Predictions and Primitive Ontology in Quantum Foundations: A Study of Examples
Valia Allori, Sheldon Goldstein, Roderich Tumulka +1 more
A major disagreement between different views about the foundations of quantum mechanics concerns whether for a theory to be intelligible as a fundamental physical theory it must involve a ‘primitive ontology’ (PO), i.e. variables describing the distribution of matter in four-dimensional space–time. In this article, we illustrate the value of having a PO. We do so by focussing on the role that the PO plays for extracting predictions from a given theory and discuss valid and invalid derivations of predictions. To this end, we investigate a number of examples based on toy models built from the elements of familiar interpretations of quantum theory.11 Introduction2 The GRWm and GRWf Theories 2.1 The GRW process 2.2 GRWm 2.3 GRWf3 Predictions and Primitive Ontology 3.1 Calibration functions 3.2 Taking the PO seriously 3.3 Examples from the literature 3.4 The main theorem about operators in the GRW formalism 3.5 The GRW formalism4 A Set of Examples 4.1 Bohmian mechanics 4.2 Bohmian trajectories and GRW collapses 4.2.1 Bohm’s law and GRW’s law 4.2.2 Bohm’s law and a modified GRW law 4.2.3 Trajectories from the GRW wave function 4.2.4 Configuration jumps and GRW law 4.2.5 Another way of configuration jumps and GRW law 4.3 MBM: Bohm-like trajectories from the master equation 4.3.1 Empirical equivalence of MBM with GRWm and GRWf4.4 Master equation and matter density4.5 Master equation and flashes5 Conclusions
arXiv:1206.0019•The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•May 9, 2014•103 citations