The Internet of Things (IoT) is transforming lives, making daily tasks more convenient and efficient than ever before. However, the true potential of IoT can only be realized if its nodes interact with robust security, ensuring that sensitive data and personal information remain protected. While many data transmission protocols have been proposed in recent years, most fail to deliver on their security promises in real-world scenarios. Adversaries can exploit vulnerabilities through sophisticated leakage attacks such as side channel attacks or cold boot attacks to compromise encryption keys and undermine system integrity. Without advanced, resilient protocols, the promise of IoT is put at serious risk. In addition, the corresponding protocols deployed in IoT should enjoy high computational efficiency, because the mobile terminals have weak computing power. Also, from the viewpoint of actual application, the proposed data transmission protocol should have wider universality and can be used in multiple scenarios of IoT. Therefore, to further address the above problems, we propose a general construction of a leakage-resilient data transmission protocol with multi-receiver from an identity-based hash proof system (IB-HPS) and identity-based signature (IBS) scheme. For our proposal, the unforgeability, anonymity, and confidentiality can be proved based on the security of the underlying cryptography tools. Compared with the existing protocols, our proposal has better performance, such as dynamic anonymity, leakage resilience, traceability, etc. Furthermore, to guarantee the highest levels of security and efficiency, we have developed a novel IB-HPS construction that offers continuous leakage resilience and perfect key updates. Alongside this, our new leakage-resilient IBS scheme delivers the computational efficiency essential for practical deployment in IoT networks, ensuring that security enhancements do not come at the expense of performance. Both performance analysis and security analysis show that our data transmission protocol is secure, efficient, and highly practical.
The Internet of Things (IoT) is transforming lives, making daily tasks more convenient and efficient than ever before. However, the true potential of IoT can only be realized if its nodes interact with robust security, ensuring that sensitive data and personal information remain protected. While many data transmission protocols have been proposed in recent years, most fail to deliver on their security promises in real-world scenarios. Adversaries can exploit vulnerabilities through sophisticated leakage attacks such as side channel attacks or cold boot attacks to compromise encryption keys and undermine system integrity. Without advanced, resilient protocols, the promise of IoT is put at serious risk. In addition, the corresponding protocols deployed in IoT should enjoy high computational efficiency, because the mobile terminals have weak computing power. Also, from the viewpoint of actual application, the proposed data transmission protocol should have wider universality and can be used in multiple scenarios of IoT. Therefore, to further address the above problems, we propose a general construction of a leakage-resilient data transmission protocol with multi-receiver from an identity-based hash proof system (IB-HPS) and identity-based signature (IBS) scheme. For our proposal, the unforgeability, anonymity, and confidentiality can be proved based on the security of the underlying cryptography tools. Compared with the existing protocols, our proposal has better performance, such as dynamic anonymity, leakage resilience, traceability, etc. Furthermore, to guarantee the highest levels of security and efficiency, we have developed a novel IB-HPS construction that offers continuous leakage resilience and perfect key updates. Alongside this, our new leakage-resilient IBS scheme delivers the computational efficiency essential for practical deployment in IoT networks, ensuring that security enhancements do not come at the expense of performance. Both performance analysis and security analysis show that our data transmission protocol is secure, efficient, and highly practical.
By utilizing the sensing and perception capabilities of various devices, the Internet of Things (IoT) enables more precise awareness of the real world, thereby enhancing management and resource utilization efficiency. However, due to their open deployment environments and frequent message exchanges, IoT endpoints are highly vulnerable to a wide range of security threats and privacy breaches, including forgery, data theft, and information leakage. Therefore, to address these challenges and ensure device legitimacy verification and secure data exchange among IoT devices, we propose a privacy-preserving and traceable certificateless anonymous mutual authentication scheme (PPT-CLAMA). PPT-CLAMA not only eliminates the need for a secure channel during key generation but also prevents attackers from tracing the real identity of devices through their own identity or public keys while providing pseudonym and anonymous authentication to devices, demonstrating greater practicality. Furthermore, through security proofs and analysis, PPT-CLAMA satisfies various high-level security properties, including mutual authentication, key agreement, nonrepudiation, unlinkability, perfect forward secrecy, known session-specific temporary information security, traceability, anonymity, and privacy preservation. The simulation results indicate that, compared to authentication and key agreement schemes, PPT-CLAMA reduces the average computational overhead and average communication overhead during the authentication process by 6.73% and 3.31%, respectively, demonstrating higher computational and communication efficiency.
Authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol for client–server environments is a significant cryptographic primitive that provides communication confidentiality and mutual authentication between clients and servers. In an Internet of Things (IoT) environment, clients typically employ IoT devices with limited computing capability to interact with servers through the Internet. Numerous AKE protocols suitable for IoT devices, called AKE-IoT protocols, have been proposed. Recently, side-channel attacks have been conducted to defeat traditional cryptographic protocols because a side-channel adversary can retrieve partial content of long-term or short-term secret keys. Several leakage-resilient AKE (LRAKE) protocols were presented to counteract such attacks. Unfortunately, the existing LRAKE protocols are not suitable for IoT devices because expensive pairing operations are required for client sides. In this article, we propose the first efficient LRAKE protocol suitable for IoT devices, named LRAKE-IoT. By the unbalanced computation method, no pairing operation is required for client sides in our protocol. In the generic bilinear pairing group model, security analysis is conducted to demonstrate the security of the proposed protocol in the continuous-leakage-resilient extended-Canetti–Krawczyk model. Finally, computational experiences on two IoT devices are given to show that the proposed protocol is well-suited for IoT devices.
The growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) has created many problems. A wise example is presented by the design of secure, efficient authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocols. A novel three-factor AKA protocol for the IoT is presented in this paper. The scheme integrates password, biometric, and device-based factors that achieved strong security, which gives anonymity to the user, achieves forward secrecy, and makes the scheme resilient to various attacks like replay, impersonation, and de-synchronization. It also adds a safe lost-password-reset functionality, which makes the protocol more usable. Security analysis proves its strength against the typical adversary, while performance evaluation shows that the solution is better than existing solutions in terms of computational and communication efficiency. The work proposes a practical and scalable security solution for IoT systems, which satisfies the high security standard but within the constraints of an IoT system.
With the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT), maintaining data confidentiality and protecting user privacy have become increasingly challenging. End devices in the IoT are often deployed in unattended environments and connected to open networks, making them vulnerable to physical tampering and other security attacks. Different authentication key agreement (AKA) schemes have been used in practice; several of them do not cover the necessary security features or are incompatible with resource-constrained end devices. Their security proofs have been performed under the Random-Oracle model. We present an AKA protocol for end devices and servers. The proposal leverages the ECC-based key exchange mechanism and one-way hash function-based message authentication method to achieve mutual authentication, user anonymity, and forward security. A formal security proof of the proposed scheme is performed under the standard model and the eCK model with the elliptic curve encryption computational assumptions, and formal verification is performed with ProVerif. According to the performance comparison, it is revealed that the proposed scheme offers user anonymity, perfect forward security, and mutual authentication, and resists typical attacks such as ephemeral secret leakage attacks, impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and key compromise impersonation attacks. Moreover, the proposed scheme has the lowest computational and communication overhead compared to existing schemes.
The Internet of Things (IoT) is being applied to various environments such as telecare systems, smart homes, and intelligent transportation systems. The information generated from IoT devices is stored at remote servers, and external users authenticate to the server for requesting access to the stored data. In IoT environments, the authentication process is required to be conducted efficiently, and should be secure against various attacks and ensure user anonymity and untraceability to ensure sustainability of the network. However, many existing protocols proposed in IoT environments do not meet these requirements. Recently, Rajaram et al. proposed a paring-based user authentication scheme. We found that the Rajaram et al. scheme is vulnerable to various attacks such as offline password guessing, impersonation, privileged insider, and known session-specific temporary information attacks. Additionally, as their scheme uses bilinear pairing, it requires high computation and communication costs. In this study, we propose a novel authentication scheme that resolves these security problems. The proposed scheme uses only hash and exclusive-or operations to be applicable in IoT environments. We analyze the proposed protocol using informal analysis and formal analysis methods such as the BAN logic, real-or-random (ROR) model, and the AVISPA simulation, and we show that the proposed protocol has better security and performance compared with existing authentication protocols. Consequently, the proposed protocol is sustainable and suitable for real IoT environments.
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an innovative concept aimed at offering an extensive range of applications that have become integral to our everyday existence. In recent decade, cyber-attacks are a major barrier to the adoption and development of critical infrastructure IoT systems. In this paper, we proposed a lightweight, secure, and energy-efficient authentication protocol with session key establishment. The protocol preserves user anonymity to safeguard users' privacy. We developed a multiple-factor authentication protocol in order to provide high resilience for critical infrastructures. According to security analysis, our hash-based scheme is robust against a large number of conventional and quantum computer attacks. We demonstrated our protocol outperforms the baseline mechanisms regarding computation cost, communication cost, and power consumption.