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Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science

Reality and Non-Reality of Physical Variables(Issues in the Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics (2))

Hisato Shirai

Published Jan 1, 2009• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Quantum mechanics is widely believed to be inconsistent with local realism because J.S. Bell proved the contradiction between quantum mechanics and the hidden variable theories based on reality and locality of matter. As described herein, the relation between quantum mechanics and local realism is discussed. This paper presents the question of whether any version of local realism is contradicted by quantum mechanics. The answer is negative. An interpretation is proposed by which the contradiction is explained using physical variables of two types: (1) physical variables of the first type, such as positions and angles (i.e. coordinates), are realistic variables and always possess definite values independently of measurements; (2) those of the second type, such as momenta, angular momenta, and spins (i.e., conserved quantities), are non-realistic variables, which possess no value before measurement. Value definiteness of the first type provides a reliable basis to physical reality of matter, and non-reality of the second type might solve the problem of inconsistency between quantum mechanics and local realism.

DOI
10.4288/jafpos.18.0_29

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Quantum mechanics is widely believed to be inconsistent with local realism because J.S. Bell proved the contradiction between quantum mechanics and the hidden variable theories based on reality and locality of matter. As described herein, the relation between quantum mechanics and local realism is discussed. This paper presents the question of whether any version of local realism is contradicted by quantum mechanics. The answer is negative. An interpretation is proposed by which the contradiction is explained using physical variables of two types: (1) physical variables of the first type, such as positions and angles (i.e. coordinates), are realistic variables and always possess definite values independently of measurements; (2) those of the second type, such as momenta, angular momenta, and spins (i.e., conserved quantities), are non-realistic variables, which possess no value before measurement. Value definiteness of the first type provides a reliable basis to physical reality of matter, and non-reality of the second type might solve the problem of inconsistency between quantum mechanics and local realism.
The article examines the controversial relation of scientific realism with quantum mechanics. To this end, two distinct discussions are invoked: the discussion about ‘realism’ in the context of quantum mechanics and the discussion about ‘scientific realism’ in the context of the general philosophy of science. The aim is to distinguish them in order, first, to argue that the former—revolving around ‘local realism’ and the theorems of Bell and Kochen–Specker—unjustifiably identifies realism with features of a particular worldview, and thereby fosters the impression that the failure of ‘local realism’ in quantum experiments constitutes a failure of scientific realism too; and, second, in light of the latter discussion, to claim that scientific realism and quantum mechanics can be compatible—there is ground for dealing with quantum measurement simply as a physical mind-independent interaction. Therefore, a realist approach to the theory is possible despite its notorious measurement problem, even if the issue of its interpretation is still disputed.
Despite the unparalleled accuracy of quantum-theoretical predictions across an enormous range of phenomena, the theory's foundations are still in doubt. The theory deviates radically from classical physics, predicts counterintuitive phenomena, and seems inconsistent. The biggest stumbling block is measurement, where the Schrodinger equation's unitary evolution seems inconsistent with collapse. These doubts have inspired a variety of proposed interpretations and alterations of the theory. Most interpretations posit the theory represents only observed appearances rather than reality. The realistic interpretations, on the other hand, posit entities such as other universes, hidden variables, artificial collapse mechanisms, or human minds, that are not found in the standard mathematical formulation. Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to the possibility that the standard theory is both realistic and correct as it stands. This paper examines several controversial issues, namely quantization, field particle duality, quantum randomness, superposition, entanglement, non-locality, and measurement, to argue that standard quantum physics, realistically interpreted, is consistent with all of them.
The two previous papers developed quantum mechanical formalism from classical mechanics and two additional postulates. In the first paper it was also shown that the uncertainty relations possess no ontological validity and only reflect the formalism's limitations. In this paper, a Realist Interpretation of quantum mechanics based on these results is elaborated and compared to the Copenhagen Interpretation. We demonstrate that von Neumann's proof of the impossibility of a hidden variable theory is not correct, independently of Bell's argumentation. A local hidden variable theory is found for non-relativistic quantum mechanics, which is nothing else than newtonian mechanics itself. We prove that Bell's theorem does not imply in a non-locality of quantum mechanics, and also demonstrate that Bohm's theory cannot be considered a true hidden variable theory.
The discussion of the foundations of quantum mechanics is complicated by the fact that a number of different issues are closely entangled. Three of these issues are i) the interpretation of probability, ii) the choice between realist and empiricist interpretations of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, iii) the distinction between measurement and preparation. It will be demonstrated that an interpretation of violation of Bell's inequality by quantum mechanics as evidence of non-locality of the quantum world is a consequence of a particular choice between these alternatives. Also a distinction must be drawn between two forms of realism, viz. a) realist interpretations of quantum mechanics, b) the possibility of hidden-variables (sub-quantum) theories.
The discussion of the foundations of quantum mechanics is complicated by the fact that a number of different issues are closely entangled. Three of these issues are i) the interpretation of probability, ii) the choice between realist and empiricist interpretations of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, iii) the distinction between measurement and preparation. It will be demonstrated that an interpretation of violation of Bell's inequality by quantum mechanics as evidence of non-locality of the quantum world is a consequence of a particular choice between these alternatives. Also a distinction must be drawn between two forms of realism, viz. a) realist interpretations of quantum mechanics, b) the possibility of hidden-variables (sub-quantum) theories.