Salem et al. proposed an asymmetric Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) scheme using four resistors, termed P-Ther-Mod, for wired and wireless thermal noise modulation in low-power IoT applications. While the authors correctly derive bit error probability (BEP) expressions and demonstrate improved BER performance, the core idea of using multiple resistors with a truth table for bit interpretation to enhance security and reliability is not novel, for it was introduced in 2013 as the "multiple" KLJN (MKLJN) protocol. Furthermore, the claimed "low-power" advantage is questionable, as the four-resistor design consumes at least four times the power per exchanged bit compared to the classical two-resistor KLJN, without reducing the energy per bit. These aspects warrant clarification to properly contextualize the contributions of the P-Ther-Mod scheme.
Salem et al. proposed an asymmetric Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) scheme using four resistors, termed P-Ther-Mod, for wired and wireless thermal noise modulation in low-power IoT applications. While the authors correctly derive bit error probability (BEP) expressions and demonstrate improved BER performance, the core idea of using multiple resistors with a truth table for bit interpretation to enhance security and reliability is not novel, for it was introduced in 2013 as the "multiple" KLJN (MKLJN) protocol. Furthermore, the claimed "low-power" advantage is questionable, as the four-resistor design consumes at least four times the power per exchanged bit compared to the classical two-resistor KLJN, without reducing the energy per bit. These aspects warrant clarification to properly contextualize the contributions of the P-Ther-Mod scheme.
In (Nature) Science Report 5 (2015) 13653, Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl (VMG) introduce a new Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchanger that operates with 4 arbitrary resistors (instead of 2 arbitrary resistance values forming 2 identical resistor pairs in the original system). They state that in this new, VMG-KLJN, non-equilibrium system with nonzero power flow, the security during the exchange of the two (HL and LH) bit values is as strong as in the original KLJN scheme. Moreover, they claim that, at practical conditions, their VMG-KLJN protocol “supports more robust protection against attacks”. First, we investigate the power flow and thermal equilibrium issues of the VMG-KLJN system with 4 arbitrary resistors. Then we introduce a new KLJN protocol that allows the arbitrary choice of 3 resistors from the 4, while it still operates with zero power flow during the exchange of single bits by utilizing a specific value of the 4th resistor and a binary temperature set for the exchanged (HL and LH) bit values. Then we show that, in general, the KLJN schemes with more than 2 arbitrary resistors (including our new protocol mentioned above) are prone to 4 new passive attacks utilizing the parasitic capacitance and inductance in the cable, while the original KLJN scheme is naturally immune against these new attacks. The core of the security vulnerability exploited by these attacks is the different line resistances in the HL and LH cases. Therefore, on the contrary of the statement and claim cited above, the practical VMG-KLJN system is less secure than the original KLJN scheme. We introduce another 2, modified, non-equilibrium KLJN systems to eliminate the vulnerability against some - but not all - of these attacks. However the price for that is the loss of arbitrariness of the selection of the 4th resistor and the information leak still remains greater than zero.
Abstract We introduce seven new versions of the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-(like)-Noise (KLJN) classical physical secure key exchange scheme and a new transient protocol for practically-perfect security. While these practical improvements offer progressively enhanced security and/or speed for non-ideal conditions, the fundamental physical laws providing the security remain the same. In the "intelligent" KLJN (iKLJN) scheme, Alice and Bob utilize the fact that they exactly know not only their own resistor value but also the stochastic time function of their own noise, which they generate before feeding it into the loop. By using this extra information, they can reduce the duration of exchanging a single bit and in this way they achieve not only higher speed but also an enhanced security because Eve’s information will significantly be reduced due to smaller statistics. In the "multiple" KLJN (MKLJN) system, Alice and Bob have publicly known identical sets of different resistors with a proper, publicly known truth table about the bit-interpretation of their combination. In this new situation, for Eve to succeed, it is not enough to find out which end has the higher resistor. Eve must exactly identify the actual resistor values at both sides. In the "keyed" KLJN (KKLJN) system, by using secure communication with a formerly shared key, Alice and Bob share a proper time-dependent truth table for the bit-interpretation of the resistor situation for each secure bit exchange step during generating the next key. In this new situation, for Eve to succeed, it is not enough to find out the resistor values at the two ends. Eve must also know the former key. The remaining four KLJN schemes are the combinations of the above protocols to synergically enhance the security properties. These are: the "intelligent-multiple" (iMKLJN), the "intelligent-keyed" (iKKLJN), the "keyed-multiple" (KMKLJN) and the "intelligent-keyed-multiple" (iKMKLJN) KLJN key exchange systems. Finally, we introduce a new transient-protocol offering practically-perfect security without privacy amplification, which is not needed in practical applications but it is shown for the sake of ongoing discussions.
not-yet-known not-yet-known not-yet-known unknown This commentary critically reviews the 2024 article ”Kirchhoff meets Johnson: In pursuit of unconditionally secure communication” by Ertugrul Basar, focusing on claims regarding the originality, security, and energy efficiency of thermal noise-based secure communication systems. The article presents the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) key exchange scheme and wireless noise modulation as breakthroughs in security; this review clarifies their historical foundation, practical limitations, and security vulnerabilities. Key issues discussed include proper attribution to pioneering work by Kish (2005–2006), feasibility of unconditional security for wireless adaptations, and exaggerated claims of low-power operation. The aim is to contextualize this field’s evolution for engineering audiences and stimulate more precise scholarship and realistic expectations for future research directions.
Abstract We introduce two new Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution schemes which are generalizations of the original KLJN scheme. The first of these, the Random-Resistor (RR-) KLJN scheme, uses random resistors with values chosen from a quasi-continuum set. It is well-known since the creation of the KLJN concept that such a system could work in cryptography, because Alice and Bob can calculate the unknown resistance value from measurements, but the RR-KLJN system has not been addressed in prior publications since it was considered impractical. The reason for discussing it now is the second scheme, the Random Resistor Random Temperature (RRRT-) KLJN key exchange, inspired by a recent paper of Vadai, Mingesz and Gingl, wherein security was shown to be maintained at non-zero power flow. In the RRRT-KLJN secure key exchange scheme, both the resistances and their temperatures are continuum random variables. We prove that the security of the RRRT-KLJN scheme can prevail at a non-zero power flow, and thus the physical law guaranteeing security is not the Second Law of Thermodynamics but the Fluctuation-Dissipation Theorem. Alice and Bob know their own resistances and temperatures and can calculate the resistance and temperature values at the other end of the communication channel from measured voltage, current and power-flow data in the wire. However, Eve cannot determine these values because, for her, there are four unknown quantities while she can set up only three equations. The RRRT-KLJN scheme has several advantages and makes all former attacks on the KLJN scheme invalid or incomplete.
In this paper, a Resistor Hopping (RH) scheme with the addition of biases is proposed for secure Kirchhoff Law Johnson-Noise (KLJN) communication. The RH approach enables us to increase the bit rate of secure communication between Alice and Bob, while also ensuring that the inherent unconditional security of KLJN is satisfied. The biases are added to the proposed scheme to better distinguish between Gaussian distributed noises in terms of their means, rather than just using variances. Throughout the paper, we strive to minimize biases to achieve a power-efficient scheme. For the detection part of the proposed algorithm, a Maximum-Likelihood (ML) detector is derived. The separability condition of Gaussian distributions is investigated, along with the provision of a threshold-based detector that offers both simple and optimal thresholds in terms of minimizing the error probability. Some analysis of the proposed RH-KLJN communication scheme is provided, including Physical Layer Security (PLS) equations. Simulation results demonstrate the advantages of the proposed scheme over the classical KLJN scheme, offering a higher data rate and lower bit error probability at the expense of increased complexity.
The Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system provides a way of exchanging theoretically secure keys by measuring random voltage and current through the wire connecting two different resistors at Alice's and Bob's ends. Recently new advanced protocols for the KLJN method have been proposed with enhanced performance. In this paper, we analyze the KLJN system and compare with the "intelligent" KLJN (iKLJN) scheme. That task requires determination of the applied resistors and identification of various superpositions of known and unknown noise components. Some statistical tools will be explored to determine how the duration of the bit exchange window (averaging time) influences the performance of the secure bit exchange.