The rapid advancement of quantum computing has significantly impacted data security, as classical cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and ECC are increasingly vulnerable to quantum attacks. This study aims to evaluate the performance of classical and post-quantum cryptographic algorithms in a quantum simulation environment, focusing on stability, efficiency, and computational time. The research method employed experimental simulations using Qiskit, where cryptographic algorithms were modeled into quantum circuits and tested across varying qubit sizes of 128, 256, 512, and 1024. The simulation results indicate that classical algorithms face substantial limitations, with exponentially increasing computational time and drastically reduced stability beyond 512 qubits. In contrast, post-quantum algorithms demonstrated superior performance, maintaining high stability up to 1024 qubits, achieving greater quantum efficiency, and showing resilience against quantum attacks such as Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms. These findings highlight the urgent need to transition toward post-quantum cryptography as a more adaptive and reliable approach to safeguarding data in the quantum era. Although post-quantum algorithms still face certain challenges, such as larger key sizes and slightly higher computational costs at smaller scales, their overall benefits are far more significant in ensuring sustainable information security. Therefore, adopting post-quantum cryptography represents a strategic step that must be prioritized to address the evolving risks posed by quantum computing technologies.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing has significantly impacted data security, as classical cryptographic algorithms such as RSA and ECC are increasingly vulnerable to quantum attacks. This study aims to evaluate the performance of classical and post-quantum cryptographic algorithms in a quantum simulation environment, focusing on stability, efficiency, and computational time. The research method employed experimental simulations using Qiskit, where cryptographic algorithms were modeled into quantum circuits and tested across varying qubit sizes of 128, 256, 512, and 1024. The simulation results indicate that classical algorithms face substantial limitations, with exponentially increasing computational time and drastically reduced stability beyond 512 qubits. In contrast, post-quantum algorithms demonstrated superior performance, maintaining high stability up to 1024 qubits, achieving greater quantum efficiency, and showing resilience against quantum attacks such as Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms. These findings highlight the urgent need to transition toward post-quantum cryptography as a more adaptive and reliable approach to safeguarding data in the quantum era. Although post-quantum algorithms still face certain challenges, such as larger key sizes and slightly higher computational costs at smaller scales, their overall benefits are far more significant in ensuring sustainable information security. Therefore, adopting post-quantum cryptography represents a strategic step that must be prioritized to address the evolving risks posed by quantum computing technologies.
The rapid advancement of quantum computing threatens to undermine the security foundations of modern cryptographic systems, particularly those based on integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. Algorithms such as Shor’s and Grover’s promise exponential or quadratic speedups, rendering RSA, ECC, and certain symmetric schemes vulnerable within the next decade. This paper presents a simulated evaluation of classical cryptographic algorithms against quantum attacks, followed by a performance assessment of post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) schemes—specifically lattice-based, hash-based, and code-based algorithms. A testing framework was developed using a quantum simulator (Qiskit) and a classical benchmarking environment to model potential attack timelines and measure computational efficiency. Results demonstrate that RSA-2048 can be theoretically broken within 8 hours on a 4000-qubit fault-tolerant quantum processor, while ECC-P256 succumbs in less than 4 hours. In contrast, lattice-based schemes such as CRYSTALS-Kyber resisted quantum simulation attacks, maintaining equivalent classical security levels with only a 27% performance overhead. The study also analyzes the trade-offs between key size, encryption/decryption speed, and resistance to quantum attacks. Our findings emphasize the urgent need for migration to NIST-recommended PQC algorithms and provide a decision-support matrix for selecting suitable replacements in government and enterprise systems.
Quantum computing has emerged as a revolutionary paradigm, holding immense potential to solve complex problems that classical computing struggles to address. This study explores the application of quantum computing in cryptography, with a specific focus on two major quantum algorithms: Shor’s algorithm for large number factorization and Grover’s algorithm for unstructured database searching. The main objective of this research is to compare the performance of these quantum algorithms with classical cryptographic methods in terms of computational efficiency and time. Shor’s algorithm, which can factorize large numbers in polynomial time, presents a significant threat to the security of public-key cryptosystems such as RSA, which rely on the difficulty of factoring large numbers. On the other hand, Grover’s algorithm offers a quadratic speedup for searching unstructured databases, making it highly relevant for symmetric key cryptography systems like AES. In this study, simulations of both algorithms were conducted using quantum simulators to assess their speed and effectiveness in solving cryptographic challenges. The results demonstrate that quantum algorithms significantly reduce the computation time compared to classical methods, with Shor’s algorithm efficiently solving factorization problems and Grover’s algorithm accelerating key searching processes. However, while these quantum algorithms show promise in improving cryptographic systems, the implementation of large-scale quantum computers remains a challenge. This research highlights the potential of quantum computing to revolutionize data security and underscores the need for further development in quantum algorithms and the transition to quantum-resistant cryptographic systems to safeguard against the threat posed by quantum computers.
The advent of quantum computing poses a significant challenge to classical cryptographic protocols, threatening to undermine the security of widely used security systems like RSA, ECC, and AES. This paper investigates the vulnerabilities of traditional public-key and symmetric cryptographic schemes to quantum decryption techniques, such as Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms, while analyzing the efficacy of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) as a mitigation strategy. Through a review of current literature and simulations of quantum attacks on legacy protocols, this research identifies critical gaps in preparedness and evaluates emergent quantumresistant solutions. The findings highlight the immediate risks of “store now, decrypt later” attacks, emphasizing the importance of transitioning to PQC algorithms. Despite promising advances, challenges related to performance, interoperability, and standardization remain. This study concludes with a call for collaborative efforts in research, policy development, and widespread adoption of quantum-safe practices to ensure the resilience of digital communications in the quantum era.
As the advent of quantum computing looms, the cryptographic landscape faces unprecedented challenges that could render traditional algorithms like AES, RSA, and ECC vulnerable. This paper delves into a comparative study of these classical cryptographic algorithms, examining their foundational principles and evaluating their resilience against quantum computing threats, particularly Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms. Through a combination of theoretical analysis and practical simulations, we assess the potential weaknesses and strengths of AES, RSA, and ECC in the post-quantum era. The study highlights the need for quantum-resistant cryptographic methods and explores how current algorithms can be adapted or replaced to withstand the sophisticated computational capabilities of quantum computers. By bridging the gap between classical and quantum cryptography, this research offers crucial insights into the future of secure digital communication, underscoring the urgency for innovation in cryptographic practices to safeguard data in an increasingly quantum-dominated world.
The rapid progress of quantum computing is changing the assumptions on which many modern security systems are built. Public-key methods such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) remain dependable against conventional computers, yet their underlying mathematical problems can be solved efficiently by a sufficiently capable quantum computer using algorithms such as Shor's algorithm. This creates a practical need to evaluate cryptographic techniques that can continue to protect information in a post-quantum environment. This study compares representative classical algorithms - RSA, ECC, and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) - with post-quantum approaches, with particular attention to CRYSTALS-Kyber and CRYSTALS-Dilithium. The comparison considers security assumptions, key-generation cost, encryption and decryption time, key size, memory demand, and resistance to quantum attacks. The reported benchmark values indicate that RSA has the highest processing cost among the evaluated schemes, whereas CRYSTALS-Kyber provides comparatively fast key generation, encryption, and decryption while maintaining resistance to known quantum attacks. The study also discusses a hybrid migration model in which established classical mechanisms and post-quantum algorithms operate together during the transition period. Overall, the findings support a gradual move toward quantum-resistant communication systems while recognising the deployment and storage overhead introduced by larger post-quantum keys.
As quantum computing technology evolves, it poses greater risks to current cryptography schemes such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), widely used to secure digital communications These classical algorithms are based on mathematical problems that quantum algorithms such as Shore-Grover deal with. Both, can resolve much faster, making them vulnerable to quantum attack This has given rise to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which focuses on developing quantum-resistant algorithms to protect data in the future of quantum computers classical cryptography Can Break This paper aims to provide a comprehensive insight into quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, including lattice-based, hash-based, code-based, and multivariable polynomial methods. It examines the efficiency, benefits, and challenges associated with implementing these algorithms in real-world applications. By comparing key parameters such as key size, encryption/decryption speed, and signature size, this study examines the relative strengths and limitations of post-quantum algorithms to their classical counterparts The results show that lattice-based algorithms , such as NTRU and Kyber, offer promising solutions with relative efficiency and manageable key sizes, making them potential candidates for quantum-resistant cryptography but other approaches , such as SPHINCS+ (hash-based) and McEliece (code-based), large -Face challenges of key size and slow encryption speed, which may limit their usefulness in some applications Despite these challenges, quantum post-cryptography is necessary to secure the future of digital communications.