On the Indispensability of Atomism in Natural Science

Niels Henrik David Bohr, E. T. Jaynes

Anne M. Luescher, Reinhard Heckel, Robert N. Grass

Physical sources of randomness are indispensable for information technology and cryptography. Yet, the usefulness of random processes seems to be ignored by many natural science researchers, who are exposed to the downsides of randomness, which adds noise and uncertainty to experiments. Here, we look at experimental science through the lens of information theory, with entropy as a key concept that bridges multiple fields. By examining physical unclonable functions and molecular information technology, we highlight interdisciplinary research leveraging these synergies. With this perspective, we hope to inspire the fascination of randomness and entropy in science, encouraging new research directions across different disciplines. Physical sources of randomness are indispensable for information technology and modern cryptography. In this Perspective, the authors explore entropy as a key concept and the interdisciplinary work that utilizes randomness.

Mauro Dorato, Laura Felline

T. Bergstein

From the preceding exposition it follows that not only physics but natural science as a whole is basically dependent on ordinary language. The complementarity of quantum physics displays the fundamental interdependence of observation and description of natural phenomena, and the very objectivity of natural science relies directly on the differentiation of experiences into external and private phenomena afforded by ordinary language. Because of the extreme smallness of the quantum of action the complementarity of physical phenomena is not experienced either in daily life or in classical physics. But the interdependence of observation and description of phenomena prevails as much in classical science as in quantum physics. The very aim of experimental investigation is to perform observations in those particular ways which make possible the communication of information sufficient for the reproduction of the observed phenomena. Concordantly the elementary physical variables, which are indispensable to any systematic analysis in natural science, are defined through reference to measuring arrangements constructed so as to be unambiguously describable in ordinary language. Thus no scientific formula, law, or result of measurement can be given objective significance independent of ordinary language. Through every hierarchy of descriptions in natural science ordinary language penetrates as the unambiguity of propositions.

Niels Henrik David Bohr

Vassilios Karakostas

The pros and cons of various forms of atomism and holism that are applicable both in physical science and today’s philosophy of nature are evaluated. To this end, Lewis’ thesis of Humean supervenience is presented as an important case study of an atomistic doctrine in philosophical thought. It is shown that Lewis’ ontological doctrine of Humean supervenience incorporates at its foundation the so-called separability principle of classical physics. In view of the systematic violation of the latter within quantum mechanics, it is argued that contemporary physical science posits non-supervenient relations over and above the spatiotemporal ones. Depending on the mode of assignment of states to physical systems — unit state vectors versus statistical density operators — we distinguish between strongly and weakly non-supervenient relations. It is demonstrated that in either case the relations of quantum entanglement constitute prototypical examples of irreducible physical relations that do not supervene upon a spatiotemporal arrangement of Humean qualities, weakening, thereby, the thesis of Humean supervenience. It is examined, in this respect, the status of Lewis’ recombination principle, whereas his conception of lawhood is critically investigated. It is concluded that the assumption of ontological reductionism, as expressed in Lewis’ Humean doctrine, cannot be regarded as a reliable code of the nature of the physical world and its contents. It is proposed instead that due to the undeniable existence of non-supervenient relations a metaphysic of relations of a moderate kind ought to be acknowledged as an indispensable part of our understanding of the natural world at a fundamental level.