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Scientia et Fides

The Two Faces of Semi-Physicalism

Robert Charles Koons, William M. Simpson, Barbara Drossel, George Ellis

Published Oct 31, 2025• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

This paper responds to Halvorson’s reflections on hylomorphism by addressing its quantum application (Koons and Simpson) and contextually emergent physics (Ellis and Drossel). It also critiques physicalist interpretations of quantum mechanics and argues for the fundamental nature of thermodynamic phenomena. Koons, Simpson, Ellis and Drossel defend hylomorphism as a framework that challenges dogmatic semi-physicalism. They examine causal pluralism, semantic indeterminacy and the limited validity of quantum mechanics, emphasising the role of micro and macroscopic elements in shaping a consistent worldview.

DOI
10.12775/setf.2025.016

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This paper responds to Halvorson’s reflections on hylomorphism by addressing its quantum application (Koons and Simpson) and contextually emergent physics (Ellis and Drossel). It also critiques physicalist interpretations of quantum mechanics and argues for the fundamental nature of thermodynamic phenomena. Koons, Simpson, Ellis and Drossel defend hylomorphism as a framework that challenges dogmatic semi-physicalism. They examine causal pluralism, semantic indeterminacy and the limited validity of quantum mechanics, emphasising the role of micro and macroscopic elements in shaping a consistent worldview.
"In this chapter, I argue that Aristotle's doctrine of hylomorphism, which con- ceived the natural world as consisting of substances which are metaphysically composed of matter and form, is ripe for rehabilitation in the light of quantum physics. I begin by discussing Aristotle's conception of matter and form, as it was understood by Aquinas, and how Aristotle's doctrine of hylomorphism was `physicalised' and eventually abandoned with the rise of microphysicalism. I argue that the phenomenon of quantum entanglement, and the emergence of irreducibly macroscopic phenomena in nite temperature quantum systems, have given us good reasons to doubt the truth of microphysicalism. In support of my argument, I show how to construct a hylomorphic interpretation of the de Broglie-Bohm theory that posits a single Cosmic Substance. I then show how to construct a hylomorphic interpretation of an alternative `contextual' wave function collapse theory (recently proposed by the physicists Barbara Drossel and George Ellis) which posits a plurality of Thermal Substances. Both of these neo-Aristotelian ontologies reject the microphysicalist dogma that nature consists fundamentally of some set of microscopic constituents."
Abstract The neo-Aristotelian programme in natural philosophy comprises a family of theoretical frameworks that offer alternatives to quantum fundamentalism , i.e., to the metaphysical thesis that all the fundamental entities and all natural properties are represented explicitly in some model of quantum theory (whether or not supplemented by microphysical hidden variables or microphysically driven collapse mechanisms). I develop a taxonomy of possible Aristotelian interpretations of QM by considering seven choice points for quantum hylomorphism. I consider George Ellis and Barbara Drossel’s Contextual Wave Function Collapse theory, Alexander Pruss’s Traveling Forms model (Pruss 2018, 2023), and William Simpson’s Contextual Bohmian Mechanics, and locate them on this taxonomy. Finally, I take a stand (tentatively) on each of the seven choice points and suggest directions for further research.
In this chapter, I argue that Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism, which conceived the natural world as consisting of substances which are metaphysically composed of matter and form, is ripe for rehabilitation in the light of quantum physics. I begin by discussing Aristotle’s conception of matter and form, as it was understood by Aquinas, and how Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism was ‘physicalised’ and eventually abandoned with the rise of microphysicalism. I argue that the phenomenon of quantum entanglement, and the emergence of irreducibly macroscopic phenomena in finite temperature quantum systems, have given us good reasons to doubt the truth of microphysicalism. In support of my argument, I show how to construct a hylomorphic interpretation of the de Broglie-Bohm theory that posits a single Cosmic Substance. I then show how to construct a hylomorphic interpretation of an alternative ‘contextual’ wave function collapse theory (recently proposed by the physicists Barbara Drossel and George Ellis) which posits a plurality of thermal substances. Both of these neo-Aristotelian ontologies reject the microphysicalist dogma that nature consists solely of some set of microscopic constituents.
Abstract Many features of quantum mechanics (QM) suggest that, at the microscopic level, objects sometimes fail to determinately instantiate their properties. In recent years, many have argued that this phenomenon indicates the existence of an ontological kind of indeterminacy, often called metaphysical indeterminacy , which is supposed to affect the ontology of QM. As insisted by Glick ('Against Quantum Indeterminacy, 2017, Thought), however, once we look at the major realist approaches to QM we learn that the indeterminacy disappears from the description of the world at its most fundamental level. This absence might be taken as a good reason for adopting some form of eliminativism towards quantum mechanical indeterminacy. The aim of this paper is to distinguish three ways of defending eliminativism, and to argue that none of them eventually succeeds. The upshot is that QM does in fact suggest the existence of metaphysical indeterminacy, although only as an emergent phenomenon.
Abstract Metaphysicians should pay attention to quantum mechanics, but not because it provides definitive answers to many metaphysical questions. The theory itself is remarkably silent on the nature of the physical world, and the various interpretations of the theory on offer present conflicting ontological pictures. Rather, quantum mechanics is essential to the metaphysician because it reshapes standard metaphysical debates and opens up unforeseen new metaphysical possibilities. Even if quantum mechanics provides few clear answers, there are good reasons to think that any adequate understanding of the quantum world will result in a radical reshaping of our classical worldview in some way or other. Whatever the world is like at the atomic scale, it is almost certainly not the swarm of particles pushed around by forces that is often presupposed. This book guides readers through the theory of quantum mechanics and its implications for metaphysics in a clear and accessible way. The theory and its various interpretations are presented with a minimum of technicality. The consequences of these interpretations for metaphysical debates concerning realism, indeterminacy, causation, determinism, holism, and individuality (among other topics) are explored in detail, stressing the novel form that the debates take given the empirical facts in the quantum domain. While quantum mechanics may not deliver unconditional pronouncements on these issues, the range of possibilities consistent with our knowledge of the empirical world is relatively small—and each possibility is metaphysically revisionary in some way.