Security Arrangements in the Computer-Aided Election System

Igor V. Limar, Yevhen Vasiliu

Published Mar 1, 2015• 0 citations

Abstract

A cryptographic security scheme is proposed within the frame of a subsystem of the integrated computer-aided system that is intended for holding elections and counting the election returns. The solution is based on two quantum technologies of cryptographic security: quantum bit commitment and secret sharing

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