Cambridge University Press eBooks

Conclusions

Pieter E. Vermaas

Published Feb 5, 2010• 0 citations

Abstract

Let's return to the three demands I have imposed on the bi, spectral and atomic modal interpretations. The first was the demand that these interpretations should provide well-developed descriptions of reality. And a first conclusion is that the bi, spectral and atomic modal interpretations indeed provide the necessary starting points to develop them. That is, they all describe reality by means of well-defined property ascriptions: for all it is clear on which points these descriptions of reality need improvement, and for all one has the means to make a start with these improvements. A second conclusion is, however, that the success with which the bi, spectral and atomic modal interpretations can be developed varies. The results with regard to the full property ascription to a single system are in my opinion satisfactory for all three interpretations (Chapter 5). But with regard to the correlations between the properties ascribed to different systems the results start to diverge. For the atomic modal interpretation such correlations can be given (Section 6.4). But for the spectral modal interpretation it is proved that such correlations do not always exist for the properties ascribed to non-disjoint systems (Section 6.3). And for the bi modal interpretation correlations are unknown or, when one accepts Instantaneous Autonomy, Dynamical Autonomy for measurements and Empirical Adequacy (Section 3.3), do not exist as well (Section 6.3). Only if one adopts perspectivalism, that is, if one assumes that one can simultaneously only consider the properties of two disjoint systems in the bi modal interpretation and of n disjoint systems in the spectral modal interpretation, these two interpretations give all the defined correlations.

DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511608230.019

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