The ontological deficits of quantum reality
Ramón Lapiedra Civera
Departament d’Astronomia i Astrofisica. Universitat de ValenciaBefore entering into any deeper philosophical discussions,our immediate intuition is that our world is comprised of ourown consciousness, with its contents and varying states,and an outer world that is independent of our conscious-ness. Take, for example, a table and the image and idea wehave of that table. Let’s say the table is brown. Yet, what isbrown? The table, you reply, which even had it been red orgreen would still be a table. This table is also, to a greater orlesser extent, hard to the touch. So, let’s try again. What isthis hard, brown object? The very table under discussion, atall times the table, which moreover occupies a given placeand has certain dimensions. The table, that if I close my eyesdisappears from sight, but returns if I open them. This tableis the object of somebody else’s comments, (oh, that memo-rable meal we had on it one day!) and my expectations(now, I leave, but when I come back tomorrow, I know I willfind it in the same corner of the room). Yet it seems that thistable, the real table, whatever be the significance of this ass-esment, is not the brown colour I perceive, nor the tactilesensation, nor its environment, nor its apparent size in myeyes, nor the comments I have heard about it, nor the mem-ory I keep of it, nor the expectations to which it gives rise.From the beginning, it is none of these, nor can it be ac-counted for by the most complete series of characteristicsthat we might predicate. At the level of our immediate intu-ition, the table is something which is previous to this andconcerning which we can predicate all the elements in thatcomplete series. What then is the nature of this enigmaticprevious object, if such a question has any meaning?Perhaps it is worth pointing out at this point that the set ofsensations, opinions, judgements, memories, expectations,etc. in relation to the table is endowed with a certain stand-ing, structural and global existence, which is separable fromthe complete set of sensations, opinions, etc.,that constitutethe entirety of our conscious life. For example, we can pre-dict that, if standing alongside the said table, we reach out ahand, we will experience a clearly defined tactile sensation-that of touching the table; if we drum our fingers on its sur-face we will receive an unmistakeable sound sensation; if wedraw close to the table the image we have of it will grow insize, and if we move away from it, the table becomes small-er, etc., etc. So, the set of experiences in relation to the tablehas a given structure: This structure, the stable set of specif-ic experiential interrelations, forms a part of the object«table». If we were unable to perceive these interrelations, ifthe only thing we perceived was an indifferentiated magmaof table-experiences, un-separated in our inner concious-ness from the rest of our mental experiences, we would bediagnosed as suffering a clinical madness: a chaos of sen-sations devoid of the richness of distinction and order thatcaracterises our subjective lives. But, this consideration apart, the claim I am making is that the «stable set of specificexperiential interrelations» forms a part of this object. I couldperhaps take this one step further and argue that the struc-tured series of table-experiences is the very object underdiscussion. Without it, the object no longer exists and afteranalysing the object and my perception of it, as we have justdone, nothing additional has appeared. Nevertheless, ifseeking to be coherent with the result of this analysis, one at-tempts to move forward and to dissolve the object (i.e., thething for which we predicated each of the elements in the se-ries «table») within its structured series, then, it raises in ourinner consciousness the basic intuition that the object existsindependently of ourselves, that behind the above structurelies something more, without entailing that this supposed re-ality adds anything new to our experience, nor calls intoquestion our experience. We might see it as a sort of uselessunattainable ontological patch, to which we cannot, howev-er, renounce and which perhaps give us a basic reliance onour inner life.
Contributions to science•Jan 1, 1999•0 citations