In today's world, several cryptographic algorithms are used to secure information and defend against traditional computing attacks. However, as computer science continues to evolve with the development of Quantum computing, it poses a threat to traditional cryptographic methods. To address this, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms have emerged as a critical area of research, aiming to provide secure communication channels that are resistant to quantum attacks. Similarly, advancements in network infrastructure have paved the way for programmable networks known as Software-Defined Networks (SDN). Communication channels in SDN may be vulnerable to quantum attacks. To fortify these channels, the integration of PQC into SDN needs to be studied. This paper evaluates the deployment of the PQC algorithms ML-KEM and ML-DSA, standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in SDN. The performance of a quantum-resistant communication channel is compared against the channel with traditional cryptographic approaches in an SDN environment. The result demonstrates that integrating the secure channel in SDN using PQC is not only feasible but also a promising solution for enhanced security. However, the larger key sizes of the PQC algorithms lead to longer handshake duration, although overall performance remains largely balanced. This highlights the need for trade-offs in security, performance, and resource utilization when transitioning to PQC based communication channel in SDN.
In today's world, several cryptographic algorithms are used to secure information and defend against traditional computing attacks. However, as computer science continues to evolve with the development of Quantum computing, it poses a threat to traditional cryptographic methods. To address this, Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms have emerged as a critical area of research, aiming to provide secure communication channels that are resistant to quantum attacks. Similarly, advancements in network infrastructure have paved the way for programmable networks known as Software-Defined Networks (SDN). Communication channels in SDN may be vulnerable to quantum attacks. To fortify these channels, the integration of PQC into SDN needs to be studied. This paper evaluates the deployment of the PQC algorithms ML-KEM and ML-DSA, standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in SDN. The performance of a quantum-resistant communication channel is compared against the channel with traditional cryptographic approaches in an SDN environment. The result demonstrates that integrating the secure channel in SDN using PQC is not only feasible but also a promising solution for enhanced security. However, the larger key sizes of the PQC algorithms lead to longer handshake duration, although overall performance remains largely balanced. This highlights the need for trade-offs in security, performance, and resource utilization when transitioning to PQC based communication channel in SDN.
Quantum Computers are disrupting the traditional cryptographic algorithms, like RSA and ECC. These Traditional cryptographic algorithms are generally used for network communication, basically like SDN’s (Software Defined Networking). Now to address these Challenges the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) proposes post quantum algorithms (PQC) which are designed to resist the Quantum Computers. Now, the transition from traditional algorithms to PQC in SNDs is no easy task, it needs to properly address issues of transitioning like higher processing demands, compatibility issues with existing infrastructure, and no proper guidelines to deploy PQC which is secure and scalable. This paper proposes a hybrid approach, i.e. a stepping stone to help SDNs shift from traditional cryptography algorithms to quantum-safe environments. It includes a step by step transition plan, from layer to layer to help the environment transition to PQC without any major disruption to existing networks.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant threat to current cryptographic systems, particularly public-key algorithms such as RSA and ECC, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks like Shor's algorithm. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) aims to develop and standardize quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms to secure digital communications in the quantum era. This paper examines the current landscape of PQC, focusing on the evaluation and standardization efforts led by organizations such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We analyze the major families of quantum-resistant algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, multivariate, and isogeny-based cryptography, discussing their security guarantees, performance trade-offs, and implementation challenges. Furthermore, we review NIST's PQC standardization process, highlighting selected finalists and alternate candidates, and explore the ongoing transition challenges in adopting these algorithms across industries. Finally, we discuss future directions for PQC research, including hybrid cryptographic systems and the need for continued cryptanalysis to ensure long-term security. This work provides a comprehensive overview of the progress and challenges in deploying quantum-resistant cryptography to safeguard against emerging quantum threats.
Conventional cryptographic algorithms that are widely used in Software-Defined Networking (SDN), cloud computing, and edge computing infrastructures are facing a serious challenge because of the fast development of quantum computing. The traditional public-key cryptography like RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is believed to be vulnerable to quantum attacks, which will require quantum-resistant security mechanisms to be adopted. The past few years have seen a focus on incorporating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), Artificial Intelligence (AI), blockchain, and Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) into SDN, with the aim of creating secure, programmable, and intelligent communication infrastructures. The paper summarizes the recent progress in post-quantum secure SDN in cloud and edge computing. The study starts by examining how lattice-based cryptographic algorithms like CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium can be integrated in SDN controllers and SDN programmable networks. Then, hybrid QKD-PQC architectures for quantum-safe communication are discussed, followed by intelligent SDN architectures based on AI-powered threat detection, blockchain-based trust management, and adaptive cryptographic orchestration. Moreover, the paper reviews recent advances, summarizes research challenges, and points towards scalable, autonomous, and quantum-resistant networking infrastructures for next-generation cloud, IoT, edge and 6G networks and ecosystem
As the era of quantum computing approaches, the fundamental cryptographic primitives securing global communications face a paradigm shift. With the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalizing new standards, the industry must urgently address the vulnerabilities of legacy systems. The imminent advent of CRQCs (Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers) poses an existential threat to the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) underpinning the global digital economy. Classical algorithms such as RSA and ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) are vulnerable to polynomial-time cryptanalysis via Shor’s algorithm. This study investigates the HNDL (Harvest Now, Decrypt Later) threat model and evaluates the resilience of NIST-standardized PQC (Post-Quantum Cryptography) algorithms: ML-KEM and ML-DSA. Utilizing a high-performance Fortinet networking environment, we experimentally validate that "Hybrid Mode" IPsec VPNs can achieve quantum resistance with negligible performance degradation, offering a viable migration path for enterprise infrastructure. Specifically, we benchmark the trade-offs between PQC’s larger key sizes and network latency, demonstrating that the overhead remains within acceptable operational thresholds. Implementing hybrid protocols provides a critical transition mechanism, allowing organizations to secure long-term data confidentiality against retrospective decryption while preserving interoperability with legacy systems.
This thesis investigates the current state of Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in the industry, with a particular focus on its practical deployment, integration challenges, and performance implications.The study combines a structured analysis of academic literature, standardization efforts, and industry guidance with an experimental evaluation of PQC integration in widely used security protocols. The analysis shows that, while significant progress has been made in the standardization of quantum-resistant algorithms such as ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA, real-world adoption remains in an early and transitional phase. Organizations primarily focus on evaluation and pilot implementations, as deployment is constrained by interoperability issues, implementation maturity, and the complexity of migrating existing cryptographic infrastructures.To complement the conceptual analysis, experimental measurements were conducted for TLS, SSH, and IPsec to evaluate the performance impact of hybrid post-quantum cryptographic mechanisms. The results indicate that performance overhead is not uniform across components. In particular, post-quantum signature schemes introduce significant computational and network overhead, mainly due to increased key and certificate sizes. In contrast, hybrid key exchange mechanisms show only moderate performance impact across all evaluated protocols.The findings highlight that the primary challenge of PQC adoption lies not in algorithm design but in practical integration and large-scale migration. Hybrid cryptographic approaches emerge as the most viable strategy for enabling a gradual transition, balancing improved security against quantum threats with operational feasibility.Overall, this thesis demonstrates that PQC is transitioning from a theoretical research field to a practical engineering challenge, with significant implications for the future design of secure communication systems.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing poses a significant threat to classical cryptographic systems, particularly to widely used public-key schemes that rely on integer factorisation and the discrete logarithm problem. To ensure long-term data security against potential quantum adversaries, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is currently standardised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This paper goes beyond a theoretical overview by employing a systematic methodology to evaluate the empirical performance trade-offs of the newly standardised algorithms (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA) and key finalists (FN-DSA and HQC). Based on a comprehensive review of fragmented performance data, the work presents a comparative analysis focusing on data overhead, computational latency, and resource efficiency. As a primary contribution, this study proposes a deployment-oriented taxonomy that explicitly maps these PQC standards to optimal practical use cases, considering diverse constraints across Internet of Things, cloud environments, and blockchain networks. Furthermore, the paper addresses critical real-world deployment challenges, such as vulnerabilities to side-channel attacks and hardware-level implementation constraints. Ultimately, this work systematises current knowledge into a unified decision-making framework, guiding system architects in complex migration towards a quantum-resilient digital ecosystem.