”). In the article I give several arguments against interpreting quantum predicates as mass terms. While the ontological interpretation of quantum objects as mass density fields determined by their wave functions is not uncommon in quantum mechanics (it features e.g. in the GRW interpretation of quantum theory), it is controversial to treat fragments of these fields as representing genuine entities picked out by quantum predicates. I point out that proper parts of electron matter-fields do not possess the same kinds of properties as whole electrons. Also, there are some measurable properties of ensembles of particles that cannot be recovered by describing a homogenized distribution of mass density. This problem affects both entangled and non-entangled states. In conclusion I opt for an approach (known as heterodoxy) according to which it is possible to individuate same-type particles momentarily using symmetric projectors.
This article concerns the problem of identity and individuality of quantum particles. It has been suggested that ensembles of indistinguishable particles (e.g. electrons) can be treated in the way that is analogous to the way we refer to continuous matter using so-called mass terms (such as “water”). In the article I give several arguments against interpreting quantum predicates as mass terms. While the ontological interpretation of quantum objects as mass density fields determined by their wave functions is not uncommon in quantum mechanics (it features e.g. in the GRW interpretation of quantum theory), it is controversial to treat fragments of these fields as representing genuine entities picked out by quantum predicates. I point out that proper parts of electron matter-fields do not possess the same kinds of properties as whole electrons. Also, there are some measurable properties of ensembles of particles that cannot be recovered by describing a homogenized distribution of mass density. This problem affects both entangled and non-entangled states. In conclusion I opt for an approach (known as heterodoxy) according to which it is possible to individuate same-type particles momentarily using symmetric projectors.
In this work, we focus on a very specific case study: assuming that quantum theories deal with “particles” of some kind (point particles in orthodox non-relativistic quantum mechanics, field excitations in quantum field theories), what kind of entity can such particles be? One possible answer, the one we shall examine here, is that they are not the usual kind of object found in daily life: individuals. Rather, we follow a suggestion by Erwin Schrödinger, according to which quantum mechanics poses a revolutionary kind of entity: non-individuals. While physics, as a scientific field, is not concerned with whether entities posited by a specific physical theory are individuals or not, answering this question is part of the quest for a better understanding of physical reality. Here lies, in large measure, the relevance of ontology.
This article follows an unorthodox approach to the individuation of quantum particles of the same type. According to this approach, individuation of the components of a composite system of identical particles is done not with the help of unphysical labels (indices) but physically meaningful projection operators. This unorthodox conception requires a modification of the standard notion of entanglement, in order to exclude states whose non-factorizability arises merely from the (anti)symmetrization of a product state. I will report several facts regarding the connections of the modified concept of entanglement with the issue of discernibility. I will also discuss recent experiments involving measurement-induced entanglement, and I will point out that they do not threaten the cogency of the new concept of entanglement. The statistical correlations observed in these experiments are explainable not by the entanglement of the initial state but by the creation of a new, genuinely entangled state by means of a pre-measurement selection. Finally, I will identify and discuss a genuine difference between non-entangled but non-factorizable states of identical particles and ordinary product states, which is that the former but not the latter admits an infinity of alternative and incompatible individuations by single-particle properties. This phenomenon can be accounted for using the concept of emergent particles proposed by Dennis Dieks. This article is part of the theme issue 'Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics'.
In the non-reflexive formulation of quantum physics, attention is given to a metaphysical view of quantum objects (q-objects) as non-individuals, characterised as entities to which the standard notion of identity lacks sense. The reference to the nature of q-objects is usually omitted in other interpretations and the most we can find is some vague reference to “to each [quantum] system we associate a Hilbert space”, and nothing more is said about them; we need to infer from the theory their characteristics, and it gives us several alternatives. One of them, to be justified here in broad aspects, is the non-individual view. It is important to enlighten that we are not trying to just find a way to deal with quantum entities but to defend a possible ontology of non-individuals, which can be applied also to ‘particles’ arising from quantum fields. Our account is based on two assumptions: (i) the ‘classical theory of identity’ does not apply to q-objects, and (ii) their non-individuality must be attributed from the start, that is, as a primitive notion and not ‘made a posteriori’ say by assuming symmetry principles. The underlying logic is called non-reflexive because the reflexive law of identity ∀x(x=x) is supposed not to hold for q-objects. Since all the details demand a lot of space, here we only sketch and justify our view. The references provide a more detailed account.
Particles in classical physics are distinguishable objects, which can be picked out individually on the basis of their unique physical properties. By contrast, in the philosophy of physics, the standard view is that particles of the same kind ("identical particles") are completely indistinguishable from each other and lack identity. This standard view is problematic: Particle indistinguishability is irreconcilable not only with the very meaning of "particle" in ordinary language and in classical physical theory, but also with how this term is actually used in the practice of present-day physics. Moreover, the indistinguishability doctrine prevents a smooth transition from quantum particles to what we normally understand by "particles" in the classical limit of quantum mechanics. Elaborating on earlier work, we here analyze the premises of the standard view and discuss an alternative that avoids these and similar problems. As it turns out, this alternative approach connects to recent discussions in quantum information theory.
According to classical physics, particles are basic constituents of the physical world. Quantum theory is much less friendly to particles; in particular, relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) creates serious obstacles for the idea that particles are fundamental. Apparently, when moving from the domain of RQFT to that of classical mechanics (CM), particles have to emerge at some stage. It is standard to assume that this emergence has been completed at the level of quantum mechanics, halfway between RQFT and CM, even though particles of the same kind in many-particle quantum mechanics have the curious feature of being ‘entities without identity’. Against this ‘Received View’ about the nature of quantum particles we outline and defend an Alternative View (AV), in which the emergent character of particles is emphasized. According to this AV, the step to a particle theory has not yet been made in quantum mechanics: conditions have still to be satisfied in order to make the particle concept applicable. If these conditions are met, the quantum particles that emerge are distinguishable individuals possessing physically defined identities, in stark contrast to what the Received View asserts. We will compare and contrast the two Views, both from a physical and a logical/conceptual point of view. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics’.
It has been widely thought that the ontology of quantum mechanics is real, physical fields. In this paper, I will present a new argument against the field ontology of quantum mechanics by analyzing one-body systems such as an electron. First, I argue that if the physical entity described by the wave function of an electron is a field, then this field is massive and charged. Next, I argue that if a field is massive and charged, then any two parts of the field in space will have gravitational and electromagnetic interactions, while the existence of such self-interactions for an electron contradicts quantum mechanics and experimental observations. This poses a serious difficulty for the field ontology of quantum mechanics. Third, I argue that a particle ontological interpretation of the wave function may avoid the difficulty by providing a plausible explanation of the non-existence of self-interactions. According to this explanation, the wave function of an electron is a description of the state of the random motion of the electron as a particle, and in particular, the modulus squared of the wave function gives the probability density that the electron appears in every possible position in space. Finally, I answer a major objection to the explanation of the non-existence of self-interactions in terms of particle ontology.